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ABSTRACT
MILTON’S VISIONARY OBEDIENCE
SEPTEMBER 2011
TIMOTHY IRISH WATT, B.A., HOBART COLLEGE
M.F.A., BROWN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Joseph L. Black

This dissertation is a study of the work of John Milton, most especially of his late poems,
Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes. The early poetry, the prose
tracts, and Christian Doctrine are considered in their developmental relation to those late
poems.
The question my study addresses is this: What does Milton mean by obedience?
The critical approach used to address the question is as much philosophical-theological as
it is literary. My project seeks to understand the shaping role of Milton’s theology on his
poetry: that is, to attempt to recreate and understand Milton’s thinking on obedience from
Milton’s perspective. To this end, I focus on providing contextualized, attentive readings
of key poetic moments. The contexts I provide are those derived from the two great
heritages Milton had at his disposal—the Classical and Christian traditions. The poetic
moments I attend to are most usually theologically and conceptually difficult moments,
moments in which Milton is working out (as much as reflecting on or demonstrating or
poeticizing) his key theological concerns, chief among them, obedience.
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Milton’s concept of obedience is not just an idea developed within given
interpretive frameworks, Classical, Christian, and a specific historic context, England in
the seventeenth century. It is a strangely practical structure of being intended by Milton
to recollect something of the disposition of Adam and Even before the fall. In other
words, Miltonic obedience is multifaceted and complex. To address the complexity and
nuance of what Milton means by obedience, I suggest that Milton’s idea of obedience
may be understood as a concept. The definitional source of Milton’s concept of
obedience is the Bible, and various texts of the Classical tradition. The necessary
mechanism of the concept is Milton’s idea of right timing, derived from the Greek idea of
kairos. The necessary condition of Miltonic obedience is unknowing. With Milton’s
concept of obedience fully established, the dissertation concludes by suggesting
connections between Milton’s religious imagination and his political engagements. If
Milton’s paramount value was obedience, it was so because his paramount concern was
liberty, for himself and for his nation.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation addresses the following question: What does Milton mean by
obedience? The obvious reply—by obedience, Milton means obedience to the will of
God—is easily enough written. However, Milton’s idea of obedience is extraordinarily
complex in its conception of the will of God, of human will, and the mechanics of
obedience. Milton does not only propose obedience as an abstract ideal. He is interested
in how obedience works in the world, and how it is worked. This is the case because for
Milton obedience is not a fact, nor a static ideal, nor a law, nor a mode of rote and
submissive conduct, but a sublime concept comprised of moving, inter-dependent parts,
and intended to liberate both individuals and societies.

Method

In the service of addressing my question, the discussions I offer here tend not to comprise
conventionally extended literary readings or arguments about Milton’s writings. Instead
my project seeks to understand the shaping role of Milton’s theology (of which obedience
is the paramount value) on his poetry, from the inside as it were: that is, to attempt to
recreate and understand Milton’s thinking on obedience and related issues—chiefly
knowledge, free will, time, and interpretation—from Milton’s perspective, and in terms
of his conceptual and poetic development of these ideas. As such, I focus on providing
deeply contextualized, attentive readings of key poetic moments, especially in Paradise
Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes, and in continual reference to Milton’s
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prose works, both the political tracts and Christian Doctrine. The contexts I provide are
primarily from intellectual history, and are those derived from the two great heritages
Milton had at his disposal—the Classical and Christian traditions. The Classical and
Christian traditions served as continual sources to Milton, and importantly, as the
interpretive frameworks by which he understood the issues of his day, and the concerns
of his poetry. The poetic moments I attend to are most usually theologically and
conceptually difficult moments, because these are in my view precisely those moments in
which Milton is working out (as much as reflecting or demonstrating or poeticizing) his
key theological concerns.
My critical approach then is as much philosophical-theological as it is literary. To
understand what Milton means by obedience requires a familiarity if not a developed
understanding of the way he utilized his dual heritage—Classical, Christian—as both
source and as a dialectical, interpretive framework. In brief terms, Milton the Christian
and Milton the Classicist were in continual conversation. Despite the Son’s rejection of
Classical learning in Paradise Regained, Milton himself did not reject it. By the time
Milton came to write the late poems, he did prioritize the Christian over the Classical, but
he retained the Classical, and in critical ways, his theology derives as much from
Classical as from Biblical concepts. It is not too much to say that Milton’s lifelong
valuation of obedience is the product of his internal, lifelong conversation between those
parts of himself, Classical and Christian.
The ripe fruits of this “conversation” are Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and
Samson Agonistes. From a theological standpoint, and most particularly in reference to
his concept of obedience, Milton’s three late poems may be approached as a unified
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work, with a demonstrable thematic arc. In Paradise Lost, Milton gives us his definition
of obedience and shows us why it his paramount value; in Paradise Regained, Milton
shows us how obedience works in its perfected form; in Samson Agonistes, Milton
dramatizes what he takes to be obedience’s necessary conditions for humankind.

Background

Milton understood obedience to be the singular rule for all human conduct, his own and
others. As a poet Milton labored under and sang before this sole command. 1 He was to
be its exemplar, a bright free figure of obedience, his experience of time synchronous
with the will of God:
Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow,
It shall be still in strictest measure even
To that same lot, however mean or high,
Toward which Time leads me, and the will of Heaven;
All is, if I have grace to use it so,
As ever in my taskmaster’s eye.
(Sonnet 7 ll.9-14)
The lines are a self-authoring interpretation of the parable of the laborers in the
vineyard. 2
Milton’s concept of obedience derived from his lifelong reading of scripture.
From scripture, Milton received the Mosaic Law and Pauline conscience. As a Christian,
Milton prioritized conscience over Law, so that obedience became in his work dependent
on conscience first. His prioritization of conscience was so emphatic that it could at
times seem synonymous with his concept of obedience. This perception would be
1
2

Cf. Paradise Lost 3.94.
See Matthew 20.1-16.
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mistaken. For Milton the relationship of conscience to scripture was pragmatically about
prioritization. Fundamentally it concerned the proper alignment of conscience and
scripture, the right preparation for obedience. Further, all three—conscience, scripture,
obedience—were organized together and made coherent by the Holy Spirit. The crux of
this cohering activity Milton called “right reason” (Yale 6:132).
By the time Milton left Cambridge in 1632, he fully believed in the primacy of
obedience to divine will as the necessary human disposition, and mode of human
conduct. That is, he upheld obedience as the singular ideal. However, he had not yet
worked out exactly what he meant by obedience. Nor had he begun to formulate how to
implement it. It was a virginal concept set apart from, if not against, the world. One
could without too much hedging propose that Milton spent the rest of his life, from his
university graduation to his last fatal flare of gout, working out for himself, and then for
his nation, what he meant by obedience to divine will. The conceptual labor began in
earnest with the “Nativity Ode” (written 1629), developed with A Masque Presented at
Ludlow Castle (performed 1634), was doubted into crisis and then recovery in Lycidas
(written 1637), and culminated many years later in Paradise Lost (1667), Paradise
Regained (1671), and Samson Agonistes (1671).
In Masque and then again in Lycidas especially, Milton first confronted and was
confronted by a formidable intellectual and spiritual dilemma with regard to obedience:
How did obedience work, and what was its necessary condition/s? If obedience was, as
Milton believed following Paul, dependent on conscience, how could one prepare
conscience to be obedient? And how could one verify that his conscience was indeed
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right? 3 Milton’s first strong response to all three questions was purity, which in the
1630’s he misunderstood primarily as a narrow kind of chastity. In other words, Milton’s
first sustained formulation of purity was a misreading of chastity, aligned with obedience.
This early version of purity seemed to complete Milton’s concept of obedience by
proposing a disposition, if not exactly a mechanism, for obedience, and the condition
necessary for its flourishing. Thus, the necessary condition for obedience would be
purity, the way to prepare one’s conscience to be obedient would be to behave purely,
and the verification of right conscience would be its degree of purity. And purity
depended principally on a stern and serious chastity. 4
The crisis of doubt brought on by the seemingly random death of Edward King,
and memorialized in Lycidas—perhaps interrogated and resolved is a better way to put
it—revealed Milton’s overestimation of the Muse as he then understood it, and rendered
the masque’s version of purity a misguided frigidity, what Comus calls “a lean and
3

These questions are similar to those confronting Puritans, and their efforts at reform in the years leading
up to the Civil Wars. See A.E. Barker, Milton’s Puritan Dilemma (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1942).
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For the standard discussion of the influence of Spenserian chastity on Milton’s idea of purity, see A.S.P.
Woodhouse, “The Argument of Milton’s Comus,” in John S. Diekhoff, ed., A Mask at Ludlow: Essays on
Milton’s Comus (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), 19-41; see also Barker,
Milton’s Puritan Dilemma, 9-12, 97. For more recent discussions on the same, see Annabel Patterson,
Reading Between the Lines (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 43-50; Debora Shuger,
“‘Gums of Glutinous Heat’ and the Stream of Consciousness: The Theology of Milton’s Maske,”
Representations 60 (Autumn, 1997),1-21. See also Gordon Teskey, “From Allegory to Dialectic: Imagining
Error in Spenser and Milton,” PMLA 101.1 (1986), 9-23. For a more general, and influential discussion of
Spenser as Milton’s “dangerous precursor,” see Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975), 125-43. And for a standard discussion of the canonical pairing of Milton and
Spenser, see Annabel Patterson, “Couples, Canons, and the Uncouth: Spenser-and-Milton in Educational
Theory,” Critical Inquiry 16.4 (Summer, 1990), 773-93. Patterson argues that Spenser’s influence on
Milton has been overestimated, primarily by Christian humanist academics of the first half of the twentieth
century (she has her teachers in mind, among them A.S.P. Woodhouse). Patterson counts references —to
Spenser, Shakespeare, Jonson, and others—and finds that Spenser is the least directly alluded to. The
argument is persuasive as far as it goes, but it fails to account for the question of influence as separate from
the question of how, merely, a writer alludes to precursors. Spenser, understood as a kind of epic
monument, especially in terms of ambition, as an example of poetic reach, is what Milton had in mind
when he told Dryden that Spenser was “his true originall,” or, if Dryden was being strategically apocryphal,
what Dryden had in mind.

5

sallow Abstinence,” the product of those “budge doctors of the Stoic fur.” (Masque l.710)
(The contemporary target of Comus’ slight was severe, flesh-denying Puritans, and more
broadly perhaps Milton was targeting the version of Milton himself who aligned entirely
with the Lady, and was, in A.E. Barker’s words, “preoccupied with discipline rather than
with the fruits of discipline.”) 5 As Masque reveals, young Milton mistook the
requirements of the Muse for abstinence, still further he had mistaken the power of the
Muse, the lament at the center of Lycidas.
In response to this crisis in his poetic vocation, Milton left his study in Horton and
entered the world: he travelled to Europe, got married, and soon found himself deeply
engaged in the fray of civil dispute, war, and revolution. He dedicated the next two
decades almost entirely to polemical writing. And in that period of time, that long and
anxious complication to his poetic ambition, Milton reformulated his concept of
obedience from a static ideal to an active disposition. Over the course of the prose tracts,
and later in Christian Doctrine, he opened up his concept of obedience—he put it in the
world—and continually refined it with the means available to him. These means were
the disputes in which he was so vigorously engaged, the issues around which those
disputes were centered, and the civil wars and the revolution that followed.
The turn from studious retirement to what can fairly be described as violent
engagement, from a position of remove to the heart of the matter, transformed Milton’s
sense of himself as a poet. The prophetic identity—implicit in Milton from a young
age—became explicit in the prose tracts, and thereafter carried into the late poems. 6 The

5

Barker, 12.
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See William Kerrigan, The Prophetic Milton (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1974), 11,
167-77. As Kerrigan writes, “He [Milton] spoke as prophet, rarely of the prophet, and this belief in intimate
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turn also produced the collateral result of in effect vanquishing Milton’s closest
precursor, Spenser, as precursor, and his decisive Classical precursor, Virgil, as
precursor, while retaining their example and poetry for allusiveness. After 1640 or so,
Milton came to see himself as a prophet, whose only true precursors were Moses, the
prophets of the Old Testament, and Paul. 7 As such, Milton wrote from the high and
intuitively assumed position of supreme importance, whether in poetry or in prose.
In one of his earliest tracts, The Reason of Church Government Urged Against
Prelaty (1642), Milton identified himself with the prophet, Jeremiah, commanded by God
“to take the trumpet and blow a dolorous or a jarring blast” (Yale 1:803). In his reading
here, Milton first encourages himself with the example of Jeremiah, and then aligns
himself implicitly and almost precisely with the coming out of Jeremiah as a prophet:
If he shall think to be silent, as Jeremiah did, because of the reproach and
derision he met with daily, and all his familiar friends watcht for his
halting to be reveng’d on him for speaking the truth, he would be forc’t to
confesse as he confest, his word was in my heart as a burning fire shut up
in my bones, I was weary with forebearing and could not stay.
(Yale 1: 803)
The “he” of the passage is Milton. Milton collapses the concerns of the pamphlet—the
present and future of church government—with his own concerns—the present and future
of himself as a poet. The astonishing directness with which he does so may be described
as arrogant, humble, naive, courageous, indiscreet, boastful, merely honest, and so on,
and of course as a bewildering Miltonic combination of all of these traits. Whatever the
case, the result produces in The Reason of Church Government one of the most famous
impulse sustained through most of his life. When he spoke in public of his inner accord with God, his
language was proud and passionate—but guarded, poised, and often impenetrable. Master of the
conventions of public discourse, this man excelled in the rare art of speaking intimately before an
audience” (11, emphasis added). See also Barker, xiii.
7

See Harold Bloom, Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 93.
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passages in all of Milton’s prose. It is nothing less than a public admission and rearticulation of his poetic ambitions, and his commitment to them:
Neither doe I think it shame to covnant with any knowing reader, that for
some few yeers yet I may go on trust with him toward the payment of
what I am now indebted, as being a work not to be rays’d from the heart of
youth or the vapours of wine, like that which flows at wast from the pen of
some vulgar Amorist or the trencher fury of a riming parasite, nor to be
obtain’d by the invocation of Dame Memory and her Siren daughters, but
by devout prayer to that eternall Spirit who can enrich with all utterance
and knowledge, and sends out his Seraphim with the hallow’d fire of his
Altar to touch and pacify the lips of whom he pleases.
(Yale 1:820-21)
Critically, in this passage Milton fuses the Classical muse with the Christian God. The
fusion needs to be emphasized. It is one of the most important maneuvers Milton ever
made in his development as a poet, not least because of its revisionary effect on his
concept of obedience. By re-making his muse in the image of God, Milton made for his
poetry an indestructible source, and for himself the identity as that source’s chosen
instrument. Thus strengthened to the power of eternity, Milton’s ideals—chiefly
obedience, and its subsidiaries—were reconceived and ready for the world and all of its
abuses, obscurity, neglect, and temptations.
In Areopagitica (1644), written just two years after Reason of Church
Government, Milton articulates the transformation in his conception and approach:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d,
that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race,
where that immortall garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.
Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much
rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary.
(Yale 2: 515)
In just six years, Milton has traveled far from the “sage and serious doctrine of virginity”
of Masque, from his first sustained attempt at defining obedience in-the-world, and far
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from the “uncouth swain” he presents himself as at the end of Lycidas (l.186). As J.M.
Evans suggests, Lycidas “records Milton’s emergence from the persona of the uncouth
swain. Lycidas is one long act of disengagement.” 8 As a disengagement from a persona,
Lycidas is also Milton’s disengagement from the conceptual limitations responsible for
creating that persona. At the risk of overstatement, in Lycidas, Milton as he was in 1637,
dies to himself as a poet. As Evans writes, “The conclusion of Lycidas thus enacts in an
extraordinarily vivid way an experience analogous to, though not, I think, identical with,
the Christian conversion experience. As the old speaker fades away, a new speaker is
born.” 9 The new speaker is the Milton of the prose tracts. And this speaker becomes the
Milton of Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes, the poet of visionary
obedience, a pure concept refined not against but in all the hullaballoo Milton’s world
had to offer. If Milton’s earlier formulation of obedience faltered on a narrow and
defensive version of purity, his realized concept of obedience flourished as a nuanced and
expansive version of a disposition ready to recover something of the disposition of Adam
and Eve before the fall.

Organization

This study comprises four chapters and a conclusion. The chapters are organized in a
philosophical-theological progression in terms of Milton’s concept of obedience, and its
constituent parts. Since this progression reflects the progression Milton develops in

8

J.M. Evans, “Lycidas,” in Dennis Danielson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Milton (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 48.
9

Evans, 48.
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Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes, the chapters are also organized
to a degree chronologically. Further, each chapter provides the relevant intellectual and
philosophical foundation of that aspect of obedience with which the chapter is concerned.
The first chapter presents the scriptural foundation of Milton’s obedience, as it
appears in Christian Doctrine, and is refracted in Paradise Lost. The primary work of
this chapter is to provide Milton’s definitional understanding of obedience; that is, the
definition of obedience as an ideal that Milton derives from his reading, interpretation,
and use of scripture. In the first two sections of the chapter, I address Mosaic Law and
then Pauline conscience, and the interdependency of the two in terms of obedience. The
final section of the chapter addresses the way in which Milton reconciles Law and
conscience, by way of his refashioned concept of purity.
In the second chapter, I take up the question of knowledge—of divine knowledge,
and of human knowledge, and human knowledge of the divine—as it relates to
obedience. The chapter engages the question of the condition of knowledge before and
after the fall as it is presented in Paradise Lost. The chapter is especially focused on the
discussion of foreknowledge and predestination in Book 3. The primary intellectual
foundation provided in this chapter is the long and highly contested debate about
foreknowledge and predestination in Christian theology from Antiquity to the
Reformation, and from the Reformation to the Renaissance, and more generally, the
problem of free will and determinism in the Classical tradition. Knowing where Milton
comes down on the question of foreknowledge and predestination is critical to any
understanding of his concept of obedience, and further, to any thematic conception of his
late poems.
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In the third chapter, I focus on the temptation of the Son in Paradise Regained.
The Son resists Satan’s temptations by being perfectly obedient to the will of the Father.
His obedience is not perfect because he has complete knowledge of what is going to
happen, of the end. Instead, his knowledge is professedly incomplete. In my argument,
what makes the Son’s obedience perfect is his sense of timing, and its perfect
synchronization with the will of the Father. This right timing is the single trait of the
Son’s that Satan doesn’t understand. Milton derives his concept of right timing from the
Greek concept of kairos. So the intellectual foundation provided in this chapter is a
definition and discussion of the genesis and development of kairos in the Classical world,
along poetic and philosophical lines. Particular attention is given to the use of kairos in
Homer, Pindar, and Plato. For Milton, right timing is the decisive mechanical
characteristic of obedience after the fall.
The final chapter reads the ambiguity of Samson’s actions in Samson Agonistes as
denotative of the necessary grounds, or condition for obedience. This condition is
unknowing. The work itself dramatizes the condition of unknowing, still further, this
condition is the source of Samson Agonistes’ dramatic power. Simply put, the drama is
an interpretive dilemma not only for all the characters involved, but also for the reader.
The meaning of the work cannot be resolved with certainty, and the will of God is not
disclosed. Therefore, the meaning of Samson’s final action as it accords or not with the
will of God cannot with certainty be known. This interpretive predicament is for Milton
precisely the predicament of humankind after the fall. Milton’s solution to the
predicament is an emphasis on the necessity of choosing in a condition of unknowing. As
such, Miltonic unknowing is more than a mere recognition of the ineffability of the
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divine. Unknowing is Milton’s visionary re-figuration of the existential condition of
uncertainty into the necessary condition for obedience. The intellectual foundation of
this chapter is the theological tradition of apophasis or negative theology.
Taken together, the four chapters provide a comprehensive definition of Milton’s
concept of obedience, as an active disposition with specific requirements for its
efficacy— free will, timing, and unknowing. It is my hope that this definition of Milton’s
concept of obedience will contribute to any thematic consideration of his late poems, and
of their interrelationship.
Following from this stated hope, in the conclusion to this study I propose a way in
which this sustained meditation on Miltonic obedience can inform a similar investigation
of Milton’s concept of liberty. If Milton’s paramount value is obedience, one may
reasonably ask, to what end? Perhaps the first response would be, to the end that is
communion with God. But then, one could reasonably ask further, to what end here on
Earth, for us mortals, in our day to day existence with each other—in our intimate, social,
economic, and political lives? Milton’s response to this question—to what end, for the
sake of what?—is elegant in its simplicity, and profound in its reach. It is for the sake of
liberty.
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CHAPTER 1
LAW, CONSCIENCE, PURITY

In Apology for Smectymnuus (1642) Milton says of himself: “For I Readers, shall always
be of this opinion, that obedience to the Spirit of God, rather than to the faire seeming
pretences of men, is the best and most dutifull order that a Christian can observe” (Yale
1:937). The claim may be taken as paradigmatic. For what Milton means by
“obedience” and how he orients and prioritizes “the Spirit of God” defines his
Christianity, and is critical to any understanding of his work.
For Milton, as for any devout Christian, everything—all matter and all human and
humanly known experience—follows from the creator, thus is created. This belief speaks
to Milton’s monism, which I touch on below. 10 For now it is enough to note that Milton
sees no other possibility available to reason than monism. In Christian Doctrine, Milton
justifies his monism with scripture, relying particularly on Romans 11.36 (“from him and
through him and in him are all things”); I Corinthians 8.6 (“one God, the Father, from
whom all things are”); and Hebrews 2.11 (“for both he who sanctifies and he who is
sanctified, are all from one.”). 11
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For a discussion of Milton’s monism, see Jason P. Rosenblatt, Torah and Law in Paradise Lost
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 71-137.
11

CD (Yale 6:417). Most of Milton’s Biblical citations are verse fragments in his own translations, and
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Since all creation comes from the creator, all creation is made to be obedient to
the creator. For Milton, this requirement is an absolute rule. However, one can never be
sure if one is obeying this rule. Furthermore, obedience to the rule depends upon
conscience, the intentions of which cannot ever be explicated with certainty. In some
sense always, an impossibility of knowledge attends the relationship to the divine will,
with the sole exception of the figure of the Son. Thus Milton’s concept of obedience in
terms of humankind transpires in a kind of unknowing. As he writes in Christian
Doctrine, “We know God, in so far as we are permitted to know him, from either his
nature or his efficiency”; and “When we talk about knowing God, it must be understood
in terms of man’s limited powers of comprehension. God, as he really is, is far beyond
man’s imagination” (Yale 6:133). 12 So there is a necessary geometry to Milton’s concept
of obedience, in which individual conscience, engaged in a field of unknowing, is then
situated in an angle of relation to divine will. Take away obedience, and the geometry
collapses.
Milton’s rationale for the primacy of obedience is simple: the opposite of
obedience, disobedience, caused the fall. The fall, as Milton has it in Paradise Lost,
wrecks reason: the “being” —“discursive, or intuitive” —of the “soul,” as Raphael
describes it to Adam. 13 Without reason there can be no liberty, no virtue, no prospect of
meaning other than cursed tyranny (e.g., bad kings and awful prelates in Milton’s
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view). 14 Perhaps most strikingly, there can be no autonomy. 15 Instead, subjugation takes
the place of autonomy.
To make such a conceptual leap—from obedience to autonomy—requires a
sophisticated concept of obedience. In Milton’s case, such a leap is in large part the
reasoned outcome of a deeply engaged if highly particular interpretative relationship to
scripture. Milton’s biblical hermeneutics—that is, the way he interprets scripture for
understanding both practical and theoretical—turns upon his estimation of the role and
power of conscience. Individual conscience prepares to obey divine will through the
reading of scripture. So Milton derives his concept of obedience from his reading of
scripture, but does so by emphasizing to himself and to his readers, that scripture can
only be read properly by individual conscience.
This emphasis on conscience complicates the view of Milton’s obedience, and
provokes important questions. The first and most fundamental is: what exactly is Milton
saying about the relationship between conscience (the individual) and law (scripture)? If
he gives priority to conscience in his biblical exegesis, what does this prioritization of
conscience do to the authority of scripture as the word of God? And most fundamentally
perhaps, is Milton choosing one over or at the expense of the other? Conscience over
scripture? Conscience over law? If so, what effect would such a choice have on his
formulation of obedience? If not, what nuances of Miltonic obedience, like gossamer
threads, hold together his seemingly incompatible ideas of conscience and scripture under
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the rubric of obedience? Finally, a perhaps unsympathetic critic might ask, is Milton
simply prioritizing Milton?
Like the rabbinic commentators for whom meaning is not separate from Torah,
but is the study of Torah, so too Milton interprets scripture. 16 He interpreted scripture
throughout his life. He approached his interpretation of scripture as the foundation of his
belief, and as the devotional spiritual and intellectual practice without which intimacy
with divine will was simply not possible. Further, Milton read the Old Testament in
Hebrew, and as a tutor required his nephews to learn Hebrew so that they also could read
the scriptures “in their own original” (Of Education, Yale 2:400). According to Edward
Phillips, the tutorial also included the study of Aramaic, so that his nephews could read
the Targum Onkelos (c. 5th century CE), the first Aramaic translation and commentary of
the original Hebrew Torah, produced during the Babylonian exile. Milton leans heavily
on Mosaic Law to justify his arguments in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce,
Tetrachordon, Of Education, and Areopagitica, and just as heavily on Psalms in the
creation of his epic poetics. Simply enough, as Jason Rosenblatt calls him, Milton is “the
most Hebraic of great English poets.” 17
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More well known, and more broadly received than Milton’s Hebraism, is Milton’s
Pauline theology. In particular, Milton’s concept of obedience is radically Pauline
because it takes the implications of Paul—fundamentally, the prioritization of grace
before law—and raises them to an unassailably internal and therefore unverifiable
condition. These two characterizations of Milton—Hebraic, Pauline—do not cancel each
other out, but instead co-exist in Milton as a productive dialectic. In brief, “the Hebrew
Bible and the Pauline epistles are the principal matrices of Milton’s poetry and doctrine
respectively.” 18
It is this seemingly obvious and yet uncanny duality—Hebraic and Pauline—
which constitutes in large measure Milton’s concept of obedience, comprised of Milton’s
“extraordinary mixture of confidence and hazard—confidence in the reality of God’s
truth and the hazard of identifying that truth in the absence of any (sure) external
indication of its location.” 19 Milton’s poetic and interpretive force gives his concept of
obedience its visionary quality. Scripture provides the foundation for his concept.
Christian Doctrine—Milton’s version of Midrash—contains more than nine thousand
citations to scripture, or to put it another way, twice as many as Calvin’s Institutes. His
polemical prose is likewise filled with biblical citations, regardless of their purported
subject matter: divorce, marriage, licensing, education, Italy, the execution of kings.
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Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained function as sustained meditations on a few verses
of scripture, plumbed by Milton to what he takes to be their bright essence. Samson
Agonistes—Milton’s marriage of Hebrew and Greek, Israel and Athens, the classical and
the biblical traditions—accomplishes the Pauline feat of performing a Hellenic reading of
a quintessentially Hebrew Aggadah, and thereby creating a Christian hero, or perhaps a
tragic Christian, or perhaps versions of both. Further, all three of Milton’s major poems
derive from the Bible: Paradise Lost from Genesis, Paradise Regained from Job, Samson
Agonistes from Judges. As well, Psalms exerted a lifelong and dynamic influence on
Milton’s poetry and thought. 20 The earliest surviving English compositions we have of
Milton’s are his paraphrases of Psalms 114 and 136, written when he was fifteen years of
age, either as a grammar school exercise or perhaps at the behest of his father. Milton
included both paraphrases in his Poems (1645), with a note of explanation: “this and the
following Psalm were done by the author at fifteen years old.” 21
Milton likely included his paraphrases to demonstrate his indebtedness to Psalms,
and to situate himself as a direct poetic descendent of the psalmist. Psalms records an
emotionally comprehensive and highly subjective experience of living within, and in
accord to Mosaic Law. For Milton, as Mary Ann Radzinowicz points out, Psalms is “the
record of a journey through life traversing all the tempers, moods, passions, and uneven
reaction that mark the psalmist’s search for an adequate faith.” 22 The psalmist makes his
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“journey” in intense and continual reference to the Mosaic Law. So does Milton. As
such, to read Milton requires us to read Milton reading the conception and unfolding of
Mosaic Law, the history of responses to it as recorded in the Torah, and the revolutionary
response to Mosaic Law, Christianity.
In this chapter, I examine the scriptural foundations of Miltonic obedience,
particularly as they appear in Christian Doctrine and are redacted in Paradise Lost, as the
necessary first step in developing an understanding of and then providing a definition of
Milton’s concept of obedience. The first section of this chapter focuses on Milton and
Mosaic Law, particularly on the conceptual and collaborative development of obedience
in the Torah, in what I am calling the genealogy of response between God and Adam and
Eve, then Noah, then Abraham, and finally Moses. The second section addresses what
we might think of as Paul’s theory of conscience; the third section concerns Milton’s
synthesis of the two, in terms of obedience, into a corollary concept, purity.

Mosaic Law

In the Torah, singular nomination generates genealogy. 23 God chooses to create
humankind. He then calls into being the first man, and the calling into being of the first
man is also simultaneously the naming of him. The calling into being is the naming.
These two facets of a single act—calling and naming—constitute divine nomination. The
singularity of that nomination is that God calls into being by name, one man. However,
the rule of singularity then extends even to Adam and Eve, once Eve is called into being;
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and not just because she is created out of Adam’s rib, thus directly related to him, but
because before the fall Eve and Adam are singular together. God nominates Adam.
Then God nominates Adam and Eve. By nominating them, as first parents, he nominates
humankind. At this moment, the nomination is singular, and theoretically complete.
But the fall, from the divine point-of-view as it were, instigates the need for a new
nomination. This nomination is intended to be singular also, and on behalf of humankind
again. But, as we know, God will have to nominate repeatedly. God nominates Noah.
God nominates Abram/Abraham, and Abraham’s line. And finally, God nominates
Moses. The activity of divine nomination occurs repeatedly because of Israel’s falling
away from and transgression of divine will. Between the fall and the nomination of
Abraham, the trilogy of sinful generations pass: the generation of the flood, the
generation of the dispersion (after Babel), and the generation of Sodom. Abraham brings
the sequence of sinful generations to a halt. 24 With Moses, the Law is given and
formalized, the covenant finalized, and Israel delivered.
Taken together, the story of the generations from Adam to Moses is the story of
the formation of Israel. 25 It is the story of an evolving relationship between divine and
human. Obedience and disobedience dictate and organize the relationship. What
obedience may mean depends upon both participants, God and humankind. Degrees of
obedience, and degrees of disobedience, God’s re-visionary responses to these degrees,
and humankind’s response to these revisions characterize and describe the formation of
Israel as God’s chosen people. The relationship develops by God’s calls, and
24
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humankind’s responses. In Genesis and Exodus, humankind’s critical intimate
interactions with God may be said to constitute a genealogy of response.
The genealogy of response begins with Adam and Eve, after they have eaten of
the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, after they have failed to resist Satan’s temptation.
Their response to God is at the heart of Israel’s formation, and of the God of Israel’s
formation. Together they “hear the voice of the Lord walking in the garden in the cool of
day.” They hide from the voice. The Lord calls to Adam, “Where art thou?” (Genesis
3.9). In Paradise Lost, Milton expands and extends the moment:
‘Where art thou Adam, wont with joy to meet
My coming seen far off? I miss thee here,
Not pleased, thus entertained with solitude,
Where obvious duty erewhile appeared unsought:
Or come I less conspicuous, or what change
Absents thee, or what chance detain? Come forth.’
He came, and with him Eve, more loath, though first
To offend, discount’nanced both, and discomposed;
Love was not in their looks, either to God
Or to each other, but apparent guilt,
And shame, and perturbation, and despair,
Anger, and obstinacy, and hate, and guile.
(PL 10.103-14)
Milton, following the Latin usage of dis-, communicates in full, despairing force that
Adam and Eve have become the opposite of what they were before God. 26 Once
countenanced and composed, reflective of the divine in both looks and internal ordering,
Adam and Eve are now discountenanced and discomposed. Guilty of the first sin they
are guilty of all sins. 27 They are no longer integral by love as children of God (before the
fall they would have had no need to be integrated, since they had never been disintegrated), and they know it. Adam responds: “I heard thy voice in the garden, and I
26
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was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself” (Genesis 3.10). Rather than being
mutual and clear, their response is a befuddlement of equivocation, shame, and fear. It is
the sound, as it were, of the effects of disobedience. 28 As Milton has it, in Paradise Lost
there now can be,
No more of talk where God or angel guest
With man, as with his friend, familiar used
To sit indulgent, and with him partake
Rural repast, permitting him the while
Venial discourse unblamed: I now must change
Those notes to tragic; foul distrust, and breach
Disloyal on the part of man, revolt,
And disobedience.
(PL 9.1-8, emphasis added)
For the time being, intimacy between God and humankind is lost, and the sound of
disobedience carries. The first ten generations of humankind pass from Adam to Noah.
Disobedience mars them all. The result is a grieved and solitary divinity; not the firstperson plurality of Genesis 1 and his generating logos, but an “I” of wounded grandeur,
disappointed, unresponded to, talking to himself: “God saw that the wickedness of man
was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only
evil continually. And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it
grieved him at his heart” (Genesis 6.5-6). 29 God mourns what has been lost: the freely
willed harmonization of humankind to divine will, diapason. The mourning turns severe.
As Torah scholar Avivah Zornberg points out, in the flood narrative
[God’s] name is transformed, from the Tetragrammaton (Adonai)
to Elohim, the name of strict justice. At the moment of reversal,
strikingly, the merciful name is used, together with a decree of
doom: ‘And Adonai regretted that He had made man on earth…
Adonai said, I will blot out from the earth the men whom I created’
28
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(Genesis 6.6-7), as though a habit of mercy is being undermined
from within. And, conversely, when God remembers Noach
and ends the Flood, his name of justice, Elohim, is still used, even
as the tide turns toward mercy. 30
To the divine voice of Justice Noah responds, but dutifully and in silence.
For Milton, duty is a sad and saddening substitute for obedience, not least because
it is the intermediate form between obedience (before the fall) and subjugation (what
obedience becomes after the fall). 31 Milton’s God does not wants subjugation. In
Paradise Lost, God commands Raphael to go to Adam, and “such discourse bring on, /
As may advise him of his happy state, / Happiness in his power left free to will, / Left to
his own free will, his will though free, / Yet mutable” (5.233-37). The sentence is
instructive in its repetitions. Three iterations of “free” and of “will” are preceded by a
doubling of “happy” and succeeded by “mutable”; that is, happiness and mutability frame
free-will. The repetitions, in shifting syntax, evoke what is at stake for God with regard
to humankind’s free will. As Robert Alter and others have shown: what is at stake for
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God with regard to humankind’s free will, and the right exercise of that free will, is
God’s happiness. Further, God’s happiness appears at least in the Pentateuch to depend
not only on human obedience but also on the quality of that obedience. Milton was
particularly attuned to the distinction: any “Yes” to God that does not flow forth from a
voluntary heart is not obedience, and is therefore neither what God wants nor what God
commands.
Christ is the exemplar of this voluntary heart. In Christian Doctrine Milton
writes, “Redemption is that act by which Christ, sent in the fullness of time, redeemed all
believers at the price of his own blood, which he paid voluntarily” (Yale 6:417). In other
words, following the example of Christ—as Milton gives it in Paradise Regained—
obedience to God’s will is and must be voluntary. Milton paraphrastically interprets
Matthew 20.28 to make the point (“to give his life as a ransom for many”). 32 In doing so,
Milton describes what he takes as the essential act of Christian obedience, Christ freely
ransoming himself for the sake of humankind. The essential act begins with complete
exposure, of what we might call Christ’s radical vulnerability; it proceeds to free will,
and the power of conscious choosing; then the choice made from a position of total
exposure opens up the possibility of Christian obedience; and in its most radical form,
this Christian obedience becomes a kind of self-ransoming. The whole describes an
imitation of Christ. In order, Milton cites John 10.18 (“I have power to lay it down and
to take it up again”), Ephesians 5.2 (“he has given himself for us”), and Philippians 2.8
(“became obedient”) to support his interpretation. 33 In Paradise Regained, Milton
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dramatizes this interpretation, or interpretative redaction of the cited scripture. In
Paradise Lost, Christ first appears in the Argument to Book 3 at the right hand of the
Father, a position of literally absolute safety, from which he freely chooses total exposure
(to Satan first and foremost), and as such, articulates Christian obedience: “The Son of
God freely offers himself a ransom for man” (PL 3, Argument). To put it another way, to
redeem humankind the Son becomes the originary volunteer, the exemplar of obedience.
He is the exemplar of obedience, not least because although the Father does not explicitly
disclose his will, and the Son does not have foreknowledge of the Father’s will, he knows
it in time, or his knowing of it is a knowing of timing: he knows it right when he needs to
know it. The example belongs to humankind.
As Raphael says to Adam in Book 5:
Attend: that thou are happy, owe to God;
That thou continu’st such, owe to thyself,
That is, to thy obedience; therein stand.
This was that caution giv’n thee; be advised.
God made thee perfect, not immutable;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power, ordained thy will
By nature free, not overruled by fate
Inextricable, or strict necessity;
Our volunteer service he requires,
Not our necessitated, such with him
Finds no acceptance.
(PL 5.520-31, emphasis added)
Reading Genesis 6 through the lens of Paradise Lost 5.520-31, what suggests itself is an
amplification of God’s grief, as sorrow, and a personification of it, as divine bitter-
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sweetness, manifested in his repeated nomination of humankind. God wanted obedience
and volunteers, he gets duty and the dutiful. 34 The genealogy of response is not done. At
the time of the flood and the subsidence of the flood, there seems no other option for God
but to establish the bond of obedience in its denigrated form, that is, the bond of duty.
The divine reasons for accepting and establishing the bond of duty appear to be
driven by 1) divine regret, and 2) divine nostalgia. What leads to these, and to the
subsidence of the flood, is divine remembrance, or perhaps more properly, divine
recollection: “And God remembered Noah, and every living thing, and all the cattle that
was with him in the ark: and God made a wind to pass over the earth, and the waters
assuaged” (Genesis 8.1). Although the attribution of ostensibly human attributes (e.g.,
regret, nostalgia, remembrance) to God may appear unorthodox, in Christian Doctrine
Milton develops a scripturally-based justification for it, based upon the concept of
anthropopatheia. 35 The passage is long, but is worth quoting in full:
We ought not to imagine that God would have said anything or caused
anything to be written about himself unless he intended that it should be a
part of our conception of him. On the question of what is or what is not
suitable for God, let us ask for no more dependable authority than God
himself. If Jehovah repented that he had created man, Gen. vi. 6, and
repented because of their groanings, Judges ii. 18, let us believe that he
did repent. But let us not imagine that God’s repentance arises from lack
of foresight, as man’s does, for he has warned us not to think about him in
this way: Num. xxiii. 19: God is not a man that he should lie, nor that son
of man that he should repent. The same point is made in I Sam. xv. 29. If
34
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he grieved in his heart Gen. vi. 6, and if, similarly, his soul was grieved,
Judges x.16, let us believe that he did feel grief. For those states of mind
which are good in a good man, and count as virtues, are holy in God. If it
is said that God, after working for six days, rested and was refreshed,
Exod. xxxi. 17, and if he feared his enemy’s displeasure, Deut. xxxii.27,
let us believe that it is not beneath God to feel what grief he does feel, to
be refreshed by what refreshes him, and to fear what he does fear. For
however you may try to tone down these and similar texts about God by
an elaborate show of interpretive glosses, it comes to the same thing in the
end. After all, if God is said to have created man in his own image, after
his own likeness, Gen. i. 26, and not only his mind but also his external
appearance (unless the same words mean something different when they
are used again in Gen. v. 3: Adam begot his son after his own likeness, in
his own image), and if God attributes to himself again and again a human
shape and form, why should we be afraid of assigning to him something
he assigns to himself, provided we believe that what is imperfect and weak
in us is, when ascribed to God, utterly perfect and utterly beautiful? We
may be certain that God’s majesty and glory were so dear to him that he
could never say anything about himself which was lower or meaner than
his real nature, nor would he ever ascribe to himself any property if he did
not wish us to ascribe it to him. Let there be no question about it: they
understand best what God is like who adjust their understanding to the
word of God, for he has adjusted his word to our understanding, and has
shown what kind of an idea of him he wishes us to have. 36
(Yale 6.135-36)
After the flood has subsided, Noah offers a burnt offering to the Lord. Here, to avail
oneself as Milton did to the emotive power of the moment, one must remember the
apocalyptic trauma, and the terrible loneliness Noah has just experienced. He has
witnessed more than genocide; he has witnessed a world-ending, and the Lord authored
it. Now Noah exits the ark, but only reluctantly, and not in strict accordance with God’s
commands. 37 He builds an altar and offers his sacrifice. His sacrifice affects the Lord:
“And the Lord smelled a sweet savour; and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again
curse the ground anymore for man’s sake; for the imagination of man’s heart is evil from
36

Cf. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 93: “Therefore in the consideration of figurative expressions a
rule such as this will serve, that what is read should be subjected to diligent scrutiny until an interpretation
contributing to the reign of charity is produced.”
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Cf. Zornberg, 54; and Rashi to Genesis 9.9.
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his youth; neither will I again smite any more every living thing, as I have done”
(Genesis 8.21). God allows himself to be moved. Once moved, God renews the
covenant.
In other words, it may be said that the concept of obedience develops
collaboratively by nomination (divine) and response (humankind) over the course of the
Torah, from Adam to Moses. First God gave Adam and Eve freedom and bounty, and a
single prohibition. With Noah, God re-institutes a version of the Edenic law; this time he
establishes a covenant, based again on freedom and bounty, and on prohibition. With the
Noahide covenant, however, there appear to be two prohibitions, the first against
cannibalism, the second against murder. Both prohibitions, although ambiguous enough
to afford differing interpretations, provide substantially more concrete definitions of
content than the mysterious and single prohibition of the Edenic law. No matter. Noah
responds by planting a vineyard. It is the first thing he does after the covenant. Then he
gets drunk and passes out. 38 Unspeakable shame follows, and out of it, as out of awful
ground, grows the Tower of Babel. 39
At this moment in Genesis human will is striving to make a name equal to God’s,
and is doing so out of a fear of dispersion, certainly of annihilation. The memory of the
flood remains. The memory of the Lord’s wrath remains. And the quality of
humankind’s fear—of God—is not reverential, but terrified. As such, humankind builds
the tower, not to worship God, but to protect itself from God. The difference—the
distinction—means everything from a theological perspective. Humankind’s interactions
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For a discussion of the implications of the vineyard, the timing of its planting, and of Noah’s
drunkenness, see Zornberg, The Murmuring Deep: Reflections on the Biblical Unconscious, 56-67.
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See Genesis 9-11.
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with divine will depend on it, and as the evolving story of Genesis and Exodus relates, so
too does God’s interactions with humankind.
For Milton, the way that humankind generates meaning and interprets experience
for meaning depends on the character of humankind’s awe, and following, its obedience.
The one possibility—worship of God—involves choice, which in turn is the act of Godgiven reason. “Reason is but choosing,” Milton writes in Areopagitica (Yale 2:526). In
Paradise Lost he makes them synonymous, “Reason also is choice” (PL 3.108). 40
Further, as Nigel Smith has pointed out, both phrases are reworkings of a phrase from the
earlier Of Education: “By this time, years and good general precepts will have furnished
them more distinctly with that act of reason which in ethics is called proaresis, that they
may with some judgment contemplate upon moral good and evil” (Yale 2:397).
The other possibility (exemplified by the Tower of Babel)—which might variously be
characterized as fear of God, fearful antagonism with God, as agon with God—can have
only disastrous consequences. Milton’s Satan summarizes them all.
So God’s nostalgia for Adam and Eve indicates his now “impossible” longing for
humankind before the fall. The longing is “impossible” because it cannot be satisfied; it
cannot be satisfied because the fall cannot be taken back. Since the fall cannot be taken
back—since it is existent, now and forever—an approximation must be devised. God reestablishes a covenantal relationship with humankind, the Noahide covenant.
Of the Noahide covenant, an important distinction must be made: as Robert Alter has
noted, “This is a pledge that God makes to Himself, not out loud to Noah…The silent
promise in God’s interior monologue invokes no external signs, only the seamless cycle
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Cf. PL 5.486-87.
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of the seasons that will continue as long as the earth.” 41 In other words, God does not
disclose his will to Noah until after he has set the commands, and the prohibition. Here
the silence of God’s intentions will have profound implications generally on all future
Judeo-Christian understandings of and relationships to divine will, and specifically on
Milton’s understanding of divine will.
With the Noahide covenant, the mystery of divine will takes on a second aspect.
The first aspect is the sheer incomprehensibility of God, the creator, as apparent in the
first book of Genesis (this is the God knowable by his energies—that is creation—but
unknowable in his essence, the God Milton justifies to men in Paradise Lost). 42 The
second aspect is now the unknowability of God’s intentions toward and with humankind,
that is, the unknowability of divine will in terms of its divine motives, in its relations with
humankind. From the covenant with Noah onward, God’s unknowability is thus doublefold, and, as I demonstrate in the final chapter, is the necessary condition for Miltonic
obedience. 43
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Alter, The Five Books of Moses, 49.
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Cf. CD (Yale 6:133): “We know God, in so far as we are permitted to know him, from either his nature
or his efficiency.”
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For a good discussion of Milton and the unknowability of God, see Noam Reisner, Milton and the
Ineffable (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). I use the term “unknowable” to indicate that my
understanding of the concept derives principally from, and is fairly strictly in accord with, the religious
tradition of apophasis, and therefore should be understood primarily in its theological valence. Reisner uses
the term “ineffable” to indicate that although his concept should also be understood theologically, his
concept takes in and is in some ways developed against Lacan, and Lacan’s idea of the “real” and Derrida’s
“there is nothing outside of the text.” See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), x; and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivack (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158. Although different, both our
terms are meant to emphasize the theological. As Reisner writes: “My use of the term ‘ineffable’, therefore,
is confined to its religious theist uses which, while in themselves potentially having recourse either to
positive or negative expression, ultimately proceed from the axiomatic assumption that God exists and that
his existence is something about which nothing can be said using ordinary language, except through
negation” (5). In the final chapter of this dissertation, on unknowability in Samson Agonistes, I take up
Reisner’s claims more vigorously, and in some places, I am in clear debt to those claims.
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Further, the inward turn that God makes, God’s interiorizing of God’s divinity, is
an instructive example for Milton: for Milton God’s will is knowable only within
individual conscience, becomes that which can only be heard in and by one’s conscience.
(It is for this reason that hearing is such an important motif in Paradise Lost, Paradise
Regained, and Samson Agonistes, and in his prose tracts and earlier poems.) 44 To give
one example: in Reason of Church Government, Milton quotes from the Book of
Jeremiah (“His word was in my heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones”) to situate
himself in a God-ordained destiny for which the culmination will be the writing of his
great epics against the “timorous and ingratefull” he would otherwise “heare within my
selfe” (Yale 1:804). Instead by dint of hearing of God’s “Secretary conscience” (Yale
1:822), Milton will become the epic poet of God and England:
Neither doe I think it shame to covnant with any knowing reader,
that for some few yeers yet I may go on trust with him toward the payment
of what I am now indebted, as being a work not to be rays’d from the heat
of youth or the vapors of wine, like that which flows at wast from the pen
of some vulgar Amorist or the trencher fury, of a riming parasite, nor to be
obtain’d by the invocation of Dame Memory and her Siren daughters, but
by devout prayer to that eternall Spirit who can enrich with all utterance
and knowledge, and sends out his Seraphim with the hallow’d fire of his
Altar to touch and pacify the lips of whom he pleases.
(Yale 1:820-21)
Milton will become the vatic poet because of his obedience to God as revealed in
conscience, heard rightly.
In the story of Noah, God takes the inward turn. Thereafter the obedient must
take the inward turn. (Beginning with A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle in 1634,
Milton pushes the idea of inwardness so far it becomes almost illegible. The Lady is
Milton’s first exemplar of this kind of obedience, entirely inwardly construed, and only
44

Cf. Luke 11.28: “Yea, rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God, and keep it.”
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inwardly verifiable.) 45 Once God has established in the silence of his heart his covenant
with Noah, he instructs Noah and his sons. The instructions are more than a mere echo of
those God gave to Adam and Eve; they are synonymous. So the genealogy of response is
in this case at least dramatically iterative. Genesis 1.28 begins, “And God blessed them,
and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.” Genesis 9
begins, “And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful, and
multiply, and replenish the earth.” The first sentence communicates what seem to be
God’s central concerns with regard to humankind: free will and obedience, concerns that
Milton takes up as his own. The exact reiteration of the sentence verifies the ongoing
primacy of these concerns to God. The genre of instruction indicates the theme of
obedience; the open-ended content of the instruction indicates the theme of free will.
The two passages follow the same formal pattern. In both instances, command
follows blessing, and command in turn is followed by prohibition. Critically, over the
course of the two passages it becomes clear that Milton’s monism, conventionally
understood to be a species of heresy, is founded in scripture, and furthermore, is a
necessary material condition for obedience. The “single prohibition” of the first book of
Genesis, what Milton calls “one easy prohibition” in Paradise Lost (4.433), becomes in
the ninth book of Genesis an unsettling iteration of that first “one easy prohibition.” And
the smallest change to the “prohibition” changes obedience. With the Noahide covenant,
God re-enacts a version of the first covenant in a moment of divine re-visionary effort:
“But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat” (Genesis
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See the introduction for my discussion of Masque and obedience.
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9.4). 46 (This prohibition also corresponds directly to the silent, subsidiary prohibition
against eating meat found in Genesis 1.29-30.) A relation between the fruit of the
forbidden tree and human flesh suggests itself; and the prohibition of the Noahide
covenant becomes the term with which to retroactively read the Edenic covenant.
Further, as the prohibition develops the dynamic relation between the two covenants
develops. Just as the dietary restrictions have been modified in the Noahide covenant,
and therefore the quality of the prohibition, so too has the stated punishment for
transgressing the prohibition, although to a less obvious degree. In the Edenic covenant,
God declared the punishment for breaking the prohibition to be death (Genesis 2.17). In
the Noahide covenant, the sentence becomes obscure in both its threats and its announced
effects. The sentence is simple in Eden: Do this one thing I tell you not to do and you
will die. (Perhaps the fact that Adam and Eve broke the prohibition and did not die serves
as a dark influential memory in the mind of God, when it comes time to establish the
prohibition with Noah and Noah’s sons.) Death is in the Noahide prohibition but less
obviously: “And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast
will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man’s brother will I require
the life of man” (Genesis 9.4). At this point the sentence corresponds to the prohibition
against cannibalism. But then, it is as if in the silent space between verse five and verse
six, the divine will meditates on both prohibition and sentence, perhaps recollecting
Eden, and in verse six, the sentence is amended and intensified: “Whoso sheddeth man’s
46

In the first book of Genesis God commands Adam and Eve to be vegetarians, as it were: “And God said,
Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in
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book of Genesis, the dietary restrictions have changed: “Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for
you; even as the green herb have I given you all things” (Genesis 9.3). I have neither the space here nor the
exegetical expertise to expand on this revision of dietary restriction, particularly as it pertains to the
character of the prohibitions; for a good discussion, see Alter, The Five Books of Moses, 50, n.1-7 and 6.
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blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man” (Genesis
9.6). The amended sentence carries with it—begins with—an amendment to the initial
prohibition (against cannibalism): the shedding of blood is now part of the prohibition.
With this amendment, the Noahide prohibition is complete, and an exegetical instrument
with which to read (to read back into) the Edenic covenant, and its “one easy
prohibition.” Doing so indicates a living relation between the Image of God (man), man
as human (as mortal flesh), and the fruit of the forbidden tree. What was prohibited in
the Edenic covenant becomes lifeblood in the Noahide covenant, the animating force for
the image of God. Thus, what is prohibited is the ingesting of or otherwise assaulting of
divine substance, whether material or metaphorical, bodied or mind. For Milton, the
result of any such transgression is endlessly disastrous, the fall:
So saying, her rash hand, in evil hour
Forth reaching to the fruit, she plucked, she ate:
Earth felt the wound, and Nature from her seat
Sighing through all her works gave signs of woe,
That all was lost.
(PL 9.780-84, emphasis added)
Milton’s meaning derives precisely from the Hebrew Scriptures, in which the distinction
between matter and spirit is a conceit of language at most—the world is God’s, the ways
of speaking about it are God’s also. Milton takes the lesson entirely. To Milton, logos is
flesh, flesh is itself as metaphorical, the littlest leaf is a soul-bearing attribute of God, and
the briefest abstraction, the substance of God also. In Christian Doctrine, Milton writes:
“Man is not double or separable: not, as is commonly thought, produced from and
composed of two different and distinct elements, soul and body. On the contrary, the
whole man is the soul, and the soul the man: a body, in other words, or individual
substance, animated, sensitive, and rational” (Yale 6:318).
34

With regard to matter and spirit, to substance, Milton’s thinking is, as Gordon
Teskey and others have shown, remarkably similar to Spinoza’s “substance monism.” 47
Briefly, for Spinoza there are substances and there are modes. Ultimately, all substance
can be referred to as one substance. This one substance is, necessarily, God. The
conclusion Spinoza draws, philosophy terms “necessitarianism”: “the actual world with
its one substance is the only possible world.” Since God is, in Spinoza’s system, the only
substance, then, as substance, God and world are synonymous: Deus sive Natura. Modes
may be considered as properties, potential or actual, of substance. 48 Modes then, are of
substance. That is, substance understood as mind, and modes understood as bodies, are
indivisible; so Spinoza’s theory of Substances and Modes provides a solution to mindbody dualism, a dualism Spinoza finds spiritually false and philosophically repellent, a
deep and troubling misapprehension of truth.
Milton agrees. As Arthur Barker wrote almost seventy years ago in Milton and
the Puritan Dilemma, “Dualism was unpalatable to one whose highest delight was the
integration of form and substance in poetry.” 49 In other words, and in the briefest terms,
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Samuel Newlands, “Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Milton’s poetry was matter, at least to him, as was the soul that made it. Again, from
Christian Doctrine: “Nearly everyone agrees that all form—and the human soul is a kind
of form—is produced by the power of matter” (Yale 6:322). Matter makes and is spirit, a
lesson learned from the book of Genesis, from the Edenic and the Noahide covenant most
specifically, and also of course from the life, death and resurrection of Christ. For
humankind, set in such a world, all hope of obedience to the divine will and the liberty
that according to Milton comes from obedience to the divine will, depends upon the
refutation of dualism, and upon the right recognition of what we might think of as
mattering spirit, or spirited matter, all derived from “one first matter all,” as Milton
names it in Paradise Lost:
O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Endued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life.
(PL 5.469-74, emphasis added)
It is clear that the likeness between Milton’s theory of “one first matter all” and
Spinoza’s “substance monism” is almost uncannily exact. However, Milton and Spinoza
arrive at their theories from different directions, from different starting points. As Teskey
writes:
In general, philosophical systems develop either from the outside in or
from the inside out; from speculations about the universe to theories about
man, or from speculations about man to theories of the universe; and
Milton, as perhaps befits a poet, followed the latter course. Milton did not
decide how the cosmos is put together and then follow through
consistently with a theory of humanity that fits into that cosmos. He
decided first, from scripture, and from his own experience as a poet, what
he thought about Man. Only then did Milton determine, under the
universe ‘was formed from nothing,’ and insisted that ‘the original matter’ was intrinsically good, and the
chief productive stock of every subsequent good,’ since it was ‘of God and in God.’”
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guidance of logic, what he thought about the universe. We might say that
he was an anthropic rather than a cosmological thinker. 50
After Noah gets drunk and is in some deeply shameful way trespassed against by
his son, Ham, humankind falls to disobedience again, again for another ten generations.
The thematic and numerical similarities between the Edenic and Noahic suggest the revisionary efforts of the divine. In the first response, God nominated Adam and Eve. In
the second response, with its iterative but altered prohibition, God nominated Noah.
Dispersion follows the Tower of Babel: the “lord scattered them abroad from thence upon
the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11.8). And then Genesis 12 begins with God’s third
nomination. It is of Abram, “Terah’s faithful son,” to recall Milton’s youthful rendering.
And Abram’s response—the third in this genealogy of response—begins like Noah’s, as
wordless consent. The Lord commands Abram to “get thee out of thy country, and from
thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, unto a land that I will shew thee.” For Abram
then, the journey begins in unknowing, and is divinely stipulated as a journey in the
unknown (thematically, Abraham’s journey in the unknown reaches its terrifying,
singularly radical conclusion at Mount Moriah, in the eternal instant following Abram’s
preparation to sacrifice his beloved son, and before God’s reprieve of his command for
Abraham to do so). Abram consents. His status as father of Israel follows firstly from
his dauntless consent, and his adherence to it over the course of his journey. Genesis 14
begins with the Battle of the Kings and ends with King Melchizedek’s blessing of
Abram, after Abram has saved Lot: “Blessed be Abram of the most high God, possessor
of heaven and earth” (Genesis 14.19). And Abram replies: “I have lift up mine hand unto
the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth” (14.22).
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At this moment and silently, as if lighting the words from below, Abram’s humble
praise to God—it is God who saved Lot, not I—reestablishes intimacy between the divine
and humankind. Wandering becomes being-found, and the journey in the unknown is
revealed as a walk in the palm of God. So Genesis 15 begins: “The Lord came unto
Abram in a vision, saying, Fear not, Abram: I am thy shield, and thy exceeding great
reward” (15.1). Here Abram begins to become Abraham, which is also a way of saying,
he ceases to be prefigured by Noah. Noah’s response to God from his nomination to his
death was wordless, and possibly merely duty. But Abram, unlike Noah before him,
responds to the Lord, and his response is freely willed: “And Abram said, Lord God,
what wilt thou give me, seeing I go childless?” (15.2). The solely vertical relationship
between God and humankind, of straight-down command to straight-up duty, becomes
something eminently more nuanced and geometric, vertical, angular, even in moments
perhaps, surprisingly horizontal. To put it another way, the relationship becomes dialogic
between divine will and free will, as the work of human obedience is discovered to be
necessarily a work of collaboration, a fact learned both by God and by Abram. God
nominated Abram, Abram responded, and in his devoted, freely willed and questioning
responses to God, Abram articulated the first obedience. So God nominated him again,
this time as Abraham, the “father of nations.”
Abraham’s obedience to God serves as the model for Moses’ obedience to God,
the fourth and culminating response in the genealogy of responses. Thus, it functions as
the precedent for the giving of the Law. It also establishes the durable heritage, that
heritage—a promise—which will sustain Israel throughout its exile. On his deathbed,
Joseph in Egypt says to his brethren: “God will surely visit you, and bring you out of this
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land unto the land which he swore to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob” (Genesis 50.25).
In other words, he forecasts the exodus.
The story of the exodus has as its locus the life of Moses, an orphan found on the
banks of the Nile, who was raised in Egypt by the Pharaoh’s daughter, and chosen by
God as God’s agent. God speaks first to Moses through the burning bush. Moses hides
his face; God calls Moses, “Moses, Moses. Here am I” (Exodus 3.4). And a few verses
later, “behold, the cry of the children of Israel is come unto me” (Exodus 3.11). The first
three words of Moses’ response “Who am I” give back to God God’s self-definition—
Here am I—the syntax and the sound, but figured into questioning; not I am, but who. To
mix senses if not metaphors, Moses’ response is an image of the Lord’s, with a single
difference: the Lord has omniscience; Moses has wonder. From a theological
perspective, the response is paradoxically a concise and vibratory unknowing: question
(who), ontological status (am), person (I), and is precisely the only response God desires.
For God’s answer to Moses and then to all God’s chosen people, is: You are mine, bound
to me. The Law, given to Moses at Mount Sinai, is the full, realized expression of the
bond. And obedience to it—the dialogic obedience of Abraham, the dialectic and
interventional obedience of Moses—is the one and only reply to the Law. Milton took
the medium, if not the message, entirely.

Pauline Conscience

With Moses, human obedience to divine will was given its summary expression as Law.
The introduction of “conscience” by Paul’s epistles provides Milton his means to read the
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Law. Milton takes the irruptive force of Pauline conscience, the timing of that irruption,
and its revolutionary interpolation of Mosaic Law, with complete seriousness. In his own
reading of the Law, he re-enacts the irruption: Milton reads the Law, then Milton reads
Pauline conscience, then Milton reads Pauline conscience reading the Law; then he
retraces its interpolative extension from Moses’ reception of the Law to the recapitulation
of that receptive moment in individual conscience; then, Milton embodies the dialectic of
the Law and conscience, and follows this dialectic to its extreme, almost unsustainable,
and yet rigorously logical outcome. Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson
Agonistes, taken together, are the document and expression of this process. Samson
Agonistes is its logical outcome.
It may be said that Milton’s use of conscience speaks to his antinomianism.
However, if Milton’s theology was indeed antinomian, the foundation of all his
theological thinking was the Bible. 51 Thus, even though Milton prioritizes individual
conscience over any outside expression of God’s law—he writes in The Doctrine and
Discipline of Divorce, “wee cannot safely assent to any precept writt’n in the Bible, but
as charity commends it to us” (Yale 2:340)—Milton’s understanding of individual
conscience is oriented by his ongoing reading of scripture. 52 It follows then that Milton’s
understanding of free will and obedience derives in large part from his reading of
scripture, in this case, from his reading of the Psalms and of Genesis and Exodus, and
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from his re-visionary reading of Genesis and Exodus back through Psalm 114. 53 It is as
Barbara Lewalski has shown that Milton did indeed define true religion as the
“acceptance of scripture alone as the rule of faith, interpreted by the private conscience as
informed by the Spirit’s illumination.” 54
Lewalski’s order of presentation (scripture, conscience, Spirit) should not be
mistaken for Milton’s order of priority. In Milton’s order of priority, the sentence should
read something like: The Spirit illuminates (informs) private conscience, and private
conscience, once illuminated, may then interpret scripture; and the whole activity may be
understood as the rule of faith. The crux of this activity Milton calls “the phenomenon of
Conscience, or right reason,” that which receives the Holy Spirit and then reads the Word
by the light of the Holy Spirit (CD, Yale 6:132). 55 For Milton, such an understanding of
conscience comes directly from Paul’s epistles. More to the point, Milton’s concept of
conscience is Paul’s concept of conscience, which in turn is a redaction and interpretation
of Jesus’ teachings on individual conscience, and a reformulation of both Stoic and
Judaic ideas.
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“Conscience” appears nowhere in Hebrew scripture, nor in any of the formative
or medieval commentaries on the Torah. The term is Hellenistic: syneidesis. Although
syneidesis bears some relationship to the Stoic concept of the same name, it should not be
confused with it. For the Stoic, syneidesis meant apprehension of the lex naturalis, and
living morally in accord with lex naturalis. For Paul, a Roman citizen, educated Jew of
the Diaspora, brought up in the Greek-speaking city of Tarsus, lex naturalis was
insufficient as praxis, and false in essence. 56 As Guy Nicholls notes, “Conscience in St.
Paul is always related to God as the hearing of His word, the acceptance of His will,
consciousness of one’s own position, and one’s own responsibility before God, and
therefore, ultimately of Divine judgment.” 57 In other words, Paul’s concept of
conscience was influenced by the Stoic concept, but “wholly translated into Christian
terms.” 58
Having said this, the concept that syneidesis denotes does correspond to a notable
degree with the concept that leb (“heart”) denotes in Hebrew scripture, e.g, “O that there
were such an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments
always, that it might be well with them, and with their children forever!” (Deuteronomy
5.29). 59 So, as Rudolf Schnackenburg, the twentieth-century theologian, wrote, “In
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speaking of conscience Paul was only giving us a definite name for something that had
been known both to Old Testament Judaism and to Jesus.” 60
That “something known,” articulated as heart, as syneidesis, as conscientia, as
conscience, speaks to the individual’s faculty of discernment, of judgment. This faculty
is predicated on the idea of self-consciousness, and in turn it contributes to the
description and formation of self-consciousness. In Hebrew, the “heart” refers to the
essence of the self, known only by the Lord, and knowable only by the Lord. In its real
form, the essence of the self is the seat of motive. In its ideal form, the essence of the self
would be wisdom, for Milton the complete synchronicity of human will with divine will,
what Paul terms simply enough “good conscience,” and Milton, “conscience” and “pure
conscience.”
In Romans especially, Paul develops and articulates his (perhaps, the) Christian
theory of conscience. It is considered the most influential of Paul’s epistles for precisely
this reason, and according to Joseph Fitzmyer, has affected “Christian theology more than
any other New Testament book.” 61 In his commentary on Romans (c.246 CE)—the
oldest surviving commentary—Origen suggests, “by way of a preface what is usually
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observed by the diligent, that the Apostle seems to have been more perfect in this letter
than in the others.” 62 Augustine, on the lip of conversion, recounts that “with avid
intensity I seized on the sacred writings of your Spirit and especially the apostle Paul.” 63
But conversion does not thereafter immediately occur. Backsliding, into lust
predominantly, sinks Augustine to despair. Book VIII, “The Birthpangs of Conversion,”
recounts the despair, and then the conversion. Paul, again, plays a critical role.
Augustine, “weeping in the bitter agony” of his heart, suddenly hears a child’s voice
singing, “‘pick up and read, pick up and read.’” 64 Augustine receives the lyric as a
“Divine command to me to open the book and read the first chapter I might find.” 65 The
book in question is Romans, present at the very moment of Augustine’s conversion, and
scripturally speaking, responsible for it. 66
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Paul exercised a similarly formidable influence on Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).
According to Jean-Pierre Torrell, the pre-eminent Thomist scholar of the twentieth
century:
When it comes to the Christo-forming character of grace, the connection
with St. Paul is clear: Thomas merely states in theological language what
He finds in the Pauline epistles. The same thing can be said for the theme
of the imitation of Christ, the theology of the Holy Spirit, and the relationship between law and grace. 67
In his commentary on Romans, Aquinas interprets the epistle exhaustively and
persuasively as Paul’s development of grace, as priority, and as doctrine. 68
During the Reformation, Luther, Erasmus and Calvin all wrote commentaries on
Romans. The same year that Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the Castle
Church in Wittenburg, Erasmus published his Paraphrase on Romans. His Annotations,
complete notes and commentary on his translation of the New Testament, came out in
five editions between 1516 and 1535. In Annotations to the Romans, a typically copious
Erasmian production, Erasmus identifies Paul’s critical intention: “For the blessed Paul’s
chief concern in this letter is to take away from both groups their pride: to deprive the
Jews of their confidence in the law of Moses and the Greeks of their security in
philosophy, and consequently to unite both groups on an equal basis in Christ.” 69 For
just these reasons, Luther called Romans “the most important piece in the New
67
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Testament. It is purest Gospel.” 70 Similarly, Calvin writes of “the height [Paul] reaches,
the profundities he reveals, the strength he exhibits.” 71 And as William Bouwsma has
pointed out, Calvin “compared his own calling to that of Paul.” 72 Of all Paul’s Epistles,
Calvin considered Romans the most important, and he goes so far as to suggest that in a
functional sense it is the most important book of the New Testament: “When any one
understands this Epistle, he has a passage opened to him to the understanding of the
whole Scripture.” 73 To this end, Calvin cites Romans 486 times in Institutes of the
Christian Religion; only Psalms is cited more. Milton follows suit in Christian
Doctrine. 74 There are 582 citations to Romans. Only the Gospels of Matthew and John
are cited more. 75
At the heart of Romans is the paradoxical relationship between law and
conscience, scripture and inwardness. Paul announces this paradox in the first chapter.
After characterizing himself as a “debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians; both
to the wise, and to the unwise,” Paul declares that he is ready “to preach the gospel to you
that are at Rome also” (Romans 1.14-15). Two verses later, he announces the paradox:
“For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The
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just shall live by faith (1.17, emphasis added). In other words, as scripture commands, the
just shall live by that which cannot be publicly verified (faith). With this, Paul has
planted the seeds for his theory of conscience. 76
Central to the theory is the priority of faith over law. In the next chapter, Romans
2, Paul establishes this priority, beginning at verse eleven. The verse announces a new
and universal dispensation in which tribal preferment to the divine no longer has any
place: “For there is no respect of persons with God” (2.11). Here, in a single sentence,
Paul both associates all humanity with God, and levels all humanity with respect to
God. 77 In the development of Christian theology, this is a crucial moment. By
associating all humanity with God, Paul lessens the authority of the law, both secular and
religious, the law of Rome, and the law of Torah. With regard to secular law, to the law
of Rome, if all people are potential or actual associates of the divine, than all people are
subject to a higher law, and not merely to that of a Pantheon which reflects and reinforces
civic authority and civic authority’s flaws. With regard to the Torah, if all people are
potential or actual associates of the divine, than the Torah can only be a partial law,
76
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applying as it does to Israel only. Taken together, these two responses to law diminish
the generic authority of law. Law itself becomes understandable only in relation to some
other authority. As such, law becomes a relative rather than an absolute authority, and
adherence to the law becomes at best a relative rather than an absolute indicator of
conscience.
Paul emphasizes this shift in the following three verses. Notably, in both the
Authorized Version and the Geneva Bible, verses 13-15 are presented as a parenthetical
between verse 12 (“For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law:
and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law”) and verse 16 (“In the
day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel”).
In other words, verse 12 and verse 16 are two parts of a complete sentence, which taken
together read: “For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law: and
as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law; in the day when God shall
judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.” The first part of the
sentence relativizes the authority of the law, and does so in preparation for the second
part; the second part indicates that in this new dispensation divine judgment will concern
not outer adherence to the law, but inward character, “the secrets of men.” In terms of
poetic effect and grammatical function, the parenthetical as parenthetical (and not yet in
terms of its content) acts as a bridge from the first part of the sentence to the second part.
Thematically, it serves as a bridge from law to conscience, from the old dispensation to
the new. By the time one gets to the end of verse 16 the shift in priority has happened,
and thus the attendant transformation in theology has happened.
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The parenthetical (verses 13-15) accomplishes the work of this transformation.
Staying with the analogy of the bridge for a moment, the parenthetical serves as a bridge
for the work it does—for spanning from one bank to the other bank—and not for what it
says, nor for any other reason. The grammatical fact of the parenthetical does the work
of spanning by itself, regardless of its content. Its content, what is written within the
parenthetical, must then be identified in terms of the analogy of the bridge, and explained
in reference to this analogy. Verses 13-15 read:
(For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the
law shall be justified.
For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things
contained in the law, these, having not the law unto themselves;
Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their
conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while
accusing or else excusing one another.) 78
In the analogy of the bridge, the content of the parenthetical (verses 13-15) is the new
dispensation, as written in verse 16 (“In the days when God shall judge the secrets of men
by Jesus Christ according to my Gospel”), to be established on the other bank. This
means that there is no other bank until the bridge is being built, becomes a spanning, and
bears with it the content of that other bank: the content is the parenthetical, most
especially, verse 15: “Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their
conscience also bearing witness.”
This verse—Romans 2.15—is one of the most heavily cited verses of scripture in
Milton’s Christian Doctrine. Only Matthew 28.19 (“Go ye therefore, and teach all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost”), John 3.16 (“For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that
whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life”), Romans 3.25
78
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(“Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his
righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God”),
Romans 8.39 (“For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to
the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren”), and 1
Corinthians 8.6 (“But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and
we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him”) are cited
more. 79 Milton quotes Romans 2.15 to support his thesis that God is also within, and is
to be found in and by individual conscience. Again, order of priority is important in
understanding Milton’s Pauline theory of Christian conscience. First, Milton establishes
God-within; more specifically, that God remains within us, despite the catastrophe of the
fall: “But he [God] has left so many signs of himself in the human mind, so many traces
of his presence through the whole of nature, that no sane person fails to realize that he
exists” (CD, Yale 6:130); and “It cannot be denied, that some traces of the Divine image
still remain in us, which are not wholly extinguished by this spiritual death” (Yale 6:396).
In both cases, Milton cites the same fragment of Romans 2.15: “Which shew the work of
the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness.” By using this
fragment, Milton, like Paul before him, begins the re-prioritization of individual
conscience over law. As Stanley Fish notes, “Milton supports his case for the priority of
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unwritten over written laws with citations from a written law.” 80 Milton then
distinguishes the written (outward) law from the unwritten (inward) law:
The law of God is either written or unwritten.
The unwritten law is no other that that law of nature given originally to
Adam, and of which a certain remnant, or imperfect illumination, stills
dwells in the hearts of all mankind; which, in the regenerate, under the
influence of the Holy Spirit, is daily tending towards a renewal of its
primitive brightness.
(Yale 6:623)
To support this point, Milton collapses Romans 2.14 and the first part of 2.15 into a
single verse best suited to his purposes: “when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by
nature the things contained in the law, then although they have no law, they are their own
law: for they show the work of the law written in their hearts” (Yale 6:623). This verse
bridges in Pauline fashion to the new dispensation. For once he has made the distinction
between the outward and the inward law, Milton can then, in the most radical-seeming
terms possible, eternally prioritize conscience over law with his paraphrastic translation
of Romans 2.15: “Their conscience supplies evidence too, and their own thoughts will
mutually accuse or excuse each other, on the day when the Lord will judge the secrets of
men” (Yale 6:623).
I say the terms are radical-seeming rather than radical because the terms and the
theology are, as I have been arguing, Paul’s. So, if the terms are radical, the radicalism
belongs to Paul. “The standard of judgment will be the individual conscience itself” is
one of Milton’s typical re-statements of Paul (Yale 6:623). It is also a concise if
troubling summary of the theory of Christian conscience that Paul articulates in the
second chapter of Romans, and reiterates, develops, and expands in his other epistles, as a
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redaction of Christ’s teachings on Christian conscience, most especially in the Gospels of
Matthew and Luke. The reiterations occur in numerous places: for example, in Romans
2.28-29 (“For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which
is outward in the flesh: But he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that
of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter”) and 2 Corinthians 3.3 (“Forasmuch as ye
are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ ministered by us, written not with ink,
but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the
heart.”). Both verses derive from the Book of Jeremiah: “But this shall be the covenant
that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my
law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall
be my people” (Jeremiah 31.33). In Christian Doctrine, Milton cites this verse nearly as
often as he cites Romans 2.15. The verse appears in the text, and in Milton’s
interpretative headings. To offer one example, Milton begins chapter XXVII of Christian
Doctrine, “Of the Gospel, and Christian Liberty,” with a direct and unequivocal allusion
to Jeremiah 31.33, and justifies it as the pivotal step between Moses and Christ, in the
development of Grace:
The Gospel is the new dispensation of the covenant of grace. It is much
more excellent and perfect than the law. It was first announced,
obscurely, by Moses and the prophets, and then with absolute clarity
by Christ himself and his apostles and the evangelists. It has been written
in the hearts of believers through the Holy Spirit, and will last
until the end of the world.
(Yale 6:521)
The frequency of citation makes sense. Paul utilizes Jeremiah 31.33 to justify his theory
of Christian conscience. Therefore, since Milton’s theory of Christian conscience is
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essentially Pauline, it follows that Milton would, as indeed he does, also rely on Jeremiah
31.33 to support his theory.
In the third chapter of Romans, Paul extends the implications of Jeremiah 31.33 to
his revolutionary conclusion. Most theologians and biblical commentators consider 3.2128 in particular to be the key to understanding the letter and the heart of the letter’s
meaning, to be the essence of Paul’s theology. 81 Certainly, these verses exercised a
formidable influence on Milton. Paul writes:
But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being
witnessed by the law and the prophets;
Even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all
and upon all them that believe: for there is no difference:
For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God;
Being justified freely by his grace the redemption that in Christ Jesus:
Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to
declare his righteousness for the emission of sins that are past, through the
forbearance of God;
To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and
the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.
Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? Nay:
but by the law of faith.
Therefore we conclude that man is justified by faith without the deeds of
the law.
(Romans 3.21-28, emphasis added)
The last line summarizes the essence of both Pauline and Miltonic theology. With its
joining of law and faith in a single evocative phrase, the penultimate line suits Milton’s
synthesizing imagination. According to Joseph Fitzmyer, Paul insists in Romans 3.21-28
“that his teaching on the justification by faith, apart from the observance of prescriptions
of the law, not only suits God’s new plan of salvation through Christ, but upholds the
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very nature and purpose of the Mosaic law itself.” 82 (Of course, this is a Christian
perspective.) As a result, “faith excludes all boasting, for either the Greek or the Jew.” 83
The point reiterates Erasmus’s summary of Paul’s intention in Romans. 84 More
importantly, particularly as it pertains to Milton’s Hebraic-Pauline theology, “The
purpose of the law was to silence all boasting. And yet, the role of faith in human life
does not undo the law or prove it ineffective, but instead achieves the very purpose for
which the Mosaic Law as a set of legal regulations was intended” (see parenthetical just
above). 85
In other words, according to Paul faith is necessarily an ongoing re-orientation of
the individual to the law. 86 In this Pauline dispensation, the contingent (humankind)
meets the absolute through the medium of the word. Furthermore, the contingent is
always meeting the absolute by and in and through the word. Another way to put it:
conscience meets the Law, ideally under the direction of grace. From a Puritan
standpoint at least, the whole purpose of reading scripture is to sustain and deepen this
meeting. For Milton it was the necessary practice, a kind of ongoing trial in which
conscience and scripture debated in the hope of coming together as harmony, a harmony
indicative of divine will—an echo of lost diapason. Milton lived this trial and arrived at
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this harmony, more or less, whether by poetic or rhetorical slight-of-hand, by delusion,
need, genius, or revelation cannot perhaps be known. Regardless, the effort authenticated
the belief. For as William Kerrigan has pointed out, “faith not rationally tried by the
believer [did] not in Milton’s view qualify as authentic.” 87
In Christian Doctrine especially, Milton tries his faith, as it were, and comes
away with various results—heretical, subjective, obscure and orthodox. These results
flower into astonishing form: Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes.
Each refracts a central tenet of Miltonic faith: obedience, first and foremost, and
obedience’s necessary component parts, those aspects without which there can be in
Milton’s view no obedience, right timing or kairos (Paradise Regained) and unknowing
(Samson Agonistes). In the end Milton, like Paul before him, comes to the conclusion
that “the law of God exact he shall fulfill / Both by obedience and by love, though love /
Alone fulfil the law” (PL 12.402-04). 88 He speaks with Paul for the primacy of love, but
his Pauline speaking is itself generated by, made coherent, and perhaps even preeminently haunted by the Mosaic Law. In other words, he is theologically Pauline, in just
the way Paul was.

Miltonic Purity

As mentioned in the introduction, Milton’s theology, and the flowering of it into poetic
form, developed during an intense period of religious and political conflict, in the context
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of revolution, civil war, restoration, and from Milton’s perspective, failure. Milton
engaged his moment along ecclesiological, theological, political, and aesthetic lines. The
disputes he involved himself in and influenced, just as markedly engaged him back, and
just as markedly exerted influence. In terms of Milton’s relationship to scripture
especially, it may be said that the conflicts of 1638-1660, and thereafter the Restoration,
in some ways determined both the depth and idiosyncrasy of Milton’s engagement with
scripture. So, in his prose and in his poetry, Milton observed the tenets of biblical
exegesis, as he reckoned them, in Lewalski’s terms, “acceptance of scripture alone as the
rule of faith, interpreted by the private conscience as informed by the Spirit’s
illumination.” 89 (Of course, this strategy had the polemically convenient and effective
result of allowing Milton to count his argument and discount his opponents’ arguments,
particularly when the strategy was allied with Milton’s unmatched learning.)
In general terms, Lewalski’s description develops, and does so accurately, out of
an engagement with the entirety of Milton’s work; specifically, the description is a
synthesis of Milton’s thinking in Second Defense of the English People (1654), The
Ready and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660), and in Christian
Doctrine. Milton wrote Second Defense in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Tongues
in response to Regii sanguinis clamor ad coelum, adversus parricidas anglicanos (The
Cry of the Royal Blood to Heaven, against the English Parricides) published by Adrian
Vlacq at The Hague in 1652, and dedicated to Charles II. Second Defense was Milton’s
second major effort on behalf of the Commonwealth. (The first, A Defense of the English
People, appeared in 1651 in response to Salmasius’ A Defense of Kingship (1650)). The
genre and intended audience of Second Defense is not incidental: for Milton, arguing for
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the Commonwealth, therefore arguing retroactively for the regicide of Charles I, meant
arguing for the liberty of conscience of the English people, as a chosen people of God.
(Milton had not yet become disillusioned with the Commonwealth.) In Second Defense’s
introduction or exordium, Milton first establishes the English people as “inspired by
heaven” and “of purity of life and…blameless character which showed them the one
direct road to true liberty” (Yale 4:550). By liberty Milton means life in accordance with
truth. By truth Milton means God’s will. In the second part or narratio, Milton writes,
“God himself is truth! The more veracious a man is in teaching truth to men, the more
like must he be to God” (Yale 4:585). Taking the two parts together, what Milton has
just established by a kind of rhetorical slight-of-hand, which is nonetheless utterly
sincere, is that the destiny of England is likeness to God. As such, the situation in which
England will meet its destiny is liberty of conscience. With liberty of conscience,
Englishmen will become, inwardly, the true Christians they are meant to be. Thus the
promise of the revolution will be achieved. The vision is not Milton’s alone. As Austin
Woolrych has written,
Cromwell too looked forward to the realization of Christ’s kingdom
and hoped for wonderful things from this new government [the Barebones
Parliament]. He opened it on July 4 [1653] with a speech of visionary
enthusiasm, trusting that its meeting would prove to be ‘a day of the
Power of Christ’ – a stage, that is, on the road towards that cherished
goal…His expectation was that Christ would reign ‘in our hearts’. 90
It is important to emphasize that Milton’s political concept of liberty of
conscience is inseparable from his religious understanding of the concept. The religious
version of the concept of liberty of conscience is in fact the basis from which Milton
develops the political version of that concept. In other words, while talking about
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political liberty in an official capacity, Milton is also and always talking about God, and
about the will of God. The point is most explicitly apparent is The Readie and Easie
Way, written just before the Restoration, and in mourning “for the good old cause” and as
a last ditch effort to inspire the good old cause: 91
The whole freedom of man consists either in spiritual or civil libertie. As
for spiritual, who can be at rest, who can enjoy any thing in this world
with contentment, who hath not libertie to serve God and to save his own
soul, according to the best light which God hath planted in him to that
purpose, by the reading of his reveal’d will and the guidance of his holy
spirit? That this is best pleasing to God, and that the whole Protestant
church allows no supream judge or rule in matters of religion but the
scriptures, and these to be interpreted by the scriptures themselves, which
necessarily inferrs liberty of conscience.
(Yale 7:456, emphasis added)
So what we have, having read Second Defense and The Ready and Easie Way in concert,
is a seemingly incidental (for being found in Milton’s political discourse) articulation of
Milton’s idiosyncratic nationalist theology. It may be summed up as: England possesses
the road to liberty; by liberty is meant liberty of conscience; the goal of conscience, thus
liberated, is truth; truth is God; the truth that is God is in scripture; scripture can only
truthfully be read by a liberated conscience. As with Paul, conscience takes priority, but
the ontology is absolute: God is truth. The epistemology is elusive: God is truth, known
by individual conscience—an elusive property to be sure, particularly when proffered in
ecclesiological and political debates. However, this elusiveness does not mean that
Milton’s epistemology is unclear, only that it is difficult to categorize in conventional
philosophical and/or theological terms. One might legitimately, if perhaps
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unsympathetically, note that the most accurate designation of Milton’s epistemology
would be “Milton’s thinking, about Milton’s concerns.”
In any case, what Milton develops in Second Defense and The Readie and Easie
Way, he summarizes with bald concision in Christian Doctrine (and perhaps the privacy
of CD allowed him to do so):
God has revealed the way of eternal salvation only to the individual
faith of each man, and demands of us that any man who wishes to be
saved should work out his beliefs for himself. So I made up my
mind to puzzle out a religious creed for myself by my own exertions, and
to acquaint myself with it thoroughly. In this the only authority I
accepted was God’s self-revelation, and accordingly I read and pondered
the Holy Scriptures themselves with all possible diligence, never sparing
myself in any way.
(Yale 6:118, emphasis added)
Milton takes “God’s self-revelation” not to be the Holy Scriptures, but the reading of the
Holy Scriptures. And Milton insists on individual conscience as the first instrument of
devotion, of obedience, and Holy Scripture (that is to say, Law) as the second instrument,
to be employed by individual conscience. He writes, “God has revealed the way of
eternal salvation only to the individual faith of each man.” This means that God’s first
revelation occurs by faith within the individual. Recognized, this faith, from God, orients
individual conscience. And this conscience, thus oriented, is in the right state with which
to “read and ponder the Holy Scriptures,” God’s self-revelation. In this way, individual
human beings are both mediums for and participants in divine activity: God-within,
justified by faith, recognized by conscience (necessarily by an individual conscience),
reads God-without, that is, Holy Scriptures; in turn, the God-without (Holy Scriptures)
reads back through conscience, God-within. So that in this activity, what comes out of
the individual conscience is divine will, and what goes into the individual conscience is
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divine will, returning to itself through the medium of humankind. This circuit describes
the action of what Milton calls “double scripture” in Christian Doctrine, and which I
cited above: “…the external scripture of the written word and the internal scripture of the
Holy Spirit, which he, according to God’s promises, has engraved upon the hearts of
believers” (Yale 6:587). 92
With his doctrine of double scripture, Milton is drawing out the full implications
of Pauline conscience, in reference both to exegetical practice and the nature of
obedience. 93 (Exegesis must be commended first and foremost by charity, as charity must
be the “animating principle of interpretation.” 94 And obedience must issue from a pure
conscience.) To the point, in 1 Timothy, Paul introduces the quality of “purity” to his
theory of conscience: “Now the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart,
and of good conscience, and of faith unfeigned” (1 Timothy 1.5). It is a quiet but critical
addition: the end of God’s commandment(s) to humankind can now be distilled to
charity, which issues from a pure heart, which is directed by a good conscience. The
reasoning is almost circular. Because it is so, God’s law and individual conscience
become temporarily blurred, a situation Milton certainly welcomed (perhaps Paul did as
well). A Miltonic rendering of 1 Timothy 1.5 would read: The end of the commandment
is a good conscience. In 1 Timothy 3.9 this good conscience becomes a pure conscience:
“…holding the mystery of faith in a pure conscience.” Conscience is now fundamentally
characterized by purity, as Paul intends it. So too then is obedience. Milton takes the
update, and then its culmination, in the Epistle to Titus: “Unto the pure all things are
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pure” (Titus 1.15). With this formulation, Paul most accurately redacts the teaching of
Christ in the Gospel of Luke: “The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye
is single, thy whole body also is full of light; but when thine eye is evil, thy body also is
full of darkness” (Luke 11.34). I do not think it is too much to say that with these two
verses, and most succinctly that verse from Titus, Milton’s theology is summed up: “To
the pure all things are pure.” Purity—the pure—was for Milton the essential dictate and
radically unverifiable quality of his concept of obedience. What Paul suggested, Milton
realizes. What Paul situated as a corollary, Milton re-situates as center. In other words,
for Paul, obedience requires purity; for Milton obedience perfectly realized is purity, a
distillation to Edenic disposition, to the prelapsarian state of being-as-essence in which
humankind receives God and God receives humankind, as intimate meeting intimate, in
“perfect diapason.” 95
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CHAPTER 2
KNOWLEDGE BEFORE THE FALL

In Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486), one of the most representative and culturally
influential texts of Renaissance humanism, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola begins with a
description of “God, the Father, the Mightiest Architect” just after he has made creation,
from the “supercelestial region” all the way down to the “dung-heap of the inferior
world.” 96 Mirandola’s God wants to be seen and known with intelligence and awe: “But
when this work was done,” Mirandola writes, “the Divine Artificer still longed for some
creature which might comprehend the meaning of so vast an achievement, which might
be moved with love at its beauty and smitten with awe at its grandeur.” 97 Here, with
something like blitheness, Mirandola describes—and the description is really a
theological position—God’s motive for making humankind. By describing divine
motive, Mirandola implicitly allows us to consider obedience from the divine-point-ofview, as it were. Taken together, his descriptions of divine motive and divine
prescription serve to answer Adam’s original questions in Book 8 of Paradise Lost:
But who I was, or where, or from what cause,
Knew not; to speak I tried, and forthwith spake,
My tongue obeyed and readily could name
Whate’er I saw. ‘Thou sun,’ said I, ‘fair light,
And though enlightened earth, so fresh and gay,
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,
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And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell,
Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here?
Not of myself; by some great Maker then,
In goodness and in power pre-eminent;
Tell me, how may I know him, how adore,
From whom I have that thus I move and love,
And feel that I am happier than I know.’
(PL 8.270-82)
Before the fall Adam responds to what he does not yet know—the source of his and all
creation—with quick and agile wonder. And the wonder is so open and immediate, so
expressly intuitive, because Milton intends it to be understood as genetic, a
responsiveness “moved with love” and “smitten with awe” issuing from Adam’s essential
disposition. As Milton writes in Christian Doctrine, “For man was by nature good and
holy, and was naturally disposed to do right” (Yale 6:352). Adam’s language use shows
the point: his usage is not an acquired property but a given. 98 He is disposed to perfect
apprehension. As “each bird stooped on his wing,” Adam says, “I named them, as they
passed, and understood / Their nature, with such knowledge God endued / My sudden
apprehension.” (PL 8.352-54). As such, Adam is mere being before the fall, the seminal
and substantial attribute of Milton’s endlessly resonant monist cosmos. 99 He is a figure
of essence with no alternative, sympathetically organized by and as part of divine
harmony.
In this chapter, I examine the condition of knowledge before the fall in Paradise
Lost, most particularly in relation to obedience, presented first as “the sole command”
(PL 3.94) and singular term of discourse and value of relation between God and
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humankind. As early as “At a Solemn Music” (c.1632), Milton had already made his
paramount valuation of obedience, and had begun to conceptually intuit what he meant
by obedience, and its opposite, disobedience:
With those just spirits that wear victorious palms,
Hymns devout and holy psalms
Singing everlastingly;
That we on earth with undiscording voice
May rightly answer that melodious noise;
As once we did, till disproportioned sin
Jarred against nature’s chime, and with harsh din
Broke the fair music that all creatures made
To their great Lord, whose love their motion swayed
In perfect diapason, whilst they stood
In first obedience, and their state of good. 100
The examination of Miltonic obedience that follows requires looking at the
condition of knowledge for both God and for Adam and Eve before the fall. Therefore, it
also demands a discussion of the issue of foreknowledge and foreordination. There is
perhaps no more fraught and disputed issue in the history of Christian theology. The
review I provide contextualizes Milton’s presentation of foreknowledge and
foreordination in Paradise Lost, and Milton’s development of his idea in the aftermath of
the dispute between Calvin and Arminius.
To describe Milton’s position on the issue of foreknowledge as Arminian is true
enough if the frame of the discussion is limited to the dispute between Calvin and
Arminius. Milton indeed did not subscribe to Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination,
but to Arminius’ more amenable proposal of grace as the predestinational condition
available to all humankind. However, as Maurice Kelley has pointed out, “though this
intestine struggle took place in the early seventeenth-century Netherlands, its ultimate
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origin was in the fifth-century Christendom of Pelagius and Augustine.” 101 To Kelley’s
point, I would add that the grounds of the dispute between Pelagius and Augustine are to
be found in Paul’s Letter to the Romans, and subsequently in Origen’s Against Celsus
(c.248 CE). 102 Projecting forward, the issue of foreknowledge after Augustine is most
influentially taken up by Boethius and Aquinas before coming to a head in the
Reformation, in Luther, and again in Calvin and Arminius. 103
The point is that the context of Milton’s position on foreknowledge is not the
dispute between Calvin and Arminius, nor more broadly that of the Reformation and its
effects, but the whole history of the dispute from Paul to Milton himself. Milton engages
with this entire history. And out of that engagement his ideas on the matter develop,
doctrinally and exegetically in Christian Doctrine, and poetically in Paradise Lost. In
other words, in Christian Doctrine Milton develops his idea of foreknowledge, and in
Paradise Lost, most especially in Book 3, he gives the idea its fullest expression. 104
For Milton, the differences in the conditions of divine knowledge before the fall
and the condition of human knowledge before the fall are as great as those between
divinity and humanity. These differences illustrate my central argument: before the fall
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there is no need for interpretation, understood as a retrospective engagement with
acquired knowledge, for the purpose of making sense, or perhaps even of gaining mastery
of the human condition. There is a mysterious figure: the tree of interdicted knowledge.
The only thing that Adam and Eve know about the tree is that it is prohibited them. God
has foreknowledge (which is not at all the same thing as knowledge). And Adam and
Eve have responsivity, a genetic condition comprised as much by dream and recollection
as by physical disposition. The condition is immediate and essential apprehension, an
unfallen mode of perception akin to Milton’s angels. 105 But almost immediately this
condition is also on its way to becoming something else.
For Adam and Eve, knowledge begins with the fall, and begins as a condition of
alienation for Adam and Eve (cf. PL 9.9), and also for God. As a condition it is a roar of
discord founded on a single act of disobedience, the “tragic” revolt (PL 9.6). So the
condition of knowledge after the fall is disorientation, and thus disorder, a peerless
catastrophe. The catastrophe must be rectified by humankind’s response to it. The
formulation of this response depends first that the condition of knowledge be organized.
The organization can only be effected by the right orientation of knowledge. For Milton,
the sole means for effecting this right orientation is obedience. So obedience becomes
and is the knowledge that Adam and Eve must come to after the fall. Adam says,
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
And love with dear the only God, to walk
As in his presence, ever to observe
His providence, and on him sole depend.
(PL 12.561-64)
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He, so humankind after him, will seek to become again the reverent and comprehending
creature the divine artificer longed for and created, to recall Mirandola’s On the Dignity
of Man. The condition of his knowledge will be obedience, the fruit of an inward
reformation. And this obedience will restore man to God, by creating the “paradise
within” (PL 12.587).

From the Divine Point of View

For Milton, the prelapsarian world is not just harmonious; it is harmony, diapason. The
fall destroys harmony, not least because it produces a disastrous antagonism between
matter and spirit:
Their inward state of mind, calm region once
And full of peace, now tossed and turbulent:
For understanding ruled not, and the will
Heard not her lore, both in subjection now
To sensual appetite, who from beneath
Usurping over sov’reign reason claimed
Superior sway.
(PL 9.1125-31)
The antagonism between matter and spirit, the frightful noise, replaces humankind’s
essential disposition, that which comprehends immediately with love and awe “the
meaning of so vast an achievement.” That disposition was the direct result of divine
motive, of the divine will’s “longing for reception”: divine will created humankind as
faithful audience for itself and its creation. Thus for Milton the fall alters humankind at a
genetic level. 106 Before the fall, obedience is synonymous with being, with Adam and
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Eve’s pure responsivity to God’s creation, and may be understood as the seamless and
entirely integrated reception of the divine, its will and creation. After the fall, obedience
recovered becomes the only hope of return, or some approximation of return, both for
God and for humankind, to the previous state of relation.
Milton’s God desires human free will to synchronize flawlessly with divine will.
This synchronization is what Milton intends by obedience. As he writes in Christian
Doctrine: “Obedience is that virtue which makes us determine to do God’s will above all
things, and to serve him” (Yale 6:663). In Paradise Lost, Milton redacts and re-presents
his definition, situating it after the fall, and near the close of the epic. The fall happened,
the original and incommensurate disaster. In the ruins, as it were, Adam longs for
direction, any direction that he can hold as hope. 107 Michael tells him about the Son:
Now amplier known thy saviour and thy Lord,
Last in the clouds from Heav’n to be revealed
In glory of the Father, to dissolve
Satan with his perverted world.
(PL 12.544-47)
Adam listens to the story. Perhaps he is reminded of himself as he was before the fall.
The guarantee of redemption through the Son finally produces actual comprehension of
the “sole command.” Adam understands that the only hope for humankind lies in
obedience.
The necessity of obedience is not a new idea to Adam, but it is newly received by
him. The fall having happened, Adam now retroactively apprehends the meaning of the
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single prohibition. 108 It is that the dissonance produced by the fall has simultaneously
produced the need for interpretation as a response to this dissonance, and the event that
caused it. What the fall has produced is the experience of shame, and of disorientation, a
force of shaming unto itself. The only way of bearing such shame and disorientation is
by interpreting both one’s response and then one’s understanding of that response.
Human beings, having no alternative, become interpreters. And the interpretive project
that stands before us is a negative mode of knowledge with the fall at its core. As Milton
writes in Areopagitica:
It was from out the rinde of one apple tasted, that the knowledge
Of good and evill, as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the
World. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing
good and evill, that is to say of knowing good by evill.
(Yale 2: 514)
This turn to being-as-interpretation begins with the fall, but is, as it were,
subliminally conceived before it. In book 5, Eve, recounting her troubling dream to
Adam, calls the tree the tree of “interdicted knowledge” (PL 5.52). Interdiction,
understood as a spoken prohibition made with authority, specifically as an interposition
by speaking made with authority, functions as the absolute and mystical threshold in
Eden. It is mystical for being a threefold paradox: it is the limit that produces freedom; it
is the ignorance that produces knowing; it is the separation that produces intimacy.
Limit, ignorance, and separation are the necessary conditions for freedom, knowing, and
intimacy. Further, the intelligible activity of Eve and Adam in Eden before the fall is
108

In Paradise Lost, the scene of prohibition (Genesis 2.17) appears first as summary, second as
recollection, and third as dramatically rendered recollection. In other words, Milton does not dramatize the
prohibition directly. For the Son’s sake, God obscurely summarizes the prohibition in Book 3. He also
speaks of the fall, which has not yet happened, as a foregone conclusion for him, but not for Adam and
Eve, e.g. “For man will hearken to his glozing lies, / And easily transgress the sole command” (PL 3.9394). The prohibition is recalled by Adam in Book 4; his recollection begins as a description, and ends in
ignorance (4.223-26). And in Book 8, Adam dramatically recalls the moment of prohibition to Raphael
(8.319-30).

69

exactly one of freedom knowing intimacy. Limited, Eve and Adam are free to know, and
their knowing is that of intimacy with the divine. The knowing does not result in
intimacy with the divine: it is intimacy with the divine. As such the tree of interdicted
knowledge is the cohering force in Eden, that which organizes and binds together. One
might think of it as the keynote of Edenic harmony, and to mix metaphors, the lynchpin
of the entire structure of Eden.
The fall silences the note, pulls the pin, and transmogrifies choosing into a labor
of alienated crisis. For once the interdiction is transgressed, the threshold, and its
threefold paradox, becomes a serpentine system of strict and sorrowful division: things
fall apart; the center cannot hold. 109 So that in Paradise Lost the fall is a fall in modes of
perception, from nuance to rudeness, from paradox to either orthodox or heresy. Limit,
ignorance, and separation now imprison Adam and Eve in a closed, panicking, obsessive
realm of self-consciousness:
Soon as the force of that fallacious fruit,
That with exhilarating vapor bland
About their spirits had played, and inmost powers
Made err, was now exhaled, and grosser sleep
Bred of unkindly fumes, with conscious dreams
Encumbered, now had left them, up they rose
As from unrest, and each other viewing,
Soon found their eyes how opened, and their minds
How darkened.
(PL 9.1046-54)
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For Adam and Eve, the fall is an absolutely complete movement: every mote, every
single cell of their being, and every single word, spoken and unspoken, and their dreams,
the entire breadth and depth and consciousness of them, falls. 110
Before the effects of the fall are felt however, there is a pause, a suspension built
by the illusory force of fancy. It is as if harmony pauses before its own fall into time,
kairos on a cliff-edge, as it were, with chronos below. For Milton the pause is that made
at the last moment before history begins. It occurs in the brief moment after Adam eats
“his fill” and before Adam and Eve cognize the disaster,
They swim in mirth, and fancy that they feel
Divinity within them breeding wings
Wherewith to scorn the earth: but that false fruit
Far other operation first displayed,
Carnal desire inflaming; he on Eve
Began to cast lascivious eyes, she him
As wantonly repaid; in lust they burn.
(PL 9.1009-15)
In the moment, their lust is a force so apparently beautiful and strong it vanquishes not
only the divine but the need for and threat of the divine: “if such pleasure be / In things to
us forbidden, it might be wished, / For this one tree had been forbidden ten” (PL 9.102426). Here, Adam is literally out-of-his-mind, taunting divine will and doing so playfully
(“now let us play” (PL 9.1027)). Eve is out-of-her-mind also: she is a “contagious fire.”
They are falling into history, and it feels like pleasure. 111 Then “the exhilarating vapor”
exhales, and Adam and Eve realize that they have in a lust-fed blink of delusion become
figures antagonistically far from God’s choice, when “God created man in his own image,
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in the image of God created he them” (Genesis 1.27). Few moments equal the tragic
power of this one in Western literature. Milton frames Adam and Eve in the brief pause
after transgression and before consequence, and in that frame they appear appallingly
lost, as inept and graceless figures of noise: “Thus they in mutual accusation spent / The
fruitless hours” (PL 9.1187-88). 112
The tragedy is not theirs alone. If we recall the passage from On the Dignity of
Man (“The Divine Artificer still longed…), and extend the God’s-eye view it suggests,
the fall may be seen as a catastrophe not just for humankind, but for God also. 113 For
humankind it is a catastrophe warned of, but impossible to know before its occurrence.
For God, it is the catastrophe, the image of himself falling. In Paradise Lost, God makes
humankind in a revisionary act of creation, a response to the fall of Satan and the loss to
heaven of his associated angels. Satan, at first God’s high angelic creation, becomes his
deep creative failure. The experience haunts the mind of the creator. Apparently the plan
of action Satan describes to Beelzebub near the very beginning of the epic has achieved
some demonstrable effect:
If then his providence
Out of our evil seek to bring forth good,
Our labor must be to pervert that end,
And out of good still to find means of evil;
Which ofttimes may succeed, so as perhaps
Shall grieve him, if I fail not, and disturb
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His inmost counsels.
(PL 1.162-68, emphasis added)
The God of Adam and Eve is a haunted God.
The degree to which God is haunted by Satan, by creative failure, manifests in his
speech to the Son (3.80-134). This speech also contains God’s discourse on
foreknowledge and foreordination. The two are critically related. Just as God foreknows
the fall, but does not foreordain it, he foreknows the Son but does not foreordain the Son
as savior. The Son ordains himself in a perfect act of free will, perfect because it
conforms perfectly to divine will. 114 The Son’s choosing of the divine will of the Father
counters Satan’s choosing against divine will, and makes possible the future God
foretells: “So Heav’nly love shall outdo Hellish hate” (PL 3.298).
First, however, God begins with all his attention fixed on Satan:
Only begotten Son, seest thou what rage
Transports our Adversary, whom no bounds
Prescribed, no bars of Hell, nor all the chains
Heaped on him there, nor yet the main abyss
Wide interrupt can hold.
(PL 3.80-84)
What is the tone of his speaking here? It seems to be mocking, admiring, and filled with
both regret and longing. It is as if God begins his characterization of Satan from a
position of the severest criticism, as to a hateful object (thus the mocking). But the
mocking belies the threat of other responses should he hold his gaze. He holds his gaze.
And those qualities of Satan’s rebellion, other than its irrefutable folly, come into view:
Satan’s ambition (“what rage / Transports”), Satan’s toughness (“nor all the chains
heaped on him there”), and Satan’s energy (“nor yet the main abyss / Wide interrupt can
hold”). God, the Father, sees a son he has lost, a son who will only return to him as his
114
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singular enemy. And from this divine perspective, Satan, having so far loomed, now
appears very small, crawling on the surface of the world or flapping his weary wings.
But Satan is the seed and the eternal provocation to a divine crisis. In this state of
crisis, God fashioned Adam and Eve. Now God, seeing simultaneously Satan “in the
precincts of light” (PL 3.88) and Adam and Eve in “the new-created world” (PL 3.89)
cannot keep them separated in his gaze. Satan, and God’s long, paternal memory of
Satan, overwhelm the distinction. Satan as a haunting in the mind of God works as a
centrifugal force pulling in Eve and Adam to himself until God sees—God’s gaze is
entirely comprised of—a single figure of disappointment. In this single figure, God sees
only disobedience, which perhaps explains, if unsatisfactorily, the fact that he speaks of
the fall as a foregone conclusion: “For man will hearken to his glozing lies, /And easily
transgress the sole command” (PL 3.93-94).
It must be remembered that God has given the command twice. The “sole
command” of obedience applied to Satan, before it was ever given to Adam and Eve.
Here the phrase (“sole command”) reaches back to Satan and forward to man, as does the
phrase that follows, “sole pledge of his obedience” (PL 3.95). The memory of the
command as given to Satan forecloses the future of Adam’s pledge of obedience, and
appears to produce divine anxiety, out of which God’s discourse on foreknowledge and
foreordination flows:
For man will hearken to his glozing lies,
And easily transgress the sole command,
Sole pledge of his obedience: so will fall
He and his faithless progeny: whose fault?
Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me
All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
Such I created all th’ ethereal Powers
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And spirits, both them who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant faith or love,
Where only what they needs must do, appeared,
Not what they would? What praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When will and reason (reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled,
Made passive both, had served necessity,
Not me. They therefore as to right belonged,
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Their Maker, or their making, or their fate,
As if predestination overruled
Their will, disposed of absolute decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.
So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
Or aught by me immutably foreseen,
They trespass, authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge, and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain,
Till they enthrall themselves.
(PL 3.93-125)
In this passage Milton achieves a double-effect, the first effect expressive of the limits of
humankind’s intelligence, and the second expressive of the divinely clear—meaning,
beyond mortal understanding—single rendering of different times and destinies (Satan’s,
Adam and Eve’s, their progeny’s) into a simultaneous expression of outcome. (It is
something like listening to God speaking of all at once.) So that what is heard by mortal
ears (in this case, Milton’s readers) as strange confusion, is the perfect expression of
divine crisis—not recollected, but in time unfolding—and is heard and received as such
by the Son (he is God’s audience) as well as by God himself. 115 If so, it may be
understood as the one, only and necessary catalyst for the Son’s intervention (3.144-66),
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God’s renovated strategy of mercy (3.173-212), and the Son’s offering of himself as the
sacrifice for the redemption of humankind:
Behold me then, me for him, life for life
I offer, on me let thine anger fall;
Account me man; I for his sake will leave
Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee
Freely put off, and for him, and for him lastly die
Well pleased, on me let Death wreck all his rage.
(PL 3.237-41)
The Son will step between divine anger and humankind. He will be a new threshold,
performing the work the tree of interdicted knowledge performed before the fall. The
idea implicit here that God, as Milton renders him, put the tree in Eden to keep
humankind from his own anger, shatters conception. How could one ever recover from
such knowledge? For Milton, the answer is the Son. 116 Not only will he be the restored
threshold, he will be that which conducts intimacy—atonement (literally, at-one-ment)—
between humankind and God. Facing God, the Son will be man; facing man, the Son
will be God.
To the Son, the Father speaks a many-layered expression of divine anxiety, a
discourse seemingly always on the verge of slipping from a vague admission of
foreknowing the fall, to an outright confession of foreordaining the fall. As noted above,
God tells the Son that man will “hearken to the glozing lies” of Satan, and “easily
transgress the sole command.” At this moment, God is still clearly speaking about Adam
and Eve. But in the two lines that follow, the object of God’s discourse becomes the
merged object of Satan and man in terms of transgressing the “Sole pledge of his
obedience.” Speaking of both Satan and humankind, God says that they “will fall / He
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and his faithless progeny,” and asks rhetorically, “whose fault?” Following lines 93-94
(“For man will hearken…) the subject of these two lines (95-96) at first appears to be
man. But two things complicate this reading: 1) the subject of the sentence of which
these four lines are a part sits back in line 87 (“…all restraint broke loose he wings his
way”), and is clearly Satan; 2) lines 95-96 are enjambed at exactly the same moment,
after eight syllables, and by the same punctuation, the colon. 117 The formal character of
the lines, and the sequential repetition of that formal character, obscures the subject. If
the “he” of line 96 can still be taken for Adam, the object of “whose fault?” cannot as
safely be assumed. Line 97 recalibrates the question at the end of line 96, with a
rhetorical question that now appears to have its object in clear sight: “Whose but his
own?” And/or God is speaking still of Adam, foreordaining his disobedience. But what
follows the rhetorical question that begins line 97 complicates reading the object of
God’s description as definitively humankind rather than Satan: “Ingrate, he had of me /
All he could have.” Further, the shift from future tense (ll.93-96) to past tense (l.97, and
continuing through to l.119) seems to imply that Satan is now the object. If so, however,
Satan remains the object of God’s description for a mere two and a half lines: “Ingrate, he
had of me / All he could have; I made him just and right, / Sufficient to have stood,
though free to fall.” In the very next line, God generalizes his object (“Such I created all
th’ ethereal Powers”). Here it is as if the mere indirect mention of free will (“Sufficient
to have stood, though free to fall”) necessarily effects a meditation on it—God prompting
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himself to the essential theme, and a definition of it. Nominally, the object of the lines
that follow (grammatically, their subject) remains “th’ ethereal powers and spirits.”
Thematically, the object becomes the nature of free will.
God’s speech is part of what David Loewenstein has called “the celestial
colloquy” of Book 3. 118 Throughout, the Son is listening. From a Trinitarian standpoint,
God is speaking to himself. And the speaking may be understood as a motion of the
Trinity, of the three persons: Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, where the Holy Spirit is the
speaking, and distillation of concern to the nature of free will and obedience, moving
between the Father and the Son: “What pleasure I from such obedience paid, / When will
and reason (reason also is choice) / Useless and vain, of freedom both despoiled, / Made
passive both, had served necessity, / Not me” (ll.107-10). I would also suggest that from
an Arian standpoint, God is also speaking to himself. He is speaking to himself,
intimately, in front of his Son. With the Son before him, as witness and prompt, God
fashions the meaning of free will, and its necessary conditions. In other words, the Son,
as audience to his Father, works as the silent, present catalyst for the Father to clarify and
explain his sole command.
God’s meditation on the nature of free will is necessarily an explication of what
he has meant all along by obedience, his critical term in his relation to humankind
(ll.102-11). God is describing the workings—the mechanics—of obedience to himself.
For the time being, Adam and Satan are nowhere to be found. The object that has taken
their place is God himself. In lines 112-19, God speaks as subject about the object of his
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speaking, the nature of God as creator. The narration is paradoxical: God speaks in the
first person, but the narrative is in the third person. Or to render it as I think Milton
intends here, God speaks in the first person a narrative in the third person: “They
therefore as to right belonged, / So were created, nor can justly accuse / Their maker, or
their making, or their fate” (PL 3.111-13). God retains the divine point-of-view
throughout. However, by speaking of himself in third person he creates a perspectival
distance with which to see himself, again perhaps, and also perhaps with which to
recollect. From this distance, and by it and with it, God then provides himself the
perspective of humankind with regard to him. From this perspective (l.112), God can
then anticipate the concerns and questions implicit in humankind’s reception of
obedience (“the sole command”), those questions concerning predestination and divine
foreknowledge:
They therefore as to right belonged,
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Their maker, or their making, or their fate
As if predestination overruled
Their will, disposed by absolute decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown. 119
(PL 3.111-19)
The accusation implicit in questions of predestination and divine foreknowledge
vanquishes God’s double narrative, and with it, for a moment, his double perspective.
The narrative becomes merely first person, a first person defending its actions and
hedging its bets (“not I: if I foreknew”).
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The narrative tone here perhaps suggests that the opposite of what God is saying
may have at least once in the creating mind of God been the case—syntactically, the
difference of two words. Not: “As if predestination overruled / Their will, disposed by
absolute decree”; but “Predestination overruled their will, disposed by absolute decree.”
The “as if” is spoken through a flinch at the front of the actual line, pressured by the
subterranean possibility of the suggested line. Is God in some sense revising his creative
past in these lines? If what the tone suggests is the case, then the answer is yes. There
was a time—the time before Satan fell—when God had given an absolute decree. The
results of that decree—Satan’s falling—and the immanent prospect of another fall,
instantiated a revision in God’s plan. That revision is the institution of free will, applied
present and forward to Adam and Eve, and retrospectively suggested backward to Satan.
It is important here to keep in mind that God is justifying himself to his only
begotten Son, before the assembled heavenly host. The fact of the double audience—the
Son is audience to the Father, the host is audience to the Father and the Son—requires
that the question posed above be augmented to: is God revising his creative past before
the host in some sense because of the attention of his Son, and because of what he needs
from his Son? If because of the attention of the Son, we return to the scenario envisioned
in Oration on the Dignity of Man, but with a difference: “the Divine Artificer still longed
for some creature which might comprehend the meaning of so vast an achievement,
which might be moved with love at its beauty and smitten with awe at its grandeur.” The
difference is that now the witnessing is not of God’s visionary effort, but of God’s
revisionary effort. The divine longing remains the same, to be “comprehended,” “moved
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with love,” and “smitten with awe.” The Son—exactly—fulfils all three. Moved with
love and smitten with awe, he comprehends the Father. 120
If we ask instead if God is revising his creative past because of what he needs
from his Son, we are asking a question about God’s strategic intentions, in the moment.
If God foreknows that humankind will need a redeemer, and if God suspects that he is
speaking to the redeemer—which is close to being just another way of saying, if God
plans on redeeming humankind with a redeemer, the identity of which only he knows—
then God must present his creativity as blameless. 121 Otherwise, 1) Satan’s rebellion
would be his (God’s) fault, and therefore his direct responsibility; and 2) his creativity
would be imperfect for having had a mistaken moment (the original institution of
absolute decree, as the necessary means for obedience, instead of free will). And if God
the Father is the author both of the fault and the mistake, then only God the Father could
be the redeemer of them. By presenting his creativity as blameless (“they themselves
decreed / Their own revolt, not I”) God establishes the necessary grounds for the Son to
become aware of his revolutionary sympathy for humankind. With the Son watching and
listening to him, the Father flourishes, and the divine will passes into the Son. Further,
by saying that God must present his activity as blameless, I am also saying that Milton
must present his God as blameless, this divine blamelessness being an important part of
Milton’s theodicy.
In lines 114-19, God does not clearly deny predestination. The phrase “as if
predestination overruled / Their will” is an equivocation that admits the competing
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possibilities but confesses to neither. By the power of the rhetorical “as if” at the
beginning of the line, the line allows the possibility that predestination overruled their
will and the possibility that predestination did not overrule their will. Further complexity
of expression follows. If predestination unequivocally did not overrule their wills—if
this is an absolute and eternal fact—nothing more would seem to be needed, but the
reiterative summary of “they themselves decreed / their own revolt.” But God qualifies
rather than concludes: “As if predestination overruled / Their will, disposed by absolute
decree / Or high foreknowledge.” Not incidentally, Milton situates human “will” and
“absolute decree” in the same line. And not incidentally, Milton situates “high
foreknowledge” and “they” together in the following line. So that line 115 may be
compressed to the order of human will, divine will; and line 116 to divine will, human
will.
Milton continues the strategy in lines 117-18. To recollect lines 114-18:
As if predestination overruled
Their will, disposed by absolute decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault.
In line 117 Milton situates human will first (“their own revolt”), followed by divine will,
equivocally given (“not I; if I foreknew”). In line 118 divine will, this time abstracted
(“Foreknowledge”), precedes human will (“their fault”). So, as with lines 115-16, lines
117-18 may be compressed to the order of human will, divine will; and divine will,
human will.
The effect produced by these lines (114-18) is manifold. Of principal importance,
Milton emphasizes the inextricable relationship of human will and divine will. In some
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way, they are reactive to each other. Milton’s God, at least here, appears to give place of
precedence to human will, rather than divine will, perhaps suggesting that in the domain
of human experience, divine will responds to human will (this suggestion would accord
with the idea of God’s blameless self-presentation to the Son). 122 But the suggestion,
once made, fails to hold. For lines 114-18 are part of a larger discourse, spoken by God.
The lines are themselves the effects produced by divine will, and as such, are subsumed
in that will. In other words, the suggestion that divine will is responding (here) to human
will does the rhetorical work it can—to introduce the possibility of a situation that is not
actually the case—and then becomes a suggestive echo behind the lines. The echo
remains to influence interpretation, chiefly the Son’s interpretation, and also the reader’s
(as instance of fallen humanity, thus child of Adam and Eve). 123 Finally, Milton may
have intended the difficulties attendant for the reader in keeping free will and divine will
separate and clear in these lines, to 1) blur the two wills so much that they can no longer
be understood apart from each other, and 2) to emphasize the necessity of free will in
terms of obedience. By bringing human will and divine will so close together in these
lines that they become almost indistinguishable, Milton simultaneously brings free will
and obedience so close together that they cannot be understood apart from each other;
they become almost synonymous.
Both predestination and foreknowledge complicate any discussion of free will and
obedience. God necessarily addresses them both. As noted above, it is possible he
equivocates subtly on the issue of predestination, with his use of “as if” at the start of line
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114. The equivocation is not so subtle with foreknowledge, but it is more sophisticated:
“they themselves decreed / their own revolt, not I; if I foreknew, / Foreknowledge had no
influence on their fault.” If God had said to the Son, “they themselves decreed their own
revolt” the issue of predestination would be clearly settled. If God had said to the Son,
“they themselves decreed their own revolt, not I” the issue would be settled, although less
clearly. For why would God need to add “not I” at the end of a clear, declarative
sentence? As it is, God qualifies twice, using a conditional clause, and then elaborates
the second qualification. This elaboration of the second qualification unsettles any clear
and confident reception of what God is saying here. The first qualification (“not I”)
begins the work of unsettling the meaning. The second qualification and its subsequent
elaboration (“if I foreknew, / Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault”) renders the
meaning elusive and quite difficult to interpret, foreknowledge being primarily a form of
immortal rather than mortal epistemology. (I qualify the claim with ‘primarily’ because
we can as human beings imagine knowing the possibility that something is going to
happen, while having no possibility of influencing the event.) Firstly, the “I” as a
recognizable subject disappears, and is replaced by this thing called foreknowledge in the
following line. 124 The fact that the subject of the conditional clause (“I”) becomes
“foreknowledge” perhaps indicates the impossible hermeneutic distance: foreknowledge
is a form of knowledge reserved for God. 125 As a result, humankind can have nothing to

124

I do not think the transition from “I” to “foreknowledge” can be read as a swift, momentary transition
into allegory. Following Milton’s own logic on the question of foreknowledge, since foreknowledge is
literally beyond the realm of human intelligibility, the word itself cannot, paradoxically, be read in any
other way but literally. Any other reading would be an interpretation, the practice of which is predicated on
some degree of knowledge.
125

This claim holds for angels, and for prophets through whom God speaks. For the former, cf. PL 1.62630. For the latter, the condition of being a prophet is an activity, an enthralling being-used by God, not a
role, nor an identity, and certainly not a job, called or otherwise.

84

say about foreknowledge beyond attributing it to God. To God’s claim that
“foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,” the most accurate response is, okay. 126
And this “okay” is God’s point exactly. God either did or did not have foreknowledge.
Humankind cannot know. That is, the direct meaning of the claim cannot actually be
interpreted in terms of the knowledge it articulates. (Possibly then, foreknowledge is the
form of prohibited knowledge.) Only the implications of the claim can be interpreted,
insofar as these implications, by slant, address the formal relation between divine will
and human will, unless of course God is not speaking about (or only about) human will
but about the will of the rebel angels, chiefly Satan. 127
What becomes apparent when reading this passage carefully is that Milton is
attempting to articulate nothing less than the organization of the divine’s eternal
perspective, and the mechanics of it. To recall: what God is qualifying in lines 115-19 is
his claim that “they themselves decreed / Their own revolt.” The first qualification is
“not I.” The second qualification, and its subsequent elaboration, is “if I foreknew, /
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault.” The next line (“Which had no less
proved uncertain unforeknown) at first reads as further elaboration, thus as part of the
second qualification. However, the line makes its own qualifying claim, and therefore
registers as the third qualification.
Of all three qualifications, the meaning of this third qualification is the most
elusive, not least because the qualification begins with a relative pronoun (“Which”) and
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The Truth’s superb surprise.
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is presented negatively (“had no less proved uncertain unforeknown”). Further, the
negative is not concisely, but ambiguously given. A concise formulation would read,
“had not proved uncertain unforeknown.” But the line reads, “had no less proved
uncertain unforeknown.” The “less” of the line, and the absence of a following,
explanatory clause (such as might be clumsily rendered along the lines of, “had no less
proved uncertain unforeknown, then if their fault had been foreknown 128) obscures the
meaning. In my view, Milton intended the obscuration. Firstly, he could have just
presented the third qualification positively: their fault proved certain unforeknown.
Secondly, and less directly, he could have rendered the negative formulation clearly (see
parenthetical just above), but chose not to. The question then is why does he present this
third qualification thusly? I would suggest that the syntactical formulation of the third
qualification obscures its discursive meaning (thus the ambiguity of the qualification), but
clarifies its intuitive and constitutional point: God in his divine constitution is speaking
crisis into some kind of resolution. 129 And what eludes discourse—literally, the mind of
God—is represented by Milton in the precisely obscuring syntax of the lines.
The meaning of this third qualification is also elusive because the implications it
makes are less obvious than those made by the first two qualifications. With the first two
qualifications the equivocations occur in and by way of a declarative and then a
conditional clause (e.g., “not I:” and “if I foreknew / Foreknowledge had no influence on
their fault”). With the third qualification the equivocation occurs in and by way of a shift
in the verb tense (I address this in a moment). In other words, the first two qualifications
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occur in the realm of the concrete, as it were, while the third qualification occurs in the
realm of abstraction.
Lines 118-19: “Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, / Which had no
less proved certain unforeknown.” Line 119 is a subordinate clause; thus, the meaning of
the line is subordinate to that of line 118. That is, the meaning with authority is line 118:
“Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault.” However, the subordinate clause (line
119) that follows is not merely subordinate, but is also ostensibly subversive (Milton
intends it to be so) as yet another expression of divine anxiety. Line 119 perhaps appears
to undermine the clear, strong authority of line 118, by introducing obscurity. And this
implied obscurity may at first appear to function as a critique of the claim made by line
119. To the clear “this” of line 118, line 119 adds perhaps a quietly corrosive “sort of,”
but it is also a clear re-statement, from the other side of the assertion as it were—a kind
of chiasmus.
The first word of line 119 is a relative pronoun referring directly back to the last
two words of line 118, “their fault.” So the nominal subject of the line can be understood
as “their fault.” After this fairly straightforward beginning however (the identification of
the subject), the meaning of the line becomes elusive; the shift in verb tense from the past
indicative of line 116 (“they themselves decreed) to the pluperfect of lines 118-19 (“had
no influence” and “had no less proved”) is initially responsible for the elusiveness. The
shift to pluperfect seems to result from the conditional clause (“if I foreknew”)
introduced in line 117. But the result is not required grammatically. The conditional
given in the past tense does not require that the subsequent clause be given in the
pluperfect; it could also be given in the past indicative, the present, or the future tense. In
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this case, the shift to pluperfect must refer to a past before the past of “they themselves
decreed.” But this past can only be indefinitely known since 1) the grammatical nature of
the pluperfect is indefinite, and 2) in this specific instance, the pluperfect usage concerns
not time (a human category) but eternity (the divine condition).
The density of meaning in the lines increases when one remembers that the object
of God’s discourse here is itself difficult for the reader to clearly discern (which does not
mean that it is unclear). It is: Satan and his rebel angels, or Adam and Eve, or Satan and
the rebel angels and Adam and Eve, or Satan and the rebel angels and humankind, and
may be any or all of these. But since eternity cannot be a position from which or out of
which one speaks, but only a condition in which one is speaking, then God must be
talking at least to some degree about all of them at once. This being the case, the shift to
pluperfect cannot indicate from the divine point-of-view a reference to a time before
“they themselves decreed” but a discursive shift in divine priority, in emphasis, a
recollecting of a different aspect of the all that God is always apprehending. 130 In other
words, the “they” of “they themselves decreed” is all of them (Satan, rebel angels, Adam
and Eve, humankind), not in a general sense, however, but in a manifold sense.
Constructing the object of discourse here as a manifold figure allows one aspect
of the “they” to be emphasized as the subject of “they themselves decreed” without
excluding the other aspects. And this construction allows Milton’s God to proceed
almost oxymoronically, by way of obscure declaration. “They” can refer to Satan and the
rebel angels, and also to Adam and Eve, without becoming necessarily predestinarian.
Since the object of God’s discourse in lines 115-19 is not clearly and absolutely
identified, what is emphasized cannot be named. It is instead emphasized implicitly, and
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made intelligible by the context of the lines (in this case ll.115-19) in which the implicit
emphasis appears. The implicit emphasis for “they” in line 116 is on Satan and the rebel
angels. This emphasis affects a de-emphasis on Adam and Eve. De-emphasized, Adam
and Eve for the moment (the moment that is this discourse) cease to be candidates for the
clearly identifiable and clearly intended subject of “they themselves decreed.” As a
result, the question of predestination and foreknowledge as they concern humankind is
elided. The moment is one of Paradise Lost’s most remarkable instances of poetical and
theological finesse. Milton achieves the double feat of articulating foreknowledge and of
effacing his articulation of it, by obscuring subject, object, and narrative time, at different
critical moments throughout the passage. The effect produced is this: in this passage, the
moment of decreed revolt is the moment time begins. And this moment appears to belong
both to Satan, and to Adam and Eve, depending on the designation being made by divine
emphasis. By extension, one might say that the object of God’s discourse throughout the
passage is not Satan, nor Adam and Eve, nor creation, nor humankind, but God’s
emphasis, functioning as a barometer of his priority of attention. For if his gaze
comprehends all, then the only possible mode of distinction between the parts of that all
is emphasis, a foregrounding or illuminating of a given part by divine emphasis.
It is perhaps important to recall that the passage under discussion here is, as I have
been arguing, an expression of divine crisis. One of the chief aspects of this crisis is the
obscuring of God’s gaze. In this obscured gaze, God sees only a single figure of
disappointment, rather than Satan, or Adam, or Eve. The resolution of the divine crisis
depends in large part on the clarifying of the obscured gaze. This clarifying is
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accomplished by divine emphasis, as just noted. Thus, the emphasis may be understood
as the divine power of resolution.
Line 119 (“Which had no less proved certain foreknown”) ends with a period.
Here grammar and meaning are perfectly attuned. The punctuation mark illustrates (and
in terms of sound, articulates) a close to the crisis of lines 93-119. The articulation of the
resolution begins in the very next line (120). The line begins with “So.” The word does
the work of indicating that resolution is to follow, particularly as it comes after the period
of line 119. Unlike “therefore” (and other similar possibilities), however, “so” elides a
simple cause-and-effect construction and meaning. It does so by being more ambiguous.
The most that can explicitly be said of “so” is that it signals a transition. Paradoxically,
the very generality of its application allows Milton’s usage of it to imply that the
resolution “so” is setting up is absolutely inevitable, a fact-of-the-world, beyond the more
unreliable dictates of cause and effect. In other words, the resolution spoken of is not
caused; it simply is.
So there is the crisis, ended with a period, a mark in time and a mark of timing;
and resolution of the crisis, begun with so. God speaks:
So without least impulse or shadow of fate,
Or aught by me immutably foreseen,
They trespass, authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain,
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change
Their nature, and revoke the high decree
Unchangeable, eternal, which ordained
Their freedom: they themselves ordained their fall.
(PL 3.120-28)
The only subject of the lines, in the narrative time they occupy, is the comprehensive
“they” (introduced at line 122, followed by “trespass,” the action of disobedience, and
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then repeated five more times). This usage of “they” would seem to suggest that God’s
gaze is still comprehensive, or still obscured, not yet made distinct by emphasis,
following the logic of lines 111-19. However, in lines 120-21 the tense has shifted from
the past tense of lines 115-19 to present tense: “They trespass”; “they judge”; “they
choose.” This shift in tense is the grammatical equivalent of divine emphasis, and
articulates it. The subject is the comprehensive “they”; but the shift in tense, functioning
as divine emphasis, specifies which part of the comprehensive subject God is now
speaking of: Adam and Eve.
The following lines make this emphasis clear, and do so by evoking a finalized
past, and a foreknown if not finalized future: “I formed them free, and free they must
remain, / Till they enthrall themselves.” (Here Milton’s God avoids the charge of
predestination, by leaving humankind’s future actions as yet uncommitted. And Milton’s
God does so, while retaining absolute foreknowledge.) Divine emphasis is now on Adam
and Eve, and remains so for the next three and a half lines (“Till they enthrall themselves:
I else must change / Their nature, and revoke the high decree / Unchangeable, eternal,
which ordained / Their freedom”). But then, in the second half of line 128, the emphasis
disappears: “they themselves ordained their fall.” The shift back to past tense indicates
that “they” is no longer the specified “they” of Adam and Eve, but a comprehensive
“they.” The following three lines make it so: “The first sort by their own suggestion fell,
/ Self-tempted, self-depraved: man falls deceived / By the other first: man shall therefore
find grace” (PL 3.129-31). Perhaps most importantly these lines illustrate that throughout
God has always been speaking of Satan and the fallen angels and of Adam and Eve, in
their near and troubling likeness, as figures of free will created by him.
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Foreknowledge and Predestination

Theologically, the passage discussed above—Book 3, lines 80-134—may be the most
central passage in Paradise Lost. 131 In terms of Milton’s theodicy, his stated claim to
“justify the ways of God to man,” it certainly is.
Milton’s justification depends in large part on persuasively distinguishing
foreknowledge from foreordination. As John Rogers has noted, Milton
needs to prove theologically, not just poetically or narratively, that God
did not place Adam and Eve in the garden with the intent or with the
purpose in mind of punishing them for eating the fruit. He needs to
convince himself and he needs to convince his reader that the fact of God's
foreknowledge of the Fall doesn’t in any way cause the Fall. 132
What Rogers is pointing to here is not just Milton’s dilemma, but the disputatious history
of foreknowledge in Christian theology—as noted above, an issue seemingly a priori in
dispute. 133 W.H. Poteat summarizes the problem:
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I am here in full accord with the more or less accepted judgment of Milton criticism that Book 3 is the
most important, theologically, of Paradise Lost. See, for example, Thomas N. Corns, Regaining Paradise
Lost (London: Longman, 1994), 15; Dennis Danielson, Milton’s Good God: A Study of Literary Theodicy,
passim; David Loewenstein, Milton: Paradise Lost, 76-77; and John Rogers, “Milton: Lecture 13”
(http://oyc.Yale.edu/english/milton/content/transcripts/transcript-13-paradise-lost-book-iii, October 22,
2007).
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Rogers, “Milton: Lecture 13.” As Rogers goes on to note, Milton needs to establish first for himself and
then for all Christians, that “free will is a genuine faculty.”
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I will provide a brief review of the dispute in the following few pages, paying attention to those thinkers
whose formulations of the problem explicitly influenced Milton. This means that I do not rehearse the
arguments made by Aristotle, and after him, Aquinas, even though these arguments are of tremendous
importance, and probably affected Milton, at the very least as cultural inheritance. Nor do I give an account
of those important arguments made by medieval philosophers other than Aquinas, most notably Boethius,
Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. Neither do I mention the philosophies of the Spanish Jesuits Luis
Molina (1535-1600) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617); their work on foreknowledge exerted a heavy
influence on future philosophy on these questions, Molina for his highly original doctrine of scientia media
(middle knowledge), and Suarez for his support of Molina’s doctrine, out of which developed his own
doctrine, De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium. But Molina and Suarez, more or less contemporaneous
with Milton, cannot be said to have influenced Milton, even though their positions are similar, most
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If God knows the world in a fashion analogous to that in which we are
thought to know it, but, as is appropriate to omnipotence, without the
element of contingency which infects all our knowing of it, he must know
all the past and all the future as though they were present. From this it
seems to follow that what will be for us in the future is, since already
known in a present to God, what it is, for God, and is already what it is to
be, for us. And this being so, these questions arise: Is it conceivable that
the activity which we take to be one of freely choosing and deciding could
really, under these circumstances, be what it seems to us to be? Even if
we can answer this affirmatively, can the activity of freely choosing be
thought to have any efficacy in the course of the world which it appears
must be determined to be what it is to be, if God is to be thought of as
knowing it in, for him, a present? 134
Poteat’s précis is a more or less theoretical account. As such, it contrasts usefully with
what is conventionally understood to be the Christian source-text of the issue, Romans
8.28-30, where the point of foreknowledge is not an abstract valuation but individual
human beings, called or perhaps not called by God:
And we know that all things work together for good to them that love
God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he
did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his
Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom
he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also
justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.
especially in terms of prevenient grace and free will. In other words, even if there was agreement, Milton
did not have ears for Counter-Reformation doctrine. It should also be reiterated that to some degree Milton
developed his views on free will contra the Socinian doctrine of God’s restricted omniscience, even as he
was debatably sympathetic to other Socinian positions, especially its denial of the trinity.
For a review of foreknowledge and predestination see those entries in The Westminster Dictionary
of Theology, edited by Alan Richardson and John Bowden (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983).
For an in-depth if at times highly specialized historical survey and discussion of the problem, including
studies on all those philosophers just mentioned, see especially William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine
Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (Leiden: Brill, 1988). See also William
Hasker, “The Foreknowledge Conundrum,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50:1
(December, 2001), 97-114; W.H. Poteat, “Foreknowledge and Foreordination: A Critique of Models of
Knowledge,” The Journal of Religion 40:1 (January, 1960), 18-26; William L. Rowe, “Augustine on
Foreknowledge and Free Will,” The Review of Metaphysics 18.2 (December, 1964), 356-63. For a brilliant
discussion of the development of free will in the ancient world, see Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of
the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). This volume is the
distillation of Frede’s forty-year philosophical engagement with the question of free will. Strikingly, Frede
proposes that neither Plato nor Aristotle yet had a concept of free will, and that credit for the concept
should not go principally to Augustine, as conventionally it does, but to the stoic Epictetus, from whom
Augustine developed his concept.
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Interpretation of these verses has been at the heart of Christian theodicy ever since,
including Milton’s.
Following the death of Paul in 67 CE, a growing and ultimately productive
confrontation developed between Neoplatonism and Early Christianity. 135 In 178 CE,
Celsus—a Greek Platonist—composed the first known polemic against Christianity,
entitled True Discourse. 136 As William Lane Craig notes, Celsus “objected to
Christianity on the basis of the fatalistic consequences of Christ’s predictions of his
betrayal [by Judas].” 137 For Celsus, the fact that Christ foreknew his betrayer can only
mean that Judas was fated to betray Christ, with no alternative. (Here, Celsus provides a
foundation for theological fatalism, which posits that omniscience and free will cannot be
compatible.) Further, Celsus sees in this situation a deeper, more appalling betrayal—
Christ’s betrayal of his own disciples. In Celsus’ view, Christ, by the very fact of his
foreknowledge, made his disciples co-conspirators with Judas, thus co-conspirators with
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To say that the confrontation between Neoplatonism and Early Christianity was productive understates
the matter. In terms of seminal influence on Christianity, Neoplatonism, and more broadly the Hellenic
culture of which it was a part, was second only to the Hebrew Bible, and the Judaism of which it was a part.
For an account of this influence see Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans 8.1-14.
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No copy of True Discourse survived. We know of it only as Origen presents it in his response to Celsus
(itself one of the first, if not the first, work of Christian apologetics), Against Celsus. Origen apparently
wrote the work at the request of “pious Ambrosius,” a convert to Christianity. In his preface, he tells
Ambrosius that he has attempted to fulfill Ambrosius’ request: “we have endeavored to the best of our
ability, to suggest, by way of answer to each of the statements advanced by Celsus, what seemed to us
adapted to refute them, although his arguments have no power to shake the faith of any (true) believer”
(Preface, 3). To this end, Origen begins each successive chapter with a summary of one of Celsus’ points,
bolstered by quotations from Celsus. Of course, since there is no extant copy of True Discourse, one must
choose to accept Origen’s account of Celsus as more or less reliable, or reject his account of Celsus as the
most convenient of manipulations, or accept the account in a provisional manner, as a necessary structure
of Origen’s polemic.
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the suffering and death of God on the cross. 138 To put it in the vernacular, Celsus
convicted Christ of rigging the game.
Some seventy years after Celsus’ polemic, Origen wrote his famous rebuttal,
Against Celsus. The seventy-year lapse suggests that Celsus’ polemic had continued to
disquiet early Christians since its appearance in 178. In Against Celsus, Origin refutes
Celsus’ fatalism and its implications, by pointing out Celsus’ misapprehension of the
meaning and function of prediction. Origen writes:
Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to
pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he
who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it
would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place
though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed
with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. 139
In other words, according to Origen, God’s foreknowledge is chronologically but not
causally prior to any given moment. 140
At the beginning of the fourth century, Pelagius, a monk from Britain sojourning
in Rome, articulated a series of theological positions which were to become known as the
Pelagian heresy. For Pelagius, the problem of foreknowledge had little practical, and
perhaps less theological importance. This was so because Pelagius denied both Edenic
paradise and original sin. He also denied the resurrection of the body, and the necessary
grace of God. Primarily stoical in outlook, Pelagius considered man’s will, rightly
trained, sufficient in itself for the virtuous flourishing of humankind. As part of Pelagius’
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See Origen, Against Celsus 2.20.
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See Craig, 59.
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belief in self-sufficiency, he viewed Christ primarily as an exemplar of virtuous and
unshakeable faith, a view amenable to if not synonymous with Arianism.
Most of these positions Pelagius set out in his Commentarii in epistolas S. Pauli,
written sometime around the sack of Rome in 410, and brought to the attention of Saint
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, soon thereafter. Of all the controversies Augustine was
involved in (e.g., Manichaeism, Donatism), the dispute with Pelagius was the most
challenging, ultimately the most productive, and certainly the most important in the
formation of Christian doctrine in the West. 141 Augustine had already addressed the
problem of divine foreknowledge in On the Free Choice of Will, completed in 395, the
same year he became Bishop of Hippo, and just two years before he began writing his
Confessions (completed c. 398). Out of the dispute with Pelagius, Augustine composed
three more tracts, all of which addressed divine foreknowledge and free will, by way of
refuting Pelagianism, and most particularly its denial of grace: On Grace and Free
Choice (426-427), On Reprimand and Grace (426-427), and On the Gift of
Perseverance. 142 He also addressed the problem of divine foreknowledge, contra
Pelagius, in The City of God Against the Pagans, initially conceived of in 410 as a
response against those who blamed the fall of Rome on Christianity. The scope of the
work broadened considerably over the following decade. It was completed in 426, four
years before Augustine’s death.
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Peter King notes firstly that “Augustine formulated some of his most subtle and original doctrines when
confronted by views with which he disagreed”; and secondly, that “without a doubt the most sophisticated
challenge Augustine had to confront was the movement inspired by British monk Pelagius, beginning in the
early 400’s.” See King, introduction to Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free
Choice, and Other Writings, xv.
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Augustine wrote the first two tracts in response to questions raised by the monks of Hadrumetum, and
the third to the monks of Marseilles and Lérins. See King, xvii.

96

In The City of God Augustine counters theological fatalism where he finds it first,
in Cicero’s De divinatione (44 BCE). For Cicero, divine foreknowledge and human free
will are not compatible. 143 Philosophically, the presence of one necessitates the absence
of the other. A stoic, Cicero chooses free will. In Book 5 of The City of God Augustine
recounts Cicero’s philosophical rationale, and the philosophical argument he develops
from it: “In his book De divinatione, however, Cicero in his own person most plainly
opposed the belief in foreknowledge of things to come. But he does this, it seems, in
order to avoid admitting the existence of fate and so losing freedom of will;” 144 and “He
[Cicero] restricts the mind of the religious man to a choice between two alternatives:
either there is something which lies within the power of our own will, or there is
foreknowledge of the future.” 145
Augustine, however, sees no contradiction between foreknowledge and free will.
The crux of Augustine’s argument lies in his estimation of human will. As he proclaims
to his interlocutor, Evodius, in On the Free Choice of the Will, “nothing is so much in our
power as the will itself.” 146 With this statement, Augustine is in ringing agreement with
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See De divinatione 2.56.
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The City of God Against the Pagans 5.9.
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Ibid. In this same paragraph, Augustine makes his now famous declaration on Cicero: “Thus, because he
wished to make men free, he made them ungodly.” Cf. Paradise Lost 9.1074: “And force upon free will
hath here no place.”
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On the Free Choice of the Will 3.3.7.27. Cf. The City of God 5.10: “It is not true, then, that, because God
foreknew what would be within the power of our wills, nothing therefore lies within the powers of our
wills. For when He foreknew this, He did not foreknow nothing. Therefore, if He who foreknew what
would lie within the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, then clearly something
lies within in the power of our wills even though God has foreknowledge of it.” Cf. CD (Yale 6:160): “We
imagine nothing unworthy of God if we maintain that those results, those conditions which God himself has
chosen to place within man’s free power, depend upon man’s free will. In fact, God made his decrees
conditional in this way for the very purpose of allowing free causes to put into effect that freedom which he
himself gave them.” Also cf. Confessions 13.12: “For I am, and I know, and I will. I am a knowing and a
willing being; I know that I am and that I will; and I will to be and to know.”
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stoicism, with Cicero. The agreement is necessarily fleeting. For Augustine, free will
does not cancel out divine foreknowledge. He writes: “The religious mind, however,
chooses both, confesses both, and confirms both by the faith of godliness.” 147 Augustine
then lays out his rationale for the double choice:
Thus it turns out both that we do not deny that God has foreknowledge of
everything that will be, and nevertheless that we do will what we will. For
although He has foreknowledge of our will, it is the will of which he has
foreknowledge. Therefore, it is going to be our will, since He has
foreknowledge of our will. Nor could it be our will if it were not in our
power. Therefore, He has foreknowledge of our power. Hence power is
not taken away from me due to His foreknowledge—it is thus mine all the
more certainly, since He whose foreknowledge does not err foreknew that
it would be mine. 148
As Craig notes, for Augustine “foreknowledge, far from being incompatible with free
will, actually serves to guarantee it.” 149 In other words, where Cicero sees
incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will, Augustine sees absolute and
necessary relation. As such, he is able to proclaim, contra Cicero: “We embrace both.
Faithfully and truly do we confess both: the former that we may believe well, and the
latter that we may live well.” 150
Augustine’s influence on all future thinking about divine foreknowledge and free
will is perhaps incalculable, but as Maurice Kelley points out, “Augustine’s true heirs
were heretics—the Protestant leaders of the early Reformation, who made him the
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The City of God 5.10. By “former” Augustine is referring to foreknowledge, by “latter” to free will.
However, in the context of the full paragraph the formulation is not as clear, as Augustine switches their
order in successive sentences (the clever master rhetorician at work!). N.61 records the first seven lines of
the paragraph, and Augustine’s heavy, albeit inexact use of anadiplosis. The lines following continue the
effect: “We are, then, in no way compelled either to take away freedom of will in order to retain the
foreknowledge of God, or (which is blasphemous) to deny that He has foreknowledge of things to come in
order to retain freedom of the will.” And then, the effect continues with the lines quoted above.
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foundation upon which they reared their formidable dogma of absolute decree and
unconditional predestination.” 151 (Here Kelley is paying Augustine a backhanded
compliment.) It is possible that Kelley’s decided aversion to Augustine, coupled with his
decided admiration for Milton, disallows him from explicitly including Milton in his list
of Augustinian heirs, with regard to divine foreknowledge and free will. 152 But Milton’s
position on foreknowledge and free will is decidedly, if idiosyncratically Augustinian. 153
It is from an Augustinian position that Milton refutes both the Socinian doctrine of
restricted omniscience and the Calvinist doctrine of foreknowledge as predestination.
After a prefatory chapter defining his terms and their constituent parts, Milton
begins Christian Doctrine with a chapter entitled “Of God.” In “Of God” Milton begins
by quoting Psalm 14.1: “for the fool says in his heart There is no God” (Yale 6:130). In
The City of God Augustine quotes the same verse at the start of his polemic against
Cicero (specifically, against Cicero’s view of foreknowledge and free will). In “Of God”
and the two chapters that follow it, “Of Divine Decree” and “Predestination,” Milton
develops and presents his views in doctrinal form. They are fundamentally a re-statement
151

Kelley, Introduction to Christian Doctrine (Yale 6:76-77). The Protestant leaders Kelley has in mind
are, of course, Luther and Calvin. As Kelley points out, in Discourse on Free Will, Luther writes “‘With
regard to God, and in all things pertaining to salvation or damnation, man has no free will, but is a captive,
servant and bondslave, either to the will of God, or to the will of Satan’”: Discourse on Free Will, 113,
quoted in Kelley’s Introduction to CD (Yale 6:77). Kelley also gives a useful although pointedly
unsympathetic account of Augustine’s influence on Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination, and the
reasons for it: “‘the mind of man has been so completely estranged from God’s righteousness that it
conceives, desires, and undertakes, only that which is impious, perverted, foul, impure, and infamous,’ and
‘the heart so steeped in the poison of sin, that it can breathe out nothing but a loathsome stench.’ ‘Man,’
consequently, ‘has now been deprived of freedom of choice and bound over to a miserable servitude,’ so
that his sole hope of salvation lies in the grace of God”: Calvin, Institutes 2.4.9, 2.2, as quoted in Kelley’s
Introduction to CD (Yale 6:77). One final point to be made: Calvin’s doctrine of double predestination is
such because it predestines both the elect and the damned, whereas Augustine predestined (more or less)
only the elect. Arminius follows a version of Augustine’s doctrine, as does Milton after him.
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For the still standard discussion of Milton and Augustine, see C.S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), 66-72.
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of Augustine’s. The difference between the two views (Augustine’s, Milton’s) is perhaps
a difference of emphasis. As regards foreknowledge, in “Of God” Milton writes, “God
has complete foreknowledge, so he knows what men, who are free in their actions, will
think and do, even before they are born and even though these thoughts and deeds will
not take place until many centuries have passed” (Yale 6:150). In “Of Divine Decree”
Milton specifies what he means by divine foreknowledge: “God’s foreknowledge is
simply his wisdom under another name, or that idea of all things which, to speak in
human terms, he had in mind before he decreed anything” (Yale 6:150). 154 After this,
Milton utilizes the same rhetorical strategy Augustine does. Just as Augustine follows his
first, unequivocal declaration of divine foreknowledge with an equally unequivocal
declaration of free will (The City of God 5.9), so too does Milton: “So we must conclude
that God made no absolute decrees about anything which he left in the power of men, for
men have freedom of action” (Yale 6:155). A few pages later, Milton sums up his
argument thusly: “By virtue of his wisdom God decreed the creation of angels and men
as beings gifted with reason and thus with free will” (Yale 6:164). 155
Having established his position, an Augustinian embrace of both divine
foreknowledge and human free will, Milton goes on to elaborate that position, most
notably in relation to predestination. Here, Milton’s Arminianism comes to the fore. In a
brief passage, Milton effectively refutes the efficacy and coherence of double
predestination:
According to their [Reformed theologians] theory we shall have to jettison
entirely all man’s freedom of action and all attempt or desire on his part to
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Cf. Paradise Lost 9.351-52: “But God left free the will, for what obeys / Reason, is free, and reason he
made right.”
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do right. For what follows? If God has decreed I shall be saved whatever
happens, no matter what I may do to prevent it, then I shall not perish.
But he has also decreed that, as a means to salvation, man should do good.
Therefore, if God has really made this decree as well, I cannot possibly
help but do good some time or other. Meanwhile I may do what I like,
and if I were never to do good, I should discover that I was never destined
to be saved after all, which would mean that whatever good I might have
done would have been of no use anyway. 156
(Yale 6:157)
Milton also claims, justifiably, that there is not a single verse of scripture to support
double predestination (Yale 6:157). He writes: “In academic circles the word
‘predestination’ is habitually used to refer to reprobation as well as to election. For the
discussion of such an exacting problem, however, this usage is too slapdash. Whenever
the subject is mentioned in scripture, specific reference is made only to election” (Yale
6:168). His claim rests principally on his interpretation and his presentation of Romans
8.29-30 (the verses with which this section began): “For whom he did foreknow, he also
did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn
among many brethren. Moreover whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and
whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified.”
Milton presents the verses (that is, freely translates them according to his needs) as
follows: “he predestined that they should be shaped to the likeness of his son: and those
whom he has predestined he has also called, justified and made glorious” (Yale 6:168).
Milton elaborates his interpretation of the verses—that is, that they refer only to
election—by citing other biblical verses: 1 Corinthians 2.7, Ephesians 1.5 and 1.11, and
Acts 2.23 and 4.28 (Yale 6:168). The verses are as follows, in Milton’s fragmentary
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The Reformed theologians Milton has in mind include William Perkins, Polanus, Wollebius, Turretinus
and Zanchius. As Kelley points out, Reformed theologians were sensitive to the kind of challenge Milton
makes. For Calvin, there was simply a logical disconnect between free will and predestination, a
disconnection which led him to articulate the position he did.
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translations: 1 Corinthians 2.7: “the wisdom which God predestined, before the creation
of the world, to our glory”; Ephesians 1.5: “he has predestined us to adoption”; Ephesians
1.11: “in whom, indeed, we have given our share, as we were predestined according to
his purpose”; Acts 2.23: “when he had been given to you by the deliberate counsel and
foreknowledge of God”; and Acts 4.28: “that they might do everything which your power
and your counsel predestined would have done.”
This mode of exegesis (predominant in Christian Doctrine) in which biblical
verses are interpreted by way of other biblical verses allows Milton 1) to demonstrate the
simultaneity of scripture to itself, and 2) to extract from scripture the meaning he
intends. 157 Here, Milton gives his thesis (that whenever predestination is mentioned in
scripture, specific reference is made only to election). 158 He then makes his first
interpretation of Romans 8.29-30 by way of 1 Corinthians 2.7. In Romans 8.29-30
predestined refers to “they” (humankind); in 1 Corinthians predestined refers to God’s
wisdom. Thus in a single interpretive maneuver, Milton has associated the idea of
humankind as predestined with God’s wisdom. What we might think of as the Miltonic
weave of interpretation is made even stronger when we recall that Milton defined
foreknowledge as “simply his [God’s] wisdom under another name.” (Yale 6:154). As a
result, Milton has collapsed foreknowledge and predestination, and then subsumed them
under the more plastic because almost totally abstract concept of God’s “wisdom.” This
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It is also the mode of biblical interpretation set out by Augustine in On Christian Doctrine 3.28: “When,
however, a meaning is evolved of such a kind that what is doubtful in it cannot be cleared up by indubitable
evidence from Scripture, it remains for us to make it clear by the evidence of reason. But this is a
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concept Milton takes to mean God’s bestowing of free will to humankind as the potential
election of all humankind. For Milton the prerequisite for election is obedience to divine
will; the prerequisite for obedience to divine will is free will.
So for Milton free will is the decisive characteristic of humankind in relation to
God. 159 And divine foreknowledge is the decisive characteristic of the divine in its
relation to humankind’s free will. They are not incompatible but mutually necessary, if
not dependent. Without free will there can be no obedience. In Areopagitica, Milton for
example writes:
many there be that complain of divin Providence for suffering Adam to
transgresse, foolish tongues! when God gave him reason, he gave him
freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had bin else a meer
artificiall Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions. We our selves
esteem not of that obedience, or love, or gift, which is of force.
(Yale 2:527)
Here Milton’s very Augustinian emphasis on the necessity of free will does not, however,
lead him to join up with the Socinians of his day, who limited God’s omniscience for the
sake of free will. (Socinians believed that limited divine knowledge was the necessary
precondition for free will. Their argument registers as a kind of theological fatalism.)
Contra all incompatibilist views, Milton emphasizes divine foreknowledge as exactly that
precondition necessary for free will. Just before God begins his discourse at 3.80-134
(the passage discussed in detail above), Milton characterizes God and God’s perspective
as “from his prospect high / Wherein past, present, future he beholds, / Thus to his only
159

For a concise discussion of Milton’s concept of free will, see especially Dennis Danielson, “The Fall of
Man and Milton’s Theodicy,” 117. Danielson writes: “A vital component of Milton’s theodicy is the ‘Free
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son foreseeing spoke.” Then, in the course of his speech, God reiterates the primacy of
humankind’s free will (e.g., “I formed them free, and free they must remain”), and free
will as the necessary precondition for humankind’s obedience: “What pleasure I from
such obedience paid, / When will and reason (reason also is choice) / Useless and vain, of
freedom both despoiled, / Made passive both, had served necessity, / Not me.” 160 For
Milton’s God, the answer is none. In that answer is found the essence of Milton’s
theodicy. Milton’s God beholds “from his prospect high,” the past, present and the
future. He foreknows. And Milton’s God wants obedience, issuing from a free will.
Thus, as Milton writes in Christian Doctrine, “neither God’s decree nor his
foreknowledge can shackle free causes with any kind of necessity” (Yale 6:166).

From the Human Point of View

In Book 5, God “to render man inexcusable sends Raphael to admonish [Adam] of his
obedience, of his free estate, of his enemy at hand” (PL 5, Argument). The “enemy at
hand” (Satan) animates “free estate” and “obedience” and suggests the necessity of the
relationship between the two. Without the pressure of the opposing force (“the enemy at
hand”), freedom and obedience remain from the prelapsarian and mortal point-of-view
impracticably ambiguous, dangerously obscure, too near to meaningless, and mistakable
as the most effortless-seeming of commands. Adam knows about disobedience and
obedience, but he does not know disobedience, and he does not know obedience either; it
is simply his disposition. Further, Adam knows only the prohibition, which exists for
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him as a sign that signifies no meaning but consequence. Do this, and you will die. The
“this” only means in terms of the effect it will produce. Similarly, Adam neither does nor
can know freedom; for freedom merely is the situation in the Garden. The ecology of
Eden, of which Adam and Eve are attributes, coheres as the most perfect harmony, Godgiven.
Thus, when Raphael descends to Eden he is met by the non-functioning
epistemology of original innocence. There can be no theory of knowledge, because there
is no knowledge understood in epistemological terms. Therefore, there is no
interpretation going on. Adam has wonder, Eve something approaching trepidation, for
Satan whispered in her dreams. (In other words, in Paradise Lost wonder, then
apprehensiveness, precedes knowledge). And when Raphael arrives, Adam and Eve,
beyond a dream and the recounting of a dream, seem to have no acquired meaning
whether systematized or simply gathered. They have a kind of dream consciousness, but
they have no historical consciousness. The dream follows the prohibition, as if it is the
prohibition as much as Satan who haunts. The transgression of the prohibition will as
God dictates result in death. But death they can sense not as something they know or
apprehend, but only as something they do not want to happen:
This one, this easy charge, of all the trees
In Paradise that bear delicious fruit
So various, not to taste that only Tree
Of knowledge, planted by the Tree of Life,
So near grows death to life, whate’er death is,
Some dreadful thing no doubt.
(PL 4.421-26)
Their situation then, in the garden, before the fall, is—to state the obvious—innocent.
They have been given terms, but instead of an explanation for those terms—that is, an
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explanation of the concepts the terms denote, and an explication of those concepts—they
have been given only an emphasis on the importance of those terms, by consequence.
Their situation is not unlike that of a child taught terms of virtues, and the importance of
those virtues in terms of the consequences following the performance or transgression of
those virtues, but not the meaning of the virtues themselves. To attempt to put it briefly,
Adam and Eve, before the fall, are recipients of signs, the signification of which they
must take entirely on faith. This faith, however, in the context of Paradise Lost (and
Paradise Regained) may be understood as generated by or synonymous with the product
of Adam and Eve’s essential disposition of obedience. In other words, according to God,
faith is all Adam and Eve need.
Properly speaking then, if overstated, the conditions upon which knowledge
depends—time as successive, and comparison—do not exist before the fall. Therefore, it
becomes increasingly difficult to speak of Adam and Eve before the fall as either literary
representations (that is, representations of persons), or as persons, two distinct figures of
humankind. As Gordon Teskey notes, “Adam and Eve are not characters until two-thirds
of the way through the poem [when the fall occurs] because before that they have little to
accomplish, and nothing to endure. We think about them not dramatically but, as it were,
environmentally.” 161 This reading points to Milton’s monist perspective. It is precisely
the case that even though Adam and Eve are the parents of humankind, the first-born
among us, they are before the fall not so much persons in any individual sense, but modes
of the divine.
The fall instantiates knowledge understood epistemologically, by creating the
requirement (the critical need) for interpretation. However, it is in Book 5 that Raphael’s
161
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instruction and Adam’s reception of it begin to conceive knowledge as a human
enterprise. It is a troubling development. For if knowledge as defined above, and
dependent upon the conditions set out above, begins with the fall, then the seeds of
knowledge reside not only in Satan’s whispering to Eve (PL 5.31-93), and Adam’s
preternaturally apt response, but in Raphael’s instructions, and before them, in God’s
single prohibition: God sends Raphael to explicate the single prohibition. So both Eve
and Adam hear what they do not know, as a faraway sound that cannot be identified. For
Eve, the hearing comes in a dream, and is the strong whisper of absolute temptation. For
Adam, it is twofold, a recounting of the dream, and a lecture from an angel. To the first:
without having heard what Eve heard, Adam can only understand the stakes by proxy.
Eve senses, in a kind of preternatural version of monistic genius: she is her body speaking
to herself the truth of her and Adam’s vulnerability. Adam does not know they are
vulnerable. Further, Adam does not know vulnerability as one among many possible
states of being. Further, Adam does not know states of being. In Milton’s still residually
masculinist perspective, Adam is the purer of the two. He is also the less intelligent. In a
dream, Eve has seen creation: “Forwith up to the clouds / With him I flew, and
underneath beheld / the Earth outstretched immense, a prospect wide / And various” (PL
5.86-89). In this moment Milton looks to Job and to Jesus, recalling both simultaneously.
The Lord speaks to Job out of the whirlwind, and the Voice of the Whirlwind gives the
panorama of creation, a poetic tour of the living world in its conception and particulars,
pronounced with overwhelming force by repeated rhetorical questions. 162 And in the
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Gospels of Mathew and Luke, Satan takes Jesus to the mountaintop and shows him “all
the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time.” 163 Eve echoes both.
Raphael begins with a discourse on the refining work of creation:
O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed, and up to him return,
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Endued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and in things that live, of life;
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure,
As nearer to him placed or nearer tending
Each in their several active spheres assigned,
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportion to each kind.
(PL 5.469-79)
The process of refinement describes a monist universe, and culminates, potentially, in the
ascent of the human spirit to the Angelic or heavenly realm. However, the culmination is
offered as a potentiality, rather than a given, because it depends on human behavior. And
so, Raphael ends his lecture with a caveat:
And from these corporal nutriments perhaps
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,
Improved by tract of time, and winged ascend
Ethereal, as we, or may at choice
Here or in Heav’nly paradises dwell;
If ye be found obedient, and retain
Unalterably firm his love entire
Whose progeny you are.
(PL 5.496-503)
Milton’s use of a semi-colon at line 500 is precise and telling. The semi-colon indicates
connection between clauses, with the first clause dependent on the second. This
grammatical situation is exactly the thematic situation. In the first four lines of the
passage Raphael tells the promise (the potential) of ultimate refinement. Then the semi163
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colon at line 500 indicates that the promise is and will be dependent on something other
than itself for realization. The three lines that follow are that something other upon
which the promise depends: human obedience, self-evident to Raphael perhaps, and
certainly to God, but a mystery in Eden, a term without context, in a place without
history.
Adam responds emotively and with praise to the tale of refinement Raphael tells:
“O favorable spirit, propitious guest” (PL 5.507). But Adam, having only wonder, can
only wonder at Raphael’s instruction: “If ye be found obedient…” That is, he cannot
interpret the instruction as it applies to himself and his future behavior. The very idea of
future behavior does not exist for Adam. And the idea of obedience exists only as the
first instruction he is given. That is, Adam knows it primarily in terms of priority and
genre. Since it is the first instruction he is given, he knows it is important; and since his
will is immediately disposed to concord, he can immediately assume that he is entirely
and irreversibly concordant with the instruction. But in terms of the instruction’s
meaning and application, Adam does not have any practicable knowledge. There is
simply no other option than this thing obedience described in this first instruction, not
even imaginatively. So Adam asks:
But say
What meant that caution joined, ‘If ye be found
Obedient’? Can we want obedience then
To him, or possibly his love desert
Who formed us from the dust, and placed us here
Full to the utmost measure of what bliss
Human desires can seek or apprehend?
(PL 5.512-18)
From our perspective, that is, the perspective afforded by the fall (therefore situated after
the fall), the answer is, “Of course!” Eve, having been whispered to, knows the answer.
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This distinguishes her in the moment from Adam. But Eve’s knowing the answer does
not confirm to a state of knowledge, but to an experience of haunting.
In response to Adam’s question (“Can we want obedience then…”), Raphael
explains the supreme import of obedience for Adam and Eve, for humankind: “Attend:
that thou are happy, owe to God; / That thou continu’st such, owe to thyself, / That is, to
thy obedience; therein stand” (PL 5.520-23). The meaning is unequivocal, as is the
instruction. Adam’s happiness depends entirely on Adam being Adam as he is before the
fall, the living embodiment of obedience, fashioned by God. No reiteration would seem
to be needed, no further emphasis. Raphael gives both: “That was that caution giv’n
thee; be advised.” He might have said, You’ve been warned! And “Be advised”
abstracts “therein stand” to a formidable regulation. Raphael then reiterates again the
critical and essential importance of obedience, as if by force of reiteration he might make
Adam understand by hearing that which Adam cannot understand by interpretation.
Further, Raphael includes himself and the angels as subject to the same charge of
obedience as humankind, an inclusion which does the rhetorical work of giving
experiential authority to Raphael’s instruction (it is a sophisticated version of “trust me, I
know what I’m talking about, and I know it by my own experience”):
Myself and all th’angelic host that stand
In sight of God enthroned, our happy state
Hold, as you yours, while our obedience holds;
On other surety none; freely we serve,
Because we freely love, as in our will
To love or not; in this we stand or fall.
(PL 5.535-40)
At the close of book 8 (the last book before the fall), Raphael reiterates his instruction yet
again, before departing: “Be strong, live happy, and love, but first of all / Him whom to
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love is to obey, and keep / His great command” (PL 8.633-35). It is perhaps the most
absurd of understatements to say the following: the instruction doesn’t take.
Milton begins Book 9 with a confirmation of the fact (the fall), before the
dramatization of it: “I now must change / Those notes to tragic; foul distrust, and breach /
Disloyal on the part of man, revolt, / And disobedience” (PL 9.5-8). The fall happens and
all its sorrowful effects. After it, God sends Michael to evict Adam and Eve from
Paradise. But, as the Argument to Book 11 attests, God also sends Michael down to
“reveal to Adam future things” (PL 11, Argument). These future things are the
generations of the flood, the generations of Abraham, the exile and the nomination of
Moses, and the redemption of humankind by the life, death, and resurrection of the
Son. 164 This is the knowledge Michael imparts to Adam. Now Adam must learn it
rightly, to have it as knowledge. If he does so, he, thus humankind, will experience
paradise again:
This having learnt, thou hast attained the sum
Of wisdom; hope no higher, though all the stars
Thou knew’st by name, and all th’ ethereal powers,
All secrets of the deep, all nature’s works,
Or works of God in heav’n, air, earth, or sea,
And all the riches of this world enjoyedst,
And all the rule, one empire; only add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith,
Add virtue, patience, temperance, add love,
By name to come called charity, the soul
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
A paradise within thee, happier far.
(PL 12.575-87, emphasis added)
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CHAPTER 3
THE TIMING OF CHRIST
In Paradise Regained, Milton establishes right timing as the essential characteristic of the
Son’s obedience. 165 It is the essential characteristic because it is that part of the Son that
Satan does not understand. As such it is the quality that informs the Son’s resistance to
temptation, and ultimately, makes the Son the savior. If from the divine point-of-view
the temptation in the wilderness is the trial of the Son’s obedience, from the satanic pointof-view the temptation is the trial of the Son’s divinity—for Satan still doubts, or wills to
doubt the Son’s divinity deep into book 4: “For Son of God to me is yet in doubt” (PR
4.501). The Son’s resistance—that is the performance of his obedience—is made as a
man. The perfection of his resistance is the fulfillment of his divine destiny. 166 To
attempt an analogy: when the Son lifts his foot to step, he does so as human; when he
brings that foot down, most especially on the pinnacle, he does so as God.
How this timing works as the indispensable mechanism of obedience is the
primary concern of this chapter. What I mean by timing as a Miltonic concept is roughly
Milton’s sense of the key classical concept of kairos as it is refracted in the three Miltonic
motifs of waiting, hearing, and stepping. These motifs appear throughout Milton’s work,
and are decisively present in the late masterpieces. A presentation of the first two, and
suggestion of the third (stepping), is given in the first section of the chapter. In the
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second section of the chapter I delineate the philosophical and literary context by which I
intend kairos to be understood. This study of kairos pays particular attention to the
formulations of this multivalent concept which most correspond to Milton’s, particularly
the antecedental forms of kairos in Homeric epic, and then its conceptual development
and use in Pindar, and especially in Plato. The chapter concludes with a reading of the
seminal moment of timing in Paradise Regained, the Son on the pinnacle—for Milton the
emblem of the triumph of obedience.

Waiting, Hearing, Stepping

There are three components of Miltonic timing: waiting, hearing, stepping. A sustained
examination of the first two of these components—with the third implied—tells us how
Milton’s concept of timing works, and thus provides a persuasive, operational definition
of obedience. My sense of “operational definition” should be understood in the context
of Wittgenstein’s theory of “family resemblances” developed in Philosophical
Investigations. 167 The operational definition of a thing cannot point to its essence,
individually, or to its essential relation to other like operations, but to its use in any given
situation, and its resemblances to like operations in similar situations. The operational
definition of obedience, together with the ostensive definition provided in previous
chapters, will go a long way in establishing a full reading of Miltonic obedience—the
concept of obedience, the structure and mechanics of obedience, and the necessary
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conditions for obedience (this last is addressed in the chapter to follow). By “ostensive
definition” I mean that definition which is made by a literal or figurative “pointing.” 168
If timing is thought of as a mechanism of obedience, waiting, hearing, and
stepping may be understood as mechanisms of that larger mechanism. So that waiting,
hearing, and stepping may more generally be understood as aspects of obedience. It is
important to keep the relation between these aspects and obedience in mind, because for
Milton timing as a concept independent of obedience to divine will is valueless; so too
the structuring mechanisms of timing, no matter how elegant. For Milton, timing is in the
service of obedience. The waiting is a state of readiness, ready to hear the will of God,
and thus confirmed by that hearing. 169 Hearing the will of God then becomes stepping
(acting) in precise accordance with the will of God. So the waiting is a devout waiting, a
waiting to discern the divine will. The hearing is the discernment of divine will. The
stepping is the action which follows the hearing of the divine will.
Further, waiting, hearing and stepping characterize Milton’s Christian heroism,
and find their corollaries in the very Christian language of patience and martyrdom. To
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be obedient as Milton conceives of it is to risk suffering and death for the sake of truth
(martyrdom), and so to suffer with calm endurance (patience). 170 The Son says,
But if there be in glory aught of good,
It may by means far different be attained
Without ambition, war, or violence;
By deeds of peace, by wisdom eminent,
By patience, temperance.
(3.88-92)
Satan does not hear the countermand the Son is speaking. Moreover, Satan cannot hear.
This inability is what sets him endlessly and negatively apart from the Son and
potentially from humankind (just as the Son’s ability to hear sets him apart from Satan,
and, ideally, not from humankind). As Laurie Zwicky notes, “Satan has no
comprehension of the rightness of a moment; he comprehends only opportuneness.” 171
Thus Satan’s interrogation presses on: “The prophets old, who sung thy endless reign, /
The happier reign the sooner it begins; / Reign then; what canst thou better do the while?”
(3.178-80). The rushing into action—and its rushing will-to-power—is itself a
temptation. In response the Son first obliquely remarks that his time has not yet come
(3.182-83). The lines are a direct quotation from John 7.6 (“My time is not yet come”).
He then suggests an explanation for seeming (only seeming) inaction:
What if he hath decreed that I shall first
Be tried in humble state, and things adverse,
By tribulations, injuries, insults,
Contempts, and scorns, and snares, and violence,
Suffering, abstaining, quietly expecting
Without distrust or doubt, that he may know
What I can suffer, how obey? Who best
170
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Can suffer, best can do; best reign, who first
Well hath obeyed.
(3.188-96, emphasis added)
Taken together, the two passages express a crucial truth for Milton: to be obedient—
which means to be able to wait for the right time, to hear when that time is come, and to
step (act) at that time—is to be heroic in Christian terms.
Poetically, waiting, hearing, and stepping are the central motifs by which and
around which Paradise Regained is organized, and to a large degree those motifs around
which Paradise Lost and Samson Agonistes are also organized. Further, one might say
that they serve as central motifs throughout the corpus of Milton’s work, from the
“Nativity Ode” onward. They work in concert, revolvingly: stepping, waiting, hearing,
stepping, waiting, hearing, stepping and so on, and are as much about Milton’s very
Pindaric sense of his own poetic destiny, as they are motifs of and in the poems
themselves. 172
Waiting appears in Milton’s early work, and he returns to the idea with striking
presence in the later poems. Hearing and stepping are the animating principles of this
waiting, without which waiting is for Milton misguided, or outright meaningless. As
Northrop Frye wrote more than forty-five years ago in The Return of Eden:
In the temptations of Adam and Samson the same theme recurs of an
action not so much wrong in itself as wrong at that time, a hasty snatching
of a chance before the real time has fulfilled itself. Christ is older than
Milton was at twenty-three when he wrote his famous sonnet, and Satan is
constantly urging him, from the first temptation on, to be his own
providence, to release some of his own latent energies. The discipline of
172
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waiting is not only more difficult and inglorious, but constantly subject to
the danger of passing insensibly into procrastination. 173
The sonnet Frye refers to is Sonnet 7 (1633) in which Milton reimagines what he took at
the beginning of the poem to be the distressing onset of his twenty-third year. 174 Milton
achieves this work of re-imagination, of re-vision, with an appeal to timing and its heroic
subsidiary, waiting. In other words, Milton stops thinking about himself in relation to
time, and starts thinking about himself in relation to timing. 175 This shift in attention
produces what we may think of as Miltonic waiting—a waiting of steady alertness, the
steady alertness poetically represented by hearing.
Sonnet 7 is a poem of compressed and remarkable transformation. Taking Milton
at his word (“How soon hath Time the subtle thief of youth, / Stol’n on his wing my three
and twentieth year”), the sonnet was written in 1631. 176 It was then included in “Letter to
an Unknown Friend,” if we accept Parker’s dating, two years later. It is then that Milton
shared the accusation and accepted the implied charge of wasting time (a charge
presumably leveled in the letter by the unknown friend to which Milton was responding),
re-envisioned it in grander terms by way of turning the adjectival belated (defined in the
OED as “Overtaken by lateness of the night; hence, overtaken by darkness, benighted”)
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into a state of being, a subtly heroic condition possibly, and then refuted the charge with
Sonnet 7. In other words, Milton communicated that he had already shared and
addressed with great skill and imagination his interlocutor’s concerns.
The sonnet begins with belatedness; it ends with readiness. It is almost as if
Milton is inscribing his destiny, or the next long step of it. Also, the sonnet itself has a
destiny. It begins, “How soon hath Time the subtle thief of youth.” In the following
eight lines, this particular, personified version of Time corners the speaker (23-year-old
Milton) with a blank appraisal: if you were really meant to be a great poet, you would
have produced something great by now. But in line 9, Time personified is replaced by
timing, and the corner becomes a vista (at least for the moment) of an as yet undisclosed
promise overseen by a rigorously attentive God:
Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow,
It shall be still in strictest measure even
To that same lot, however mean or high,
Toward which Time leads me, and the will of Heaven;
All is, if I have grace to use it so,
As ever in my great Taskmaster’s eye. 177
(ll.9-14)
The destiny of the poem is the poet’s destiny, made clear: “Apparent delay becomes
appropriate preparation. Time the thief becomes Time the guide.” 178 And time as guide
(more precisely, Milton’s understanding of timing as registered in the sonnet’s sestet)
calls Milton to attention.
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sense of timing to a greater degree than might be expected from a swift and informal letter.
178

MLM 134.
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This kind of attention—steady, alert—Milton figured as angelic in his poetry
written before Sonnet 7 (“Nativity Ode”), after it as chaste (A Masque Presented at
Ludlow Castle), and then as explicitly self-directed and potentially heroic in human terms
(Sonnet 19). In the “Nativity Ode” (1629), Milton’s first great poem, waiting is the work
of angels, and is vigilant: “the spangled host keep watch in squadrons bright” (l.21). In
this single line, Milton associates—brings together—the stars (“spangled”), the angels
(“host”), and soldiers (“squadrons”) under the defining rubric of “bright.” 179 With these
three words Milton first articulates to himself the characteristics of what will become his
concept of waiting: that it is at once star-like, angelic, and martial (its perspective is
from-on-high, its relation is one of concern, its attitude is one of vigilance). What binds
the three together is “brightness,” that necessary condition for Miltonic waiting, which is
in “Nativity Ode” defined by what it binds metaphorically: stars, angels, soldiers. The
famous final line of the ode (l.244) distills the angelic waiting of line 21 to the will of
God: “Bright-harnessed angels sit in order serviceable.” The angels are harnessed by the
brightness of God—that is, their enormous angelic energy is equipped for directed use.
Because they are harnessed by the brightness of God, they are bright. So “bright” refers
to the brightness of God’s harnessing, to the brightness of angels so harnessed, and thus
to the brightness of that relation. The relation extends from that between God and angels,
to that between angels and angels, who “sit in order,” who are composed in ranks (the
martial valence is intended) of mutual brightness in what Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 5th
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“Bright” is one of Milton’s favorite terms, and appears throughout his work, e.g., 63 times in Paradise
Lost alone. He uses the term both poetically (as a descriptor) and theologically (to note a condition).
Further, “squadron bright” appears again in PL 4.977: “While thus he [Satan] spake, th’ angelic squadron
bright / Turned fiery red.”
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century BCE) called their “celestial hierarchies.” 180 Finally, they sit in order
“serviceable,” that is, ready to serve, alert and waiting to be so called.
In A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle (1634) Milton associates waiting with
the virtue of chastity. The elder brother’s confidence in the ability of his sister, the Lady,
to spiritually withstand Comus’ proto-Satanic heat, regardless of physical outcome, rests
squarely on his estimation of purity and on his belief in his sister’s purity. 181 For the
Elder brother, “He that has light within his own clear breast / May sit i’th’ center, and
enjoy bright day” (ll.381-82). 182 The lines resonate with both line 20 and line 244 from
the “Nativity Ode,” particularly with its use of “bright,” but also of “sit.” Together the
words suggest radiant poise, again, a steady alertness, but this time the alertness belongs
not to the realm of angels, but to humankind (albeit humankind in the excessively
virtuous figuration of the Lady). 183 And the use of “enjoy” and “bright” with “day”

180

See Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, in The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luibheid
(New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 143-92. For a recent and comprehensive discussion of Milton’s
angelology, see Joad Raymond, Milton’s Angels: The Early Modern Imagination (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
181

I say Comus’ “proto-Satanic” heat to emphasize A Masque’s relationship to Paradise Regained as the
proto-type for it, from the characters of the Lady (the Son) and Comus (Satan), to the shared themes of
temptation and resistance.
182

The lines correspond with Luke 11.34: “The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye is
single, thy whole body also is full of light.” The Elder brother is referring here to his sister.
183

As I note in the introduction, Milton’s first sustained formulation of purity—the Lady in Masque—a
condition critical to his understanding of obedience, is in fact a misreading of chastity. The Lady’s chastity
is a “defensive virginity” dependent in large measure for its efficacy upon a separation of spirit and matter
that Milton opposed in his mature poetry and prose. See J.M. Evans, “Lycidas,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Milton, 35-50; Stephen Orgel, “The Case for Comus,” Representations 81 (Winter, 2003),
31-45; Kimberly Reigle, “Defensive Virginity from Spenser to Milton,” PhD diss., University of North
Carolina Greensboro, 2010 (http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/listing.aspx?id=3698); and Debora Shuger, “‘Gums of
Glutinous Heat’ and the Stream of Consciousness: The Theology of Milton’s Maske,” Representations 60
(Autumn, 1997), 1-21.
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signals an important development in Milton’s conceptual formulation of waiting: “enjoy”
implies a pleasing calm, a receptivity to the day’s offering (“and enjoy bright day”). This
positive qualification of waiting also indicates the quality of which the waiting is
decidedly not comprised: anxiety. In other words, for Milton the waiting is alert, but it is
not anxious. The poised and receptive quality of Miltonic waiting must be grasped, if his
concept of timing—and the utter importance of this timing to his concept of obedience—
is to be understood. Thus, in Masque the bright-harnessed angels “sit”; they do not burn
or lean or flail; and the Lady “sits” enjoying the day. The situation recalls Milton’s
pensive and one might say angelic dream for himself considered in Il Penseroso: “And
may at last my weary age / Find out the peaceful hermitage, / The hairy gown and mossy
cell, / Where I may sit and rightly spell, / of every star that heaven doth show” (ll.16671).
Finally, the troubling designation of virginity in the masque becomes less
troublesome when it is aligned with Milton’s conceptual priorities. If what makes the
Lady a virgin is her chastity, what makes her chaste is obedience (to the will of the
divine). Her obedience is characterized by waiting. Her waiting, her ability to not-act, is
a force which Comus feels and fears and cannot counter. Like Satan in Paradise
Regained for whom he is the rehearsal, Comus in his temptation of the Lady meets with
(the Lady’s) imperviousness. What Comus wants is the Lady’s consent. What he gets is
her refusal, and then her disdain. Thus (again like Satan) he must amplify the rhetoric of
his temptations. He must dislocate her from her virtue, from her ability in obedience to
wait. So he presses on, mystified maybe, and ends his appeal with an almost coy, “Think
what, and be advised, you are but young yet” (l.755).
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Young or not, the Lady is inside herself as bright-harnessed as an angel, thus a
figure of force, contained. Just as Comus is a prototype for Satan in Paradise Regained,
so the Lady is a prototype for the Son; and the debate (a mild word perhaps for such a
moral showdown) between the Lady and Comus prefigures that between the Son and
Satan. When the Lady replies to Comus with the full force of mockery at her disposal,
she is prefiguring the Son’s threatful and mocking response to Satan in Paradise
Regained. The Son’s mockery of evil rests on the surety of his obedience, and because
he is the only begotten Son of God, his obedience is synonymous with his destiny. To
Satan he says,
Know therefore when my season comes to sit
On David’s throne, it shall be like a tree
Spreading and overshadowing all the earth,
Or as a stone that shall to pieces dash
All monarchies besides throughout the world.
(PR 4.146-50)
In Masque the Lady proclaims to Comus the revelation of her potential (a proclamation
which is at the same time the revelation of his impotence). The surety of her claim
cannot be as the Son’s, but is qualitatively like the Son’s: “Thou art not fit to hear thyself
convinced,” she says,
Yet should I try, the uncontrolled worth
Of this pure cause would kindle my rapt spirits
To such a flame of sacred vehemence
That dumb things would be moved to sympathize,
And the brute earth would lend her nerves and shake,
Till all thy magic structures reared so high
Were shattered into heaps o’er thy false head.
(Masque ll.793-99)
In other words, the person who sits restrained in Comus’ enchanted chair is she who has
“light within [her] own clear breast” (l.381) and sits (“in order serviceable”) in the center,
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poised and without anxiety. What center? one might ask. The center, Milton replies,
comprised of God, and the figuring space at God’s right hand. So, Comus is in a spiritual
fight he was not perhaps prepared for. He acknowledges the possibility, and his own fear
of it: “She fables not, I feel that I do fear / Her words set off by some superior power”
(ll.800-01). Two lines later he likens her proclamation to wrathful Jove speaking thunder
(ll.803-04).
It is worth remembering here that the threat Comus feels, the holy heat of it,
follows not from an act of aggression but from the Lady’s poised waiting, and perhaps
what’s more, to the strength of her commitment to that waiting. So that the famously
obscure “sage and serious doctrine of virginity” (l.787), which the Lady speaks to
Comus, refers for its power not to mere virginity but to the rapt and focused condition of
waiting. The doctrine is serious because of its commitment to waiting; it is sage because
of the visionary aspect of this waiting. The waiting is visionary because it is connected
as if by an invisible unbreakable thread—what the Lady calls the “sun-clad Power of
Chastity” (l.782)—to what is not but what will be, to the fullness of time expressed as the
sum of all the moments of right timing; and it is connected by the activity at the center of
waiting, that is, a rapt and quiet listening for, which becomes a hearing of.
If in Sonnet 7 Milton first admitted in a poem his fear of belatedness, of having
missed his mark (a catastrophic possibility of disobedience), in Sonnet 19 (c.1652),
Milton returns to the theme, this time as a blind man in his early forties, a revolutionary, a
regicide, a widower. The possibility is catastrophic because for Milton, missing his time
would have meant failing to hear the will of God, thus failing to act in accordance with
the will of God, thus being disobedient to the will of God. On the one hand, Milton’s
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valuation of obedience generated enormous spiritual pressure, pulverizing in its dark
possibilities; on the other hand, Miltonic obedience relied on individual conscience, and
was intended for liberty. Thus, Milton replies to the pressures of political and social
convention (bishops, curricula, divorce laws, etc…) with the pressure of the Holy Spirit.
Milton brings to Sonnet 19 the formulations produced in Sonnet 7, in “Nativity
Ode,” and in Masque. Like Sonnet 7, Sonnet 19 begins in near despair, as Milton
ponders again, with suspicion, his own belatedness:
When I consider how my light is spent,
Ere half my days, in this dark world and wide,
And that one talent which is death to hide,
Lodged with my useless... 184
(ll.1-4)
What makes the openings of the two sonnets different is that the stakes of Sonnet 19 are
so very much higher. The belatedness described in the first lines of Sonnet 7 is the
belatedness of the young and mightily ambitious poet whose creative sap may be
congealed, and whose dream of fame is vanishing (“My hasting days fly on with full
career, / But my late spring no bud or blossom showeth”). For a fleeting moment, the
speaker of the poem (young Milton) admits the terrible possibility that he has
overestimated his poetic gift, and its resultant destiny. The moment registers as
genuinely existential, but it registers as such in the limited and entirely self-referential
realm of a young poet: I thought I was destined for singular poetic greatness; am I
184

In line 3 Milton is referring to the Parable of the Talents, Matthew 25.25-30: “And I was afraid, and
went and hid thy talent in the earth: lo, there thou hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him,
Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not
strawed: Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should
have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath
ten talents. For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath
not shall be taken away even that which he hath. And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness:
there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.”
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wrong? Sonnet 19, on the other hand, begins where Sonnet 7 ends: “All is, if I have
grace to use it so, / As ever in my great Taskmaster’s eye” (emphasis added). The stakes
now are nothing less than the judgment of God, bearing down on the poet who hid his
God-given talent, rendering the talent useless by lodging it in the dimmest inner reaches
of a blind and exasperated self (ll.3-4). And the self is exasperated because it cannot
believe that God would “exact day labor” from a man (Milton) “light denied” (l.7).
Just like Sonnet 7, however, Sonnet 19 turns at the octave/sestet division; at line 9
in both sonnets the speaker begins to extract himself from the vision of belatedness
proposed by the first eight lines, and moves into the alternative, expansive visions of lines
9-14. The clamor of near-despair, and its despairing message (ll.1-8 in both sonnets)
becomes in Sonnet 19 a “murmur” (l.9). That is, Milton characterizes it as a murmur
from the mouth of patience: “but patience to prevent / That murmur soon replies” (ll.8-9).
It is possible that murmur here suggests a dual analogy: the murmur of Satan, and the
murmur (rather than the quake) of the earth. Both are perennial forces, but diminished in
form, quieted to the background by a bona fide appeal to patience. 185 Thereafter, Milton
calls himself to right attention by reminding himself that “God doth not need / Either
man’s work or his own gifts.” Necessarily, the reminder begs the question (well, what
does God require then?) that the following two lines address, “Who best / Bear his mild
yoke, they serve him best” (ll.10-11). 186 The lines echo back to the “Nativity Ode”
(“Bright-harnessed angels sit in order serviceable”) and forward to the triumphantly
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Cf. Paradise Lost 4: “He [Satan] mounted scale aloft: nor more; but fled / Murmuring and with him fled
the shades of night” (4.1014-15); “With gentle voice, I thought it thine; it said / Why sleep’st thou Eve?
Now is the pleasant time” (5.37-39). In these lines Eve recounts Satan whispering in her dreams.
186

Cf. Matthew 11.29-30: “Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and
ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.”
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patient conclusion of Sonnet 19, “They also serve who only stand and wait” (l.14). With
this line Milton has completed the transfer of waiting, from the angelic realm, through the
excessively idealized human realm, to the merely human realm. If in “Nativity Ode”
waiting is the disposition of angels, in Sonnet 19 it has become the disposition of men
and women and poets, Milton foremost among them.
However, the line (“They also serve who only stand and wait”) in its very syntax
begs a critical question: how is it that waiting serves? We know “they” serve because
serve comes first in the sentence, unadorned to describe what “they” do. And we learn at
the conclusion of the sentence that their service is performed by “waiting.” To know how
they serve then—to know it mechanically—depends upon the quality of the waiting, of
what that waiting is comprised.
The answer to this question brings us to the second key motif in Milton’s
conception of obedience: hearing. It is listening that promotes waiting to the potential
rank of service. Then it is hearing that makes of waiting, service. One serves by waiting
to hear what is, in terms of service, to be heard. In other words, one waits to hear the will
of God. The service is rendered legitimate, however, not by the hearing (the intended
outcome) of the waiting, but by the quality of the waiting itself. 187 The quality of the
waiting is rapt listening, a vigil illustrative of the Great Commandment in the Synoptic
Gospels, and the revisionary New Commandment in the Gospel of John. 188 In Matthew
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Cf. Acts 1.7: “And he [Christ] said unto them, it is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which
the Father hath put in his own power.”
188

Shema refers to the first command in the Synoptic versions (to love the Lord thy God); the Great
Commandment refers to the second command, in John’s revisioning of the Shema (to love thy neighbor as
thyself). In the Hebrew, Shema is a central prayer of Judaism, expressive of the foundational commitment
of monotheism, and found in Deuteronomy 6.4-5: “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord: And thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.”
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Jesus’ words are given as: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with
all thy soul, and all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second
is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (Matthew 22.37-38). 189 The New
Commandment of the Gospel of John is: “A new commandment I give unto you, That ye
love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another” (John 13.34). In
Book 4 of Paradise Regained, the Son cites the New Commandment to illuminate the
force and reason of his waiting, and thus to refute Satan’s temptation to rush:
But I endure the time, till which expired,
Thou hast permission on me. It is written
The first of all commandments, ‘Thou shalt worship
The Lord thy God, and only him shalt serve.’
(PR 4.174-77)
Whenever Milton uses the motif of waiting, hearing is always, if sometimes silently,
being used as well. In those cases in which waiting is used without explicit reference to
hearing, hearing is an implied motif, as the soul of waiting. In those cases in which
hearing is written, it is done so in reference to waiting. Further, hearing as a motif is
given both by the word itself (“hearing”) and by its associative emblem, “ear(s).”
In the “Nativity Ode” Milton asks (the asking is a kind of ordering prayer) the “crystal
spheres” to “once bless our human ears” (ll.125-26). Crystal spheres refers to the music
of the spheres, the angelic harmony usually beyond the realm of human hearing. 190 So
the disposition of the hearing is angelic in the Ode, just as the disposition of waiting was
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Cf. Mark 12.30-31: “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and
with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely
this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”; and Luke 10.27: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all
thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as
thyself.”
190

As the editors of the Modern Library Milton point out, “Each of the planetary spheres was believed to
produce a unique note of the overall ‘music of the spheres’ normally inaudible on the fallen Earth. Here
Milton imagines that vast music joining in the higher harmony of the angelic symphony” (MLM 24, n.125).
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angelic. Further, the object of the hearing is itself angelic, belongs to and comes from
that higher realm.
Like waiting, hearing oriented in this fashion—as a kind of prayerful longing to
hear divine harmony, figured as external and far—appears throughout and is developed in
Milton’s early poems: as for example, in “The Passion” (ll.1-2), Arcades (ll.62-64), “At a
Solemn Music” (ll.17-24) and “Upon the Circumcision” (ll.1-3). 191 The speaker in all of
these poems (versions of Milton as a young man) waits to hear the music of the spheres,
and understands that “melodious noise” as external, far. The point bears repeating
because it indicates that hearing, as waiting before it, is first formulated by Milton as an
angelic disposition (a profound otherness, second only to the otherness of God). The
speaker in these poems does not pray so much to be angelic, so to hear the harmonious
sphere, as to be either visited by the spheres as by an angel, or momentarily possessed by
the angelic spirit capable of hearing the harmonious sphere.
Having transferred his motif of waiting from the angelic to the human, Milton
does the same with hearing. The work of transference begins in the early prose tracts, the
workshops for Milton’s mature concept of obedience, thus of its requisite mechanism,
timing, thus of waiting, hearing, stepping. The transfer made is an inward turn, resonant
with Milton’s prioritization of conscience, in terms of obedience. The formulation is
made negatively in Reason of Church Government (1642), in which Milton addresses his
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“Erewhile of music, and ethereal mirth, / Wherewith the stage of air and earth did ring” (“The Passion”
ll.1-2); “then listen I / To the celestial sirens’ harmony, / That sit upon the nine enfolded spheres” (Arcades
ll.62-64); “That we on earth with undiscording voice / May rightly answer that melodious noise; / As once
we did, till disproportioned sin / Jarred against nature’s chime, and with harsh din / Broke the fair music
that all creatures made / To their Great Lord, whose love their motion swayed/In perfect diapason, whilst
the stood / In first obedience” (“At a Solemn Music” ll.17-24); “Ye flaming Powers, and winged warriors
bright, / That erst with music, and triumphant song / First heard by happy watchful shepherds’ ear” (“Upon
the Circumcision” ll.1-3).
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fundamental reason for writing the tract, more generally for entering the dispute over
prelacy (one might say, for stepping in):
But this I foresee, that should the Church be brought under heavy
oppression, and God have given me ability the while to reason against that
man that should be the author of so foul a deed, or should she by blessing
from above on the industry and courage of faithfull men change this her
distracted estate into better daies without the least furtherance or
contribution of those few talents which God at that present had lent me, I
foresee what stories I should heare within my selfe. 192
(Yale 1:804)
In other words, in his disposition of bright attention—serving by waiting—Milton heard
(the version is obviously Milton’s, thus strategic and maybe self-valorizing). What he
heard at this point recounted in RCG, is not however the clarion absolute of divine will,
but some faint sound of it powered by visionary fear (“I foresee”) of disobedience, as
threatening a potential fate for burying talent, as it is in Sonnet 19. So Milton’s timing—
from waiting, to hearing, to stepping (in this case, stepping into the political and
ecclesiological disputes of his age)—in part results from his now elusively but
nonetheless persuasive fear of its absence, of missed timing. By extension, one might
suggest that Milton’s visionary obedience develops out of his vision of disobedience. 193
It is important to note that hearing, as a motif developed by Milton, transpires in
worlds of noise, from the fantastic clamor of Masque to the very real and pitched
discordancy of England on the verge of civil war, and the momentous events following
it—the “barbarous dissonance” of Restoration culture Milton implicitly invokes in the
invocation to Book 7 of Paradise Lost (7.32). That is, the context for hearing (as motif of
Milton’s concept of timing) is noise, the sheer punishing din within which one must
192

Milton’s mention of “talents” hearkens back to his meditation on that subject in Sonnet 19.

193

The point then would seem to suggest that Paradise Lost (the epic of disobedience) necessarily came
before Paradise Regained (the brief epic of obedience).
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discern the beckoning of divine will. And since the motif of hearing becomes figured
inwardly by Milton, the context of noise must also be figured inwardly. Otherwise, the
hearing would be without its justifying context. This work—the internal realization of
hearing as productive aspect of timing, and the interiorizing of noise as the necessary
context—is the work of the Son in Paradise Regained. Hearing corresponds to his divine
nature; noise to his human nature. To be both fully divine and human, the Son must be
both the singular beneficiary of divine will, and the just as singular vessel of human
noise. The Son’s timing develops out of his dual condition, or rather out of the condition
(waiting), the act (hearing), and the context (noise). Moreover, it is in the Son’s
experience of his dual condition that his timing begins. 194

Kairos

This section focuses on a single Greek concept, kairos, used here along poetic,
philosophical, and theological lines, and less so as a term and strategy of rhetoric. To
understand Miltonic timing, requires not only an understanding of kairos, but also of the
way Milton’s concept of timing derives from kairos, most especially as it is used by Plato
and by Paul. 195

194

Cf. Paradise Regained 1.196-99.
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Laurie Zwicky established the importance of kairos in “Kairos in Paradise Regained: The Divine Plan.”
Northrop Frye pointed the way to a discussion of Milton and kairos generally in The Return to Eden: Five
Essays on Milton’s Epics, 136. Edward Tayler Milton’s Poetry: Its Development in Time (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1979) remains an indispensable guide to the development of Milton’s idea of
time and concept of timing, from the “Nativity Ode” to Samson Agonistes. Perhaps most influentially,
Tayler argued that the distinction between kairos and chronos is at the heart of Milton’s thinking on time
(27-149). Following Tayler, Michael Schoenfeldt argues for the importance of the distinction between
kairos and chronos in Milton’s work. Schoenfeldt identifies kairos as the prelapsarian temporal situation
and chronos as the postlapsarian temporal situation, or more simply put, what we call time. Schoenfeldt
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Kairos is a nimble term, capable of suggesting much at once. For classicist
William H. Race, kairos, simply put, is “one of the most interesting—and elusive—words
in Greek. 196 To John R. Wilson, kairos is a “beautifully flexible word of moral and
aesthetic significance.” 197 And long before both scholars, Aristotle defined kairos as
simply “the good in the category of time.” 198
The conceptual heritage of the word is complex, with antecedents in Homer’s
epics and also Hesiod’s Works and Days (c.750-650 BCE). 199 The term becomes a
concept as such around the 5th century BCE. Pindar (522-443 BCE) and the Greek
tragedians adopt the term as a literary motif, the itinerant Sophists as a term of rhetoric,
as does Isocrates (436-383 BCE), who nonetheless defined himself against the Sophists;
Plato (428-348 BCE), perhaps borrowing the term from the Sophists, deploys it as a term

cautions against an overestimation of the distinction however, because of its neat reductiveness. In other
words, the distinction is accurate, if a bit of a simplification. See Schoenfeldt, “Obedience and Autonomy
in Paradise Lost,” in A Companion to Milton, edited by Thomas N. Corns (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 36376. For the importance of kairos in Paradise Regained, see especially, Mary Ann Radzinowicz, Milton’s
Epics and the Book of Psalms, 62-69; Teskey, DM, 164-76; and Zwicky, “Kairos in Paradise Regained:
The Divine Plan,” 271-77. Ken Hiltner argues that the temptations of Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,
and Samson Agonistes cannot be understood without continual reference to kairos (I agree): see Hiltner,
Milton and Ecology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 113-24.
196

William H. Race, “The Word Kairos in Greek Drama,” Transactions of the American Philological
Association 111 (1980), 197. In the same article, Race notes that it is “often impossible to isolate one sense
of such a complex word as kairos” (198). From a conceptual perspective, particularly with regard to
Miltonic kairos, this complexity (and its attendant resistance to reducibility) is the point.
197

John R. Wilson, “Kairos as ‘Due Measure,’” Glotta 58 (1980), 177.

198

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 1.4, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New
York: Random House, 1941).
199

A discussion of the complex, antecedental relationship of Homeric epic to kairos follows below.
Hesiod’s use of kairos appears in Works and Days: “Do not put all your goods in hallow ships; leave the
greater part behind, and put the lesser part on board; for it is a bad business to meet with disaster among the
waves of the sea, as it is bad if you put too great a load on your wagon and break the axle, and your goods
are spoiled. Observe due measure: and proportion is best in all things” (Works and Days 694, emphasis
added). See Hesiod, The Works and Days; Theogony; The Shield of Herakles, translated by Richard
Lattimore (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991).
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denoting political expertise, along the lines of “correct timing.” 200 Thereafter, the word
appears and is decisive in the Gospel of John (7.6), in reference to the timing of Christ
and of his mission, and then is established by Paul as a fundamental if somewhat elusive
aspect of Christian theology. 201
In English, the word has been translated variously as: due measure, fitness,
opportunity, mark, target, opening, improvisatory readiness, and in the definition that
most fully accords with Milton’s usage (not least for including so many of the other
connotations), the moment of opening rightness. 202 All of these translations—what we
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I discuss below the use of kairos by Pindar, Aeschylus, Euripides, Plato, and Paul, all of whom Milton
read extensively. For Isocrates’ use of kairos, see Panathanaicus and Against the Sophists, in volume 2 of
Isocrates, translated by George Norlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929). For a gloss of
Isocratic kairos, see Michael Cahn, “Reading Rhetoric Rhetorically,” Rhetorica 7.2 (Spring 1989), 133. For
the development of kairos in Ancient Greece and Rome, I am indebted to Richard Broxton Onians, The
Origins of European Thought: about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1954), especially 343-51.
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Cf. 1 Timothy 6.14-15.
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In the last forty years there has been a good deal of work done on kairos, most notably by rhetoric and
composition scholars. Their interest in kairos dates to James Kinneavy, A Theory of Discourse (1972; rpt.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1983). See also Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical
Rhetoric,” in Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning, edited
by Jeanne Dietz Moss (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1983), 79-105; and The
Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith: An Inquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). For
more recent studies, see Eric C. White, Kaironomia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. 3-13;
Phillip Siporia and James S. Baumlin, eds., Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); and Christopher J. Keller and Christian Weiser, eds.,
The Locations of Composition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). In The Locations of
Composition see especially Thomas Rickert, “Inventions in the Wild: On Locating Kairos in Space-Time,”
71-89. Rickert provides a brief overview of the difficulties attendant with kairos (e.g., its resistance to
formalization and to mastery), and rehearses the history of the word, and the main arguments about it in the
field of rhetoric and composition. According to Rickert, “in most of the scholarship that has appeared since
Kinneavy’s call, kairos is understood more or less in line with his original definition: kairos ‘is the right or
opportune time to do something’” (Rickert, 71; Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical
Rhetoric, 80). In my view Kinneavy’s definition is an overly plainspoken rendering (perhaps Kinneavy had
Paradise Regained in mind!), because by ending the form with “something” a vague yet limited specific,
Kinneavy’s translation empties the term of its expansiveness. Of course, his translation may be apt along
rhetorical lines, and among scholars of rhetoric and composition. Because I am interested in the poetic,
philosophical, and theological sense of the word, more precisely, in Miltonic kairos, I prefer Gordon
Teskey’s formulation, “moment of opening rightness” (DM,169). Finally it should be noted that in William
Race’s view, most translators and commentators have overemphasized the temporal sense of the word at
the expense of its normative sense. As an example, Race translates kairos in its normative sense as “proper
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might think of as connotative translations—trace back to the technical language of
archery and weaving.
The derivation from both archery and weaving is not incidental. As R.B. Onians
points out, there is an analogy in Ancient Greek culture between the archer and the
weaver. 203 In the discourse of archery, kairos referred to the exact and narrow path an
arrow must take to strike its target, the target itself, and the power sufficient to penetrate
that target. In Homeric epic (thereafter in Euripides’ tragedies) the word kairos,
however, appears only once, in adjectival form (kairion) to describe “that place in the
body where a weapon could easily penetrate to the life within.” 204 Drawing on this sense
of the word, the Romans translated kairos as tempus. The stem of the word retains the
definitional association “of time.” The word itself translates as “the temples of the head,”
the most vulnerable part of the skull. 205 From the Roman tempus derives the English
“temple.” In English, “temple” refers both to a religious dwelling and to that part of the
human skull. They are associative, and can without strain be seen as analogies for each
other.
Like archery, weaving also depends on timing. In weaving, there is the exact
moment when the weaver must pull the woof-thread through the warp (the momentary
opening of the cloth) with precision and with a kind of delicate force. Archery penetrates
amount,” and offers several examples, drawn primarily from Aeschylus and Euripides. Most recently
however, Melissa Lane has argued against Race, noting that “even where, as sometimes happens, the
explicit reference (to kairos) is not temporal, temporality provides a necessary context in almost all cases
for the notion of the kairos to make sense”: Lane, Method and Politics in Plato’s Statesman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 132. See also 132-35, in which Lane considers each of Race’s
“normative” examples.
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a mark. Weaving binds a cloth. 206 The success of both moments depends upon skill and
attention. The former is easily enough understood: skill is the obvious part and intended
outcome of technique. But the latter—attention—what we might think of as a rapt and
steady waiting for the moment, is the uncanny aspect of technique, in terms of kairos. It
is entirely implicit: the right attentiveness issues solely from one’s internal disposition,
one’s internal readiness to recognize. This kind of called-for attention squared with
Milton’s emphasis on individual conscience, in terms of obedience.
From their conceptual beginnings in the language of archery and weaving, the
lexical senses of kairos began to take on analogical possibilities. The analogy derived
from archery was martial; the analogy derived from weaving, artistic, the weave of
storytelling. Both concern community; the former, its defense (the army of archers
defends the community), and the latter its sense (the story the teller tells—the weaver
weaves—makes sense of the community to itself, and thus, gives the community its
sense). Archery is performed in the public sphere: in games, in war. Weaving is done in
the private sphere: in enclosed inner rooms. Importantly, for the Greeks at least, the
former activity is male, designating work men do, and the latter is female, designating
work women do. 207 What correlates the two activities across the threshold of public and
private, external and internal, is the similarity of skill required, and the synonymity of
attention required. This correlation speaks to the origin of kairos.
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In both the Iliad and the Odyssey archery serves not only a military function, but a
ritualistic function at critical moments of heroic and heroically broken emotion. 208
Further, archery characterizes both heroes at these critical moments. In the Iliad,
Achilles rests his exhausted army and orders funeral games to honor Patroclus. These
games are competitions, performed by soldiers. More to the point, they are successive
displays of martial skill intended to counter death’s annihilating critique of human
vulnerability, especially that aspect of humanity which loves, as Achilles loved Patroclus.
Archery is the seventh and penultimate event. In Robert Fagles’ translation, the moment
reads:
Archery next—
And again Achilles set out iron, dark gray trophies,
Ten double-headed axes, ten with single heads.
He stepped the mast of a dark-prowed man-of-war
Far down the beach and tethered a fluttering dove
Atop the pole, its foot looped with a light cord,
Then challenged men to shoot and hit that mark. 209
In the Odyssey archery’s role is decisive twice, and as in the Iliad, the moments of
archery’s significance come near the end of the epic. 210 In Book 21, Penelope, defined as
weaver, sets Odysseus’ bow unstrung before the suitors, and delivers her ultimatum:
So, to arms, my gallants!
Here is the prize at issue, right before you, look—
I set before you the great bow of King Odysseus now!
The hand that can string this bow with greatest ease,
That shoots an arrow clean through all twelve axes—
he is the man I follow, yes, forsaking this house

208

For a good discussion of archery in the Homeric epics, see Caroline Sunderland, “Archery in the
Homeric Epics,” Classics Ireland 8 (2001), 111-20.
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Homer, Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Classics, 1998), 23.941-47. All
subsequent citations are from this edition unless otherwise noted.
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The funeral games for Patroclus appear in the penultimate book of the Iliad. In the Odyssey, Odysseus
strings the bow in Book 21, and with it slaughters the suitors in Book 22.
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Where I was once bride. 211
Of course, it is the hand of Odysseus—the apparent hand of a grubby beggar to the
suitors, one of whom mocks him as the “connoisseur of bows”—that strings the bow,
with “virtuoso ease” (only Odysseus can string Odysseus’ bow!). At the very moment
that Odysseus strings the bow, “Zeus cracked the sky with a bolt, his blazing sign.” 212
The moment, divinely sanctioned—a moment of opening rightness, but externally
apprehended—was now. Odysseus hears it, and acts:
He snatched a winged arrow lying bare on the board—
the rest still bristled deep inside the quiver,
soon to be tasted by all the feasters there.
Setting shaft on the handgrip, drawing the notch
and bowstring back, back…right from his stool,
just as he sat but aiming straight and true, he let fly—
and never missing an ax from the first ax-handle
clean on through to the last and out
the shaft with its weighted brazen head shot free! 213
In the following book, Odysseus empties his quiver (as l.465 foreshadows, “soon to be
tasted by all the feasters there”), slaughtering the suitors in the hall. The arrows hit their
many marks.
Just as archery plays a significant role for men in both epics, weaving plays a
significant role for women in both epics: “In the Homeric poems all women, including
queens and goddesses, are either specifically described or said to be involved in the
spinning of wool or the creation of cloth on their looms.” 214 The women in both epics are
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characterized by their weaving. So they are characterized by, and embody a principal
theme of, Homeric epic. The first time we meet Helen of Troy she appears as a figure of
deep privacy, working the loom:
And Iris came on Helen in her rooms…
Weaving a growing web, a dark red folding robe,
Working into the weft the endless bloody struggles. 215
In the Odyssey, Penelope—in her way as cunning as her husband—deploys weaving as
both delay tactic and red herring to keep the suitors at bay. 216 Famously, by day she
weaves, by night unravels. Speaking for all the deceived and held-back suitors, Antinous
declaims:
This was her greatest masterpiece of guile:
she set up a great loom in the royal halls
and she began to weave, and the weaving finespun,
the yards endless, and she would lead us on: ‘Young men,
my suitors, now that King Odysseus is no more,
go slowly, keen as your are to marry me, until
I can finish off the web…
so my weaving won’t all fray and come to nothing.
This is a shroud for old Laertes. 217
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Maria C. Pantelia, “Spinning and Weaving: Ideas of Domestic Order in Homer,” American Journal of
Philology 114.4 (Winter, 1993), 493. Pantelia summarizes the shared literary purpose of weaving in both
epics: “Helen weaves while a war is being fought for her sake and is interrupted at the moment when her
future apparently about to be determined by the duel between her two husbands. Andromache weaves while
Hector is fighting, and her work is interrupted by the news of his death. Penelope weaves Laertes’ shroud
and unravels it at night in order to maintain her domestic stability” (398). In other words weaving,
thematically, concerns domestic stability, or its lack brought on either by war (Iliad) or by exile (Odyssey).
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Iliad 3.150-52. Iris is the goddess of the rainbow, and messenger of the Olympian Gods. Hector’s wife,
Andromache, also weaves. But her weaving does not extend to analogy, perhaps to allegory as Helen’s
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But the shroud is for no one (it is not even properly a shroud, but an activity to stop time,
or perhaps the eventfulness of time). Antinous continues:
So by day she’d weave at her great and growing web—
by night, by the light of torches set beside her,
she would unravel all she’d done. Three whole years
she deceived us blind, seduced us with this scheme…
Then, when the wheeling seasons brought the fourth year on,
one of her women, in on the queen’s secret, told the truth
and we caught her in the act—unweaving her gorgeous web. 218
As long as Penelope weaves a shroud for unweaving, she controls her destiny. It is an
incredible balancing act, performed in a space of maximum dialectical compression.
That is, making and unmaking, doing and undoing compress to a unified event. Penelope
makes what she is unmaking, and vice-versa.
So weaving and archery inform both Homeric epics, to a degree organize their
narrative arcs, and exemplify their thematic concerns. However, they are not yet in
Homer’s epics consubstantial with or used to indicate kairos. That is, they are not yet
thematically denotative of kairos. 219 Thus, in Homer we cannot (yet) read archery and
weaving through the lens of kairos. Instead, we may think of archery and weaving as the
conceptual forces out of which kairos develops as a literary concept, moreover as an
attribute of what will become the Christian idea of logos, the expressive will of God in
history embodied by Christ. 220
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In ancient everyday Greek, logos meant something like the speech of reason. Heraclitus (534-475 BCE)
introduced logos to philosophy, as a philosophical term denoting the principle of order. In other words,
Heraclitus expanded the term to take in the cosmos. See Heraclitus: Fragments, translated by T. M.
Robinson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), especially Fr. 1, 2 and 50. Philo of Alexandria (20
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of the divine. By means of allegory (which he learned from the stoics) Philo synthesized the Hellenic
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Primarily, it is Pindar and the Greek tragedians who extract kairos from the
technical language of archery and weaving, and make of it a literary motif; Plato,
borrowing both from the Sophists and from Pindar, who employs it as a political term;
and Paul who turns it into a central concept of Christian theology. 221 Pindar, self-claimed
poet of the Muses, believed that poets (himself, for instance) were born to it, just as
athletes were born to it. 222 That is, the gift of poetry as of athletics was inherent, a gift
from the gods without which poetic or athletic greatness could not be achieved. 223 In the
third Nemean Ode, Pindar writes:
A man has much weight if glory belongs to his breed.
But whoso needs lessons
His spirit blows here and there in the dark,
“Philo of Alexandria (c.20 BCE-40 CE),” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.utm.edu.
In early Christianity Christ became identified as the logos, most especially in the Gospel of John. See John
1.1: “In the beginning was the Word and the word as with God, and the Word was God”; and John 1.14:
“And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.”
221

See Onians, 343-51. For Paul’s Christianization of kairos (a project with distinct echoes of Philo), see
especially Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans,
translated by Patricia Daley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
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Quintilian considered Pindar the greatest “of the nine lyric poets” of Hellenic Greece (the others are
Alcman, Alcaeus, Anacreon, Bacchylides, Ibycus, Sappho, Simonides, and Stesichorus), “far the greatest,
for inspiration, magnificence, sententiae, Figures, a rich stock of words and ideas, and a real flood of
Eloquence”: see The Orator’s Education, translated by Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press 2001), 10.1.6. It is worth noting, as C.M. Bowra does, that “Pindar does not mean that it is
not necessary for a poet to study and master his art, but he does mean that it is useless for him to try to do
so unless he has an inborn genius for it”: Bowra, Pindar (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 8.
223
There is a vast amount of Pindaric scholarship. I am indebted especially to William H. Race’s
Introduction to his edition of Pindar’s Odes: see Pindar’s Odes, translated by William H. Race (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 1-42. For a good general study of Pindar, see Bowra, Pindar. For
more recent studies, see for example R.A. Swanson’s introduction to his edition of Pindar’s Odes (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), xxv – xlx; Thomas K. Hubbard, The Pindaric Mind: A Study of Logical
Structure in Early Greek Poetry (Leiden: Brill, 1985); Hugh-Lloyd Jones, “Pindar,” Proceedings of the
British Academy 68 (1982), 139-63. In particular, Jones points to the difficulty of assessing the intentions
of the speaker (public, subjective?) in the Odes. Mary Lefkowitz addresses this problem in
“Autobiographical Fiction in Pindar,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 84 (1980): 29-49. Lefkowitz
argues that the Pindaric “I” is neither merely bardic nor personal, neither public nor subjective. Instead,
Lefkowitz writes, “the combative tone and ‘personal’ references express the poet’s understanding of the
meaning of victory; that in these statements he describes himself as taking a combatant’s risks, sharing his
determination, experiencing his sense of isolation” (30). Milton describes his efforts in similar, that is,
Pindaric terms.
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Nor ever enters he the lists with sure foot,
Tho’ countless the glories his futile fancy savours.
(Nemean Odes 3.40-42)
In the ninth Olympian Ode, he writes:
What nature gives is always the strongest, but many
Have tried to win renown among men
By taking lessons in prowess;
If God is not there, each thing
Is no worse for being kept silent. 224
(Olympian Odes 9.100-04, emphasis added)
Milton describes his efforts in similar, that is, Pindaric terms. The opening
invocation to the Muse in Paradise Lost is implicitly Pindaric. It performs what Harold
Bloom has called the “high sense of Pindaric invocation summoning the poetic powers,
the sense of glory,” 225 as for example when Milton claims his sacred purpose: “that with
no middle flight intends to soar / Above th’Aonian mount, while it pursues / Things
unattempted yet in prose or rhyme. / … / That to the highth of this great argument / I may
assert eternal providence, / And justify the ways of God to men” (PL 1.14-16, 24-26). In
Il Penseroso Milton describes the Pindaric poet’s heroic isolation:
Or let my lamp at midnight hour,
Be seen in some high lonely tow’r
Where I may oft outwatch the Bear,
With thrice-great Hermes, or unsphere
The spirit of Plato to unfold
What worlds, or what vast regions hold
The immortal mind that hath forsook
Her mansion in this fleshly nook.
(Il Penseroso ll.85-92)
And in Reason of Church Government, Milton writes of his determination, of his coming
struggle, and of his victory:
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I began thus farre to assent both to them and divers of my friends here at
home, and not lesse to an inward prompting which now grew daily upon
me, that by labour and intent study (which I take to be my portion in this
life) joyn’d with the strong propensity of nature, I might perhaps leave
something so written to aftertimes, as they should not willingly let it die.
(Yale 1:810)
In Reason of Church Government also, Milton reiterates the Pindaric claim: “These
abilities, wheresoever they be found, are the inspired guift of God” (Yale 1:816). 226
For Pindar that which distinguishes the true poet (just as it distinguishes the true
athlete) is kairos. Additionally, the source of the poet’s genuine authority derives from
kairos. Of his own odes, Pindar writes: “I have lighted upon many themes, hitting the
kairos with no false word.” 227 The claim is not so much a boast by Pindar (although that
is indubitably how it sounds to our ears) but a justification of himself as a poet, thus an
argument for the validity of his poetic authority. In brief, what Pindar claims is what
Pindar takes to be the signal distinction of poetry: kairos. This distinction poetry shares
with victory, generally, and is that which binds all human victoriousness together. 228
Further, because kairos is about recognizing the moment of opening rightness, it is a skill
as much about waiting, in a state of readiness, for the moment. For Pindar then, kairos is
fundamentally “the moment of ripeness which requires long anticipation.” 229 This
conception of kairos is especially resonant with Milton’s sense of it, particularly with his
motif of waiting. One recalls the closing line of Sonnet 19 (“They also serve who only
stand and wait”), the closing line of “Nativity Ode” (“Bright-harnessed angels sit in order

226

In the paragraph leading up to the declaration quoted, Milton invokes Pindar.

227

Pindar, Nemean Odes 1.18. The translation given here is by Onians (343).

228

See Pindar, Pythian Odes 8.25-34; and Lefkowitz, 48.

229

Hubbard, The Pindaric Mind, 24.

141

serviceable”), and Milton’s profession of his poetic destiny in Reason of Church
Government:
Neither doe I think it shame to covnant with any knowing reader, that for
some few yeers yet I may go on trust with him toward the payment of
what I am now indebted, as being a work not to be rays’d from the heart of
youth or the vapours of wine, like that which flows at wast from the pen of
some vulgar Amorist or the trencher fury of a riming parasite, nor to be
obtain’d by the invocation of Dame Memory and her Siren daughters, but
by devout prayer to that eternall Spirit who can enrich with all utterance
and knowledge, and sends out his Seraphim with the hallow’d fire of his
Altar to touch and pacify the lips of whom he pleases.
(Yale 1:820-21)
So Pindar utilizes kairos to designate the true poet and true poetry, a move that
influenced Milton deeply. Just as influential is the similar move Plato makes on behalf of
political philosophy—really of leadership itself—in the Statesman, in which Plato
remakes the term for philosophy by conflating both the Sophists’ sense of the term (as
that opportune moment for winning an argument) and Pindar’s sense of the term. 230
The central concern of the Statesman is the nature of political expertise and the
authority which justifiably denotes that expertise. 231 If in the Republic the question of
political expertise resolves to those who have a comprehensive understanding of the
Good (these would be Plato’s philosopher-kings), a category of dubious practicalpolitical applicability, in the Statesman the question of political expertise is redistributed,
as it were, to include not just knowledge (of the Good), but usage, in time, of that
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knowledge. So that the idea of political expertise depends not just on what one knows,
but upon how one times the deployment of what one knows, in a near endless host of
specific instances. As Melissa Lane writes,
Given how many forms of expertise there are in the city—cobblers,
generals, navigators and so on—two questions must be asked about the
postulate of a purely political expertise. First, what does it know?
Second, how does it rule? The Statesman answers these questions. . .by
distinguishing between knowing what to do and knowing when to do it
. . .The dialogue emphasizes time as the dimension of political action.
Political expertise is neither meta-knowledge nor another species of
knowledge, but rather knowledge between other forms of knowledge and
the temporal demands of the moment of action, or the kairos. 232
In other words, Plato recognizes kairos as the determinant for political authority, “exalted
against the static and inflexible authority of the written and unwritten laws.” 233
The efficacy of Plato’s claim for politics as such requires that kairos be not only a
reality, but verifiable as a reality in the decision-making (in the opportune decisionmaking) of the political expert. Although the idea of such an elusive concept as kairos
being asserted as reality may be difficult to entertain from our current perspective, this is
precisely what the Statesman entails, and what it purports to show (or perhaps more
accurately, what the Eleatic Stranger purports and Young Socrates seconds).
The dialogue shows this first by way of an analogy between statesmanship and
weaving (279b-287e). According to the Eleatic Stranger (and to Young Socrates) both
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activities depend principally upon due measure for their success (283e, 284e, 285a), and
concern the binding together of seemingly disparate elements (285b, 295b). The question
that immediately arises is how due measure can possibly and consistently be imagined, if
not achieved in such an overwhelmingly diverse field of occupations and moments. The
Eleatic Stranger asks: “How could any lawgiver [whether king, constitution or
democracy] 234 be capable of prescribing every act of a particular individual and sit at his
side, so to speak, all through his life and tell him just what to do?” (295b). Here the
Eleatic Stranger’s deconstruction of the law is accomplished by pointing out its a priori
inability to respond accurately to the exigencies of any given instance. For the Eleatic
Stranger this fundamental inability of the law remains the case precisely because it is put
forth against the very idea of “one true and scientific ruler” (301c). Thus, it makes no
difference if the form of governance is an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy (all
three of which are for the Eleatic Stranger degraded forms). However, the very
deficiency of the law in terms of its application for good governance in all specific
instances necessitates at the least an ideal presence of some other governing force
superior to the mere blunt application of law, if not to govern at least to use as a reference
point for governance. This ideal presence would of course be the ideal ruler, whose
domain would be the world, every inch and person of which the ideal ruler would be
prepared to know in time and specifically. To Young Socrates the Eleatic Stranger
imagines the reign of ideal presence: “It remains true that if the ideal ruler we have
described were to appear on earth he would be acclaimed, and he would spend his days
guiding in strictest justice and perfect felicity that one and only true commonwealth
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worthy of the name” (301d). In other words, like Pindar’s ideal poet, Plato’s ideal
statesman would be such by kairos.
By strictest justice the Eleatic Stranger means that every decision rendered by the
ruler to every individual would accomplish justice, and thus would render an always
ethically accurate judgment for the case at hand. In this speculation lies the Eleatic
Stranger’s definition of what he calls the kingly art. The strictest justice, so described,
becomes the weave of perfectly recognized moments of time. All of these moments,
rightly recognized, bind the community together. The emphasis on the singularity of
every moment of time also provides the possible implication of the singularity of every
individual’s experience of time within the community. Further, the community as a
corporate force also has its experience of time. “The perfect felicity” of the ideal ruler is
his rendering of justice at all times, to individuals and to the community. 235 The question
of how a corporate entity could survive intact—with any degree of rigor and structural
dignity—the accurate distribution of justice to every individual in his specific moments
becomes the critical question. The Eleatic Stranger does not answer this question in any
practicable terms (perhaps it cannot be answered in such a way). Instead, he returns to
his analogy of weaving in the hope of illuminating the character of ideal rule. “It [the
ideal rule],” he says, “weaves all into its unified fabric, with perfect skill” (305e).
What is implied by the analogy is the issue of necessary priority in terms of the
efficacy of the ideal rule. To follow the analogy, the structural integrity of the weaving
does not depend solely or perhaps even primarily on the fabrics being woven, but on the
weaving, on the strength and accuracy and binding power of the stitch. To illuminate this

235

Cf. 305d: “The kingly art controls them according to its power to perceive the right occasions for
undertaking and setting in motion the great enterprises of the state.”

145

point, the Eleatic Stranger investigates the relationship between epithets (as he names
them) and praiseworthy (or excellent) behavior. 236 Taking swiftness—of body and
mind—as his first example of excellent behavior, the Stranger asks Young Socrates first
if he has praised or heard praised such behavior (yes), and then if he remembers “the way
in which the approval is expressed in all instances” (306d). For the moment Young
Socrates confesses that he is unable to remember. In posing the question, the Stranger
has left out a step in his chain of logic, and so Young Socrates is at first confronted by an
abstraction beyond his comprehension. The Stranger begins again, this time including
the step, and providing the answer at once: “We admire speed and intensity and vivacity
in many forms of action and under all kinds of circumstances. But whether the swiftness
of mind or body or the vibrant power of the voice is being praised, we always find
ourselves using one word to praise it—the word ‘vigorous.’” 237
The Stranger then notes that “gentleness and quietness” (307a), epithets quite
different from “vigorous,” are also often used to praise instances of human behavior.
To Young Socrates, the Stranger says,
We constantly admire quietness and moderation, in processes of restrained
thinking, in gentle deeds, in a smooth deep voice, in steady balance in
movement, or in suitable restraint in artistic representation. Whenever we
express such approval do we not use the expression ‘controlled’ to
describe all these excellences rather than the word ‘vigorous’?
The point the Stranger is making is that what constitutes praiseworthy behavior depends
upon the activity and the situation. Thus what is praiseworthy as “vigorous” in one
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The proposition bears a gentle conceit, for “vigorous” is used to suggest the kind of word issued for
praise. That is, “vigorous” is used as a sign denoting itself and words like it, as this specific sense of
epithet.
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instance would be an abomination in another instance, an instance for example in which
quietness would be the right epithet. As the Stranger puts it, “when we find either of
these kinds of behavior appearing out of its due time, we have different names for each of
them” (307b, emphasis added).
So to know what epithet to use for a given exemplary behavior requires
recognition of the instant (activity and situation) of that behavior. From this proposition,
the Stranger elaborates a like proposition in the realm of statesmanship. That is, the
Stranger’s discussion of epithet and behavior functions as a preparing (if not prophetic)
analogy for his concluding discussion of statesmanship that immediately follows it,
which the Stranger terms the description “of the kingly weaving process” (305e). The
discussion progresses from epithet and behavior to a consideration of temperament, of
conflicting temperaments (307d). As the Stranger points out, in trifling situations such a
conflict of temperaments is of little importance. However, “when the conflict arises over
matters of high public importance [e.g., war and peace] it becomes the most inimical of
all the plagues which can threaten the life of a community” (307d). Accordingly, in such
a situation those whose temperament disposes them to peace will argue for peace,
regardless of the situation: “They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on
this principle [peace] and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve
peace at any price with foreign states” (307e, emphasis added). Similarly, those whose
temperament disposes them to war will argue for war, and be “forever dragging their
cities into war and bringing them up against powerful foes on all sides just because they
love a military existence too fiercely” (308a). As such, the two temperaments are in
serious conflict with one another, even though each is necessary; or, as the Stranger puts
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it, “We find that important parts of goodness are at variance with one another and that
they set at variance the men in whom they predominate” (308b). For the Eleatic
Stranger, this is the fundamental conundrum facing any given community or state. And
the productive resolution of this tension can only recur to the ideal ruler, figured as the
Statesman. This Statesman has both the responsibility and the ability to unify variance.
He does so by the “royal weaving process” (309b), to the Eleatic Stranger an art
predicated on the recognition and application of variant temperaments to their apt
moments. In other words, statesmanship is an art of kairos.
In Christianity that art comes to designate Messianic time, the timing of the divine
will in history. Messianic time suggests and is intended to be an overwhelmingly
alternative interpretative frame: a sheer otherness, brought near, God as the Son of God.
The interpretive frame is alternative, the divine other, because it is entirely predicated on
perfect timing, a condition perhaps felt by faith, but otherwise illegible to human reason.
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection are the embodiment of this perfect timing, of what
can with precision be known as divine kairos, an experience of temporality consonant
with diapason—harmony—rather than with disobedience. When the Son says, “My time
I told thee, (and that time for thee / Were better farthest off) is not yet come” (PR 3.39697) he is simultaneously asserting the truth of his timing. It is this divine kairos that
Satan does not understand.
Once the development of kairos into a literary, philosophical, and then a
theological concept has occurred, archery and weaving, formerly merely suggestive of
kairos, become analogies for kairos. In other words, archery and weaving, once the
grounds out of which kairos developed, become the analogies by which kairos is
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expressed. However, it must be said that from a conceptual standpoint kairos does not
now just refer to both analogies, it refers to both at the same time. This simultaneity of
reference culminates in Paul’s usage, and in my view, again in Milton’s usage (as with
many theological concerns, Milton is Pauline).
To understand kairos conceptually then requires an attempt at simultaneous—
perhaps it would be better to say, double-fold—attention, an attending to two analogies at
once. From a purely mechanical perspective, the two activities are very similar, and this
similarity makes them sympathetic as analogies. The archer’s arrow is to the weaver’s
needle; the path of the arrow is to the thread attached to the needle; the mark is to the
warp. One can easily enough see the arrow’s path as the needle’s thread, and the warp as
the archer’s mark in the distance just appearing. Once the two activities are imagined in
their spatial likeness, we can then re-approach them in their analogical character. But
considering the two activities as two sympathetic analogies at once is a more difficult
critical and imaginative task. 238 It is so because in the very moment an activity becomes
(is considered) an analogy that analogy’s potential themes are conceived. That is, to
analogize any given human activity is to extend (or maybe merely to hope for) its
epistemological reach. Once any given human activity is extended beyond the bounds of
its prescribed space of transaction (the specified space in which the activity is
performed), it becomes thematic in character and designation. It becomes a theme
pointing to itself as an activity and beyond itself as an activity.
238

It is a task requiring perhaps an approach more consonant with the spirit of paideia then with our
contemporary methods of specialized scholarship. For paideia, see Werner Jaeger’s Paideia: The Ideals of
Greek Culture, 2nd edition, 3 vols., translated by Gilbert Highet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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truth of a single ideal, to which all human endeavors refer, and by which all human endeavors are
organized, and made sensible (vol. 1, xvii).
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If we take the main theme of archery to be war, and the main theme of weaving to
be storytelling/poetry, we are faced with the task of bringing these two themes together if
we want to understand kairos—not just of reconciling them in some measure, but of
understanding them as essentially related, dependent, akin to each other. 239 So that from
a poetic-philosophical perspective we could let archery stand in thematically for weaving,
or vice-versa, in our consideration of timing in Paradise Regained. To be able to do so
requires a thematic correspondence in the details, as it were, in the subsidiary themes of
each analogy. Subsidiary themes of archery might include: ritual, agôn (sport,
competition), and therefore areté (nobility of thought and action) and aidôs (honor); and
subsidiary themes of agôn, areté, and aidôs, might include techne (skill), thus
accuracy. 240 With regard to weaving, subsidiary themes might include ritual (storytelling
as ritual), harmonia (a joining together, specifically a joining together of wooden planks),
akrivia (precision), economia (flexibility); and the subsidiary theme of harmonia, akrivia,
and economia might be said to be techne. 241
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Before proceeding, it may be useful to recall the Greek gods and goddesses, and
the way the Greeks related to them. Most especially, the Greek gods were not
representations, or symbols, of that which they were gods and goddesses of. To give one
example: Zeus was not a symbol of thunder, but the embodiment of it. So too with the
goddess who most concerns us here, Athena. Carl A. Anderson writes,
The goddess Athena is a paradox. On the one hand, myth says that she
emerged fully armed from the head of her father Zeus, who swallowed
either her or, in some versions of the story, her pregnant mother Metis to
prevent the birth of a rival. This story explains Athena's unique connection
to her father and the world of men. Born armed from a male, Athena is an
invincible war goddess—and she is a virgin war goddess, Athena
Parthenos, the Maiden, unwed, sexless, and untamable. On the other hand,
Athena has significant connections to the female world as the patron of all
arts, in particular spinning and weaving. Thus Athena embodies the areté
(excellence) of both sexes: valor in war for men, and for women
distinction in weaving and management of the household. 242
Specifically, Athena was the goddess of: war, the city (hence Athens), agriculture, arts,
literature, and crafts, including weaving, spinning, and textiles. These various activities,
taken together—that is, understood in full concert and mutual relation with each other, as
inseparable—circumscribe a high ideal. They are technical and mechanical activities
expressive of necessary themes, and are also reflective of abstract virtues. Thus, Athena
was the goddess of all the activities mentioned. And so, she was the goddess of wisdom.
And, just as Zeus did not represent but embodied thunder, so Athena did not represent but
embodied wisdom. 243
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Since Athena was the embodiment of wisdom for the Greeks, then all of the
activities she was goddess of, including archery and weaving, and the themes those
activities suggest, may be understood as essentially related under the rubric of wisdom.
Their translation to wisdom depends upon utmost skill: the archer hits the mark, the
weaver threads the warp. The quality which essentially determines each skill is kairos.
Paradise Regained organizes around and is organized by kairos, a single moment. The
Son is as the arrow shot from the bow of God, and the needle held in God’s hand, the
thread being pulled the divine will designing in history, in time at a specific place. The
place is the pinnacle, the target and the warp upon which Satan puts the Son and the Son
in perfect timing stands. Analogically, the Son standing—balancing—is the singular
moment in which the martial and the artistic come together as one, war and weaving,
male and female, violence and kinship, penetrating and binding. It is the single moment
which binds the whole, in unsurpassable coherence.

The Pinnacle

Miltonic kairos redacts the concept as it is used and developed, most especially by
Pindar, by Plato, and then by Paul. The intended valences of the concept are those of the
poetic (Pindar), the political (Plato), and the Christian (Paul). For Milton at least, the last
designation of the concept (Christian) necessarily includes the first two (poetic and
political). Pindar’s “in-born” poet corresponds thematically to the idea of a begotten
divinity. Plato’s Statesman—his ideal ruler—could serve as a description of Christ on
earth. Both correspond prototypically to Milton’s characterization of the Son, and by
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extension, to his characterization of Christianity in its early and formative experience of
the temptation. Finally, the poetic, political, and therefore Christian valences of kairos
point to the three forces which shaped Milton, and which he in turn shaped.
To recall, the motifs by which Milton represents kairos in his work are waiting,
hearing, and stepping. The first two—waiting, hearing—correspond to the sense of due
measure. They are the alert and elegant poise out of which kairos comes. However,
neither is legible, at least to reason and, by extension generally, to humankind. Neither
waiting nor hearing can be externally adjudicated as real, as authentic, destinational
components of kairos. For example, the seemingly apt waiting Milton proclaims in
Sonnet 19 either is or is not authentic in terms of kairos. 244 If God knows (for Milton
God knows), with all the evaluative force of omniscience, humankind does not know.
Since waiting is an internal disposition, it cannot in isolation be publicly verified in any
rational and discursive terms. Any description of it would be just that, a description
mystical or poetical, and perhaps depending for its authenticity as much upon the
disposition of the reader as the force of the mystical or poetical vision. Similarly, the
seemingly apt hearing Milton describes, either is or is not authentic in terms of kairos.
With stepping—the third of Milton’s motifs of timing—kairos becomes
potentially legible. It must be understood as potential because in the very moment of
stepping the divine (in Paradise Regained, the Son) and the human (Adam and Eve,
thereafter, Samson) experience of kairos differentiate precisely along the threshold that
separates them. For the Son, his stepping is eternally and verifiably guaranteed by the
Father, even though he makes the step as human. More importantly perhaps, his stepping
produces the demonstrable effect of Satan’s falling—he sees it happen. This
244
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demonstrable effect is the very real verification of the rightness of the Son’s timing, of
kairos, and is therefore the verification of the perfection of his obedience.
This kind of verification is not available to humankind. Ideally, obedience to the
will of God may produce stepping that is of right timing. But the verification of it, the
rightness of the stepping, is not and will not be legible in discursive terms. When the Son
steps, obedience is perfected by this perfect moment of timing. In the Christian
dispensation, in Milton’s view, such a moment will never and need never happen again.
To borrow from the vernacular, it—the Son’s stepping—is the essential one-and-done.
When humankind steps, obedience to the will of divine may be fulfilled, or it may be
transgressed. At the end of Paradise Regained the reader may speak with absolute
assurance of the Son’s stepping; and from the Son’s stepping, may retroactively read the
Son’s waiting and hearing as authentic in terms of kairos. In Samson Agonistes, waiting
and hearing cannot be retroactively made legible and verified from the position of a
perfect step. This is the case because Samson’s “stepping”—introduced in the opening
line as “a little onward lend thy guiding hand,” and completed by Samson’s destruction
of the temple—may or may not be authentic in terms of kairos. If it is, then Samson is
being obedient to the will of God. If it is not, he is at the very least being delusional, and
is possibly being disobedient to the will of God. For Milton, Samson’s condition is the
condition for all humankind, in terms of obedience and act. The sheer existential
pressure Milton puts on “stepping” illustrates what he takes to be the critical importance
of timing, and the magnitude of the situation of humankind in either obedient or
disobedient relation to the divine. In Milton’s view (as for any Christian) what makes the
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pressure bearable, if not the yoke mild, is the example of the Son, most especially the
example of the Son against Satan.
Not coincidentally, stepping is the last of Milton’s motifs of timing to develop.
Further it does not appear in his writing to any noteworthy effect until Milton considers
the fall; that is, until he comes to write Paradise Lost. I say not coincidentally, because
stepping represents that part of Miltonic timing that most illuminates postlapsarian
humankind. Paradise Lost ends with Adam and Eve, leaving Eden, “hand in hand, with
wand’ring steps and slow” (12.648-49). Their steps begin as wandering, for wandering is
a condition of their exile. They cannot wait for the spirit to lead them, but must proceed.
This condition of wandering sums up the very pain of their exile. They are alienated and
ignorant. To borrow from Samuel Beckett, they cannot go on (having no idea how to
proceed), they must go on. In Samson Agonistes, the first half of the formulation (cannot
go on) has been dropped. Samson goes on: “A little onward lend thy guiding hand / To
these dark steps, a little further on” (SA 1-2). Apparently he is being led. By whom?
One can’t precisely say. If he is talking to himself, he is either being led by himself, or
perhaps by the spirit of God. If he is not talking to himself, it may be the Chorus leading
him. The point: Samson may be in a condition of right proceeding. But of course, this
condition is a condition of unknowing, his blindness its emblem. 245
Between Adam and Eve, and Samson, stands the Son, in perfect stillness, on the
pinnacle. There is no plot twist or revelation to give away. The reader knows from the
outset that the epiphany and resolution of Paradise Regained will be the Son standing on
the pinnacle. This moment is the very center not just of Paradise Regained, but of
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Milton’s three late poems taken as a whole, of Milton’s corpus, and also of the very
center of Christianity. 246
When we first encounter the Son in Paradise Regained, we find him “Musing and
much revolving in his breast, / How best the mighty work he might begin” (1.185-86).
The mighty work in question is the salvation of humankind. The Son’s musing on how to
begin this project is a waiting, in terms of kairos. He will wait until he hears the
prompting of the Father. He must begin in perfect accord with the will of the Father. To
put it simply, he must get the timing of this beginning right (he must not rush it, or
otherwise be distracted from hearing it when it comes). He must get the first step right
because the first step is the designating precedent for all the steps in his experience of the
temptation to come. If the first step is kairos his destiny aligns with resistance, rather
than with temptation. Thus, bright, he waits. Then “One day forth [he] walked alone, the
Spirit leading” (1.189). “Spirit leading” verifies that his step is kairos.
Thereafter the Son’s thinking is step-like, and his steps are contemplative. The
synchronization of step and thought indicates the incarnate nature of Christ: “Thought
following thought, and step by step led on, / He entered now the bordering desert wild”
(1.192-93). Further, the synchronization of step and thought indicates that for the Son,
waiting, hearing and stepping are also now completely synchronized, revolving
harmoniously. The hearing and the stepping happen at once. As he is hearing the will of
the divine, he is stepping in accord with the will of the divine. And this stepping is also
simultaneously a waiting for the will of the divine, in the greater terms of refuting Satan.
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Once the Son has made his initial step into the wilderness his temptation begins.
And in this temptation he will, again and again, be tempted not to wait, hear, step, but to
rush, proprietarily. That is, to take the world. 247 Satan tempts the Son. In response, the
Son waits (to Satan it appears as a doing nothing). What is he waiting for? He is waiting
to hear, within himself and without, the will of the Father. 248 In response to the Son’s
waiting, to his seeming inaction, Satan must progressively intensify his temptations, from
a banquet feast to worldly ambition. The amplification of his temptations reveals Satan’s
misunderstanding, his misapprehension. To the Son, all the temptations are one
temptation: the temptation to transgress the will of God, to be disobedient, in terms of
kairos, to either rush or drag, either way to be out of step with the timing of the will of
God. Thus, the Son waits, saying, “All things are best fulfilled in their due time, / And
time there is for all things, truth hath said” (3.182-83). “Due time” Satan does not
understand. Thus, he does not understand fulfillment as the expression of “due time,”
and therefore as a sign of truth, that which is and accords with the will of God, of logos
(“truth hath said”). 249
In response, Satan takes “the Son of God up to a mountain high” (3.252). The
only strategy Satan has at his disposal is apparently greater and greater temptation. He
just needs to tempt with more, is his thinking. Again, however, his thinking is without
the critical understanding: that the Son’s obedience to God, his very being, depends on
and is defined by timing. In other words, the temptations as distinct offering are not the
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point with regard to the Son’s ability to resist them. His timing is the point, and is that
which Satan misses. They are on the mountaintop looking down. To the Son, Satan says,
All this fair sight; thy kingdom though foretold
By prophet or by angel, unless thou
Endeavor, as thy father David did,
Thou never shalt obtain; prediction still
In all things, and all men, supposes means;
Without means used, what it predicts revokes.
(3.351-56)
From one perspective, Satan’s rhetoric is strong here, particularly in its allusion to David,
and sophisticated in its suggestion that if the Son does not take the throne by striving, he
will forfeit his destiny as the Son. In other words, if he doesn’t get to it, he’ll find
himself with nothing. But from the perspective of the Son’s obedience to the will of the
divine—functionally, his commitment to kairos—Satan’s rhetoric here, as everywhere in
the poem, distills to babble. It is noise, all of it, breaking against the will of God
manifesting in the Son. The Son replies to Satan “My time I told thee (And that time for
thee / Were better farthest off) is not yet come” (3.396-97). Satan amplifies his
temptation again, this time offering up the Roman Empire. Again, the Son refuses. Satan
bellows:
Since neither wealth, nor honor, arms nor arts,
Kingdom nor empire pleases thee, nor aught
By me proposed in life contemplative,
Or active, tended on by glory, or fame,
What dost thou in this world? The wilderness
For thee is fittest place, I found thee there,
And thither will return thee.
(4.368-74)
The critical moment of this passage is at line 372: “What dost thou in the world?” What
the Son does is the will of God. How he does it is by waiting to hear, neither of which
are legible to Satan, neither of which can even appear as activities of any demonstrable
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worth in and to the “world” (in quotation marks here because Milton intends it to be
understood as Satan’s term). The Son is ruled by God. The means of Satan’s misrule is
the world. For Milton, the distance between them is the distance between good and evil,
the pinnacle and the pit of hell.
The Son’s refusal of Empire exasperates Satan. “What dost thou in the world?”
signals that exasperation. Then, what he cannot achieve by guile, Satan will approximate
by force. Once he has the Son back in the wilderness, and the Son is alone, hungry, tired,
and then asleep, a figure of human vulnerability, Satan resorts to all the terror at his
disposal:
for at his head
The tempter watched, and soon with ugly dreams
Disturbed his sleep; and either tropic now
‘Gan thunder, and both ends of heav’n, the clouds
From many a horrid rift abortive poured
Fierce rain with lightning mixed, water with fire
In ruin reconciled: nor slept the winds
Within their stony caves, but rush’d abroad
From the four hinges of the world, and fell.
(PR 4.407-15)
But the Son sleeps on. His sleeping is the purest elegance of waiting. It refutes Satan’s
terror. Morning merely comes.
Out of devices, out of temptations, Satan brings the Son to the Holy City, to the
pinnacle, and “added thus in scorn: / ‘There stand, if thou wilt stand’” (4.550-51). The
Son does, in the precise and absolute fullness of time. For Milton as for any Christian,
the pinnacle is the maximum moment and place of dialectical compression. The Son
stands on the pinnacle simultaneously. He makes (is made) as Christ; he unmakes (is
unmade) as merely human. He becomes fully both, the “True image of the Father
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whether throned / In the bosom of bliss, and light of light / Conceiving, or remote from
Heav’n, enshrined / in fleshly tabernacle, and human form” (PR 4.596-99).
This moment of timing—of kairos—is the perfection of the Son’s obedience.
From the broader perspective of Milton’s corpus, it may also be seen as the moment in
which Milton reconciles his dual heritage (something like Paul before him), Classical and
Christian, by illuminating kairos (Classical) as the essential and necessary mechanism of
obedience (Christian). In other words, Milton’s concept of obedience is made efficacious
by kairos and its aura of the heroic—of the classical age of heroes, gods and
philosophers, of both the pitiable vulnerability of human beings, and also, of their
greatness. So while it is true that the Son rejects Classical learning, he rejects Classical
learning presented as a temptation, and further, it is by dint of a Classical idea—kairos—
that the Son resists the temptation, and stands. 250
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CHAPTER 4
SAMSON’S VIOLENT PRAYER
Framed as a question, the abiding concern of this dissertation is and has been the
following: What does Milton mean by obedience? The question is simple. But the
responses it provokes are of greater complexity and nuance than the term (obedience)
might to our early twenty-first century ears initially suggest. For Miltonic obedience is
not just a concept developed within given interpretive frameworks, Classical, Christian,
and a specific historic context, England in the seventeenth century. It is a nearly
ineffable and yet strangely practical structure of being, a harmonic disposition intended to
recover something of the disposition of Adam and Even before the fall. Thus, to address
the complexity and nuance of what Milton means by obedience has required addressing
not only the ostensive definition of Miltonic obedience (chapters 1 and 2), but the
mechanics of obedience (chapter 3), and now finally, the necessary condition for
obedience. This last—the necessary condition for obedience—is the main subject of this
chapter. It is also in my view the determining condition of Samson Agonistes, and the
source of its dramatic power.
To recall: For Milton the structure of obedience organizes the mind for God. A
priori the mind is otherwise always on its way to chaos without the intervening, one
might say, interpreting grace of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit informs individual
conscience, and this informing in part structures individual conscience in terms of
obedience. (Here is Milton at his Puritan truest.) So informed, conscience reads the
word of God, the logos, scripture and nature, and interprets it. The interpretation is a will
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to interpretation dictated by the fall (after the fall, perfect obedience is no longer
available to humankind), and is a required part of existence after the fall. Choices must
be made. In Milton’s view, choices must always be made, choices intended to
synchronize human will with divine will. The quality of human being-ness that does the
choosing is the will. The will’s choice-making is its chief mode of interpretation.
The Miltonic will to interpretation—which may also be known as the
postlapsarian requirement for the will—must make its choices in time. The situation of
the will to interpretation in time introduces what I termed in the previous chapter the
indispensable mechanism of obedience: right timing. To recall: Miltonic timing is in
effect Milton’s gloss on kairos, developed in the interpretive framework of JudeoChristianity. (The Son may pan the Classical tradition in Paradise Regained, but his
author’s education is classical.) Miltonic kairos means that every act of choosing—every
will to interpretation brought to fruition—is made on the threshold of obedience and
disobedience to God.
The paradigmatic instance of disobedience is the fall. The paradigmatic instance
of obedience is the Son on the pinnacle. When the Son steps on the pinnacle, his
stepping is eternally and verifiably guaranteed by the Father, even though he makes the
step as human. The moment is the visionary exemplum of obedience, the brightest
guarantee of atonement. However, as Milton makes clear in Samson Agonistes, the kind
of verification the Son’s step receives is not thereafter available to humankind. Samson’s
“stepping”—introduced in the opening line as “a little onward lend thy guiding hand,”
illuminated by his inwardly felt “rousing motions” (l.1382), and completed by Samson’s
destruction of the temple—may or may not be authentic in terms of kairos, and may or

162

may not be a choosing made in obedience to the will of the divine. No one else in the
drama but Samson can know, if indeed even Samson can.
As Milton tells us in the Argument, Samson “is persuaded inwardly that this [the
appearance of the public officer and his message from the philistine lords] was from
God.” Milton might have but did not choose to write something along the lines of, “the
message came from God.” Further, Milton gives to God no agential presence in this line
or any other line in the drama. Instead, the will of the divine—which in this drama
cannot be identified positively as a characterized presence, and thus is more accurately
denoted as the idea of the will of the divine—recurs to the characters who invoke it, either
inwardly or publicly, Samson chief among them. (This situation is denotative of Milton’s
radical antinomianism). Samson is the agent here, and persuade is the key word. Does
Samson persuade himself? The question is almost synonymous with the question
suggested by the first line of the drama (“A little onward lend thy guiding hand”): does
Samson guide himself? Both questions provoke the follow-up question that underlies
much of the critical debate this poem has generated: does God have anything to do with
Samson’s choice?
As Stanley Fish and others have pointed out, the answer is a decidedly un-clarion,
“maybe.” And this “maybe” depends to a great degree on how one thinks of participation
and engagement (of having to do with something). 251 All the evidence the drama affords
for this and related questions will be circumstantial, if not obscure, if not perhaps
irrelevant. The reader cannot with certainty evaluate Samson’s final act in terms of
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Cf. Susanne Woods, “Choice and Election in Samson Agonistes,” in Milton and the Grounds of
Contention, ed. Mark R. Kelley, Michael Lieb, and John T. Shawcross (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 2003), 175-187, esp. 176.
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divine will. And the reader most definitely cannot with certainty evaluate divine will or
its absence in Samson Agonistes.
This “uncertain world of Samson Agonistes,” as John Shawcross called it, raises
the question then: What did Milton intend with Samson Agonistes, and why? 252 To
address this two-part question, it is useful to think of Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,
and Samson Agonistes as forming a single work with a demonstrable theological
progression. 253 The most serious distillation of this progression would be: Speech, Act,
Silence. 254 A précis of this progression would be: in Paradise Lost, God the Father
speaks his divine will; in Paradise Regained, God the Son performs the divine will; in
Samson Agonistes, Samson, a human being, seeks or appears to seek to do the will of
God, and the will of God may be present, but it is not legibly presented. In other words,
if the divine is present in the world of Samson Agonistes (which is, as Joan Bennett points
out, our world) it is speaking in silence in individual conscience, and acting in the realm
of kairos. 255 Seen in this light, Samson is not so much a hero or delusional, but the heroic
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John T. Shawcross, The Uncertain World of Samson Agonistes (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2001). I
emphasize “intend” to signal that I mean to include as fully possible the meanings of the word: “to stretch
out, extend, expand, increase, intensify” (OED).
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I make this point regardless of the actual dates of composition of Samson Agonistes, although a later
dating seems likeliest, if not at this point certain. My own view is that Milton at the very least had finished
both Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained before he finished Samson Agonistes. For if we consider
Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes as forming a single work of theological
poetics—the development of which can be traced from Milton’s earliest poems all the way through the
prose tracts—then the suggestion is that Milton had parts of all three works in his mind from the start. In
other words, Milton thought of obedience comprehensively, in terms of what obedience meant for God the
Father, for the Son, and for humankind after the Son. Cf. Michael Bryson, “A Poem to the Unknown God:
Samson Agonistes and Negative Theology,” Milton Quarterly 42.1 (2008), 22.
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In the Torah, the progression of God in the world is Act (creation), Speech (law), and Silence (the
prophets). The fundamental difference between Judaism and Christianity is of course Jesus, but as obvious
as the point is, it is in this context worth remembering. Christianity brings the speaking and acting of the
divine back into the world, after silence, and then returns it to silence (after Pentecost). So the progression
of God in the world for Christianity is Act, Speech, Silence, Speech/Act, Silence.
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and the delusional potential in everyone. And Samson’s predicament—of contingency
and ineffability—is ours.
In this chapter I begin by situating Samson Agonistes in its interpretive
frameworks, Hebraism and Hellenism, both in terms of their dynamic presence in
Milton’s England, and throughout his work. The very title of the drama necessitates
establishing such a vantage point. After this, I approach Samson Agonistes not only for
the interpretive dilemma it poses, but for the interpretive dilemma it is. The two main
interpretations of the drama are addressed in turn. Both interpretations are in my view
right, or at the least valid, except when they are antagonistic or exclusionary toward the
other interpretation. I suggest this because taken together the two competing
interpretations productively illustrate the “uncertain world” of the drama. This
uncertainty is to be understood in terms of apophasis. 256 I give an account of apophasis,
by way of rehearsing its development from Parmenides of Elea (c. 5th century BCE) to
Nicholas of Cusa (1403-1464 CE). I then move to my main argument. It is that
Samson’s predicament points to Milton’s dramatic and theological solution to the
problem of uncertainty, and may be characterized by a single word—unknowing.
Without its foundational reliance on unknowing Samson Agonistes would have little
dramatic force, and Milton’s theology little cogency. 257 If Samson’s choosing—to
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See Joan S. Bennett, “A Reading of Samson Agonistes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Milton
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 227: “In Samson Agonistes we are not shown heaven or
hell or paradise or even the wilderness, but rather a world that we can recognize. It is the world of family
(parent, lover, wife); of friendship (colleagues, countrymen); of conventional beliefs and values (religious,
societal, political); and of glimpses of our intersection with the divine.”
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For Samson Agonistes and apophasis, see Michael Bryson, “A Poem to the Unknown,” 22-43.
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I want to make it clear that to say Samson Agonistes has no dramatic force is not to say that it has no
drama. The drama is there, the death of innocent people. To say that Milton’s theology has no cogency
without “unknowing” is to say that unknowing as the necessary condition is what makes Milton’s concept
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destroy the temple, to kill Philistines—eludes resolute evaluation, the manner of his
choosing, and the condition in which his choosing is made, does not.

The Interpretive Dilemma

In its title and its meanings Samson Agonistes brings together the dual heritage of Hebraic
and Hellenic, Israel and Greece, by extension Judeo-Christianity and the Classical age:
Samson from the Book of Judges, Agonistes from the Greek agon. 258 This heritage—in
certain points sympathetic, in others indicative of a felt and nearly impossible tension—is
the heritage of the age of Reformation and Renaissance, and before that of the Medieval
age stretching back to late Antiquity, illuminated in the great synthesizing labors of the
first Neoplatonists— chiefly Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus—and of their Christian
counterpart, and hugely influential early Father of the church, Augustine. 259 Properly
speaking, the dual heritage is conceived in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, as
told in the Gospels, if not articulated by and in that life and telling. From a theologicalof obedience theologically compelling. If those moments of opening rightness could in fact be apprehended
as knowledge, knowledge would supplant obedience.
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See Mary Ann Gossman, “The Synthesis of Hebraism and Hellenism in Milton’s ‘Samson Agonistes.’”
PhD diss., Rice University, 1957 (http://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/18282?show=full); Carole S.
Kessner, “Milton’s Hebraic Herculean Hero,” Milton Studies 6 (1975), 243-58; and especially, Jeffrey S.
Shoulson, Milton and the Rabbis: Hebraism, Hellenism, and Christianity (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2001), 1-9, 240-62. Shoulson’s book pays close attention to Milton’s texts and to the philosophical
and theological interpretive frameworks in, by and with which the author Milton wrote the texts. Also of
interest is Jeffrey Einboden’s study of Joseph Massel’s 1890 translation of Samson Agonistes into biblical
Hebrew, “Toward a Judaic Milton: Translating Samson Agonistes into Hebrew,” Literature and Theology
22.2 (2008), 135-50. A good place to start for any discussion of the relationship between Hebraism and
Hellenism, particularly in the Western tradition, is Matthew Arnold’s essay “Hebraism and Hellenism,”
collected in Culture and Anarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 84-96.
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As Susanne Woods writes, “In Samson Agonistes Renaissance humanism and Reformation
Protestantism mingle in a discourse as rich and uneasy as an experience of radical times. The drama not
only tells a powerful tale, it invites the reader to live within each moment’s ambiguities as that tale
unfolds”: “Choice and Election in Samson Agonistes,” 179.
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philosophical standpoint, Christianity may with intellectual fidelity be described as the
Hellenic spirit reading the Hebraic law. The teachings of Paul are certainly so. To recall
the example given in the previous chapter, Mosaic obedience is read by way of Hellenic
kairos.
If one thinks of this dual heritage as a tension, then the relationship between the
heritages may be understood as dialectic and the productive outcomes of it as, potentially,
synthesis. If one thinks of this heritage as a conflict, then each heritage considered in
isolation from the other is didactic in nature, and autocratic in intended outcome. 260 In
this case, the heritages are as it were in competition with each other, vying for absolute
supremacy in terms of truth, and concomitantly seeking to vanquish the other heritage
from any proprietary relation to truth. These two possibilities—of dialectic, of didactic—
may be considered the problem of the dual heritage, or perhaps more accurately as the
dual heritage within the dual heritage, as the generative dynamic of the ongoing
encounter between the Hebraic and the Hellenic, between Athens and Jerusalem (to
retrospectively agitate Tertullian). 261
The writers, priests, and philosophers of England in the Renaissance—more
generally the thinkers—received this dual heritage as in a full and complicated embrace,
and their intellectual productions (Renaissance humanism in total) arose to a marked
degree out of this dual heritage. The point just made is perhaps as obvious as strong
260

Cf. Northrop Frye, “Agon and Logos,” in Spiritus Mundi: Essays on Literature, Myth, and Society
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 201: “Milton intended Paradise Lost to be a Christian
conquest of the Classical epic genre, and similarly Samson Agonistes is a Christian conquest of the
Classical genre of dramatic tragedy.
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For Tertullian classical philosophy was incompatible with the truths of scripture. In De praescriptione
haereticorum (The Prescription Against Heretics), Tertullian famously and rhetorically asked, “What
indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” (De praescriptione haereticorum VII, in Ante-Nicene Fathers,
vol. 3, edited by Philip Schaff and Alexander Roberts. Rpt. ed. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers,
1994).
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convention, but like many strong conventions it is worth reiterating and remembering.
This is so not least because in embracing the dual heritage, Renaissance England became
an intensive recipient of the problem at the heart of the dual heritage, just articulated: that
is, the Hebraic-Hellenic dialectic, and/or the Hebraic didactic vs. Hellenic didactic. In
other words, in Renaissance England the diffusion of classical learning transpired in a
Reformation and then post-Reformation context, just as the reforming spirit of
Christianity—from Tyndale’s translation to the Restoration—developed and variously
articulated itself during a renaissance of classical learning. So that to say Renaissance
England embraced the dual heritage is to say that in terms of intellectual production, it
embraced first and foremost a productive tension, and/or a debilitating conflict. Further,
when one employs instead of the backward-looking term Renaissance, the forwardlooking term, Early Modern (which appears to be the now preferential term), one simply
transposes the tension/conflict from inheritance (theirs) to bequest (ours), which from our
standpoint can then be variously revised in the past tense according to one’s relationship
to that bequest—as curse, to give an extreme example, as blessing, or to the point, as
inheritance.
When one turns from the Renaissance in England generally to seventeenthcentury England in particular (and by extension to the New World), one enters upon an
era notable for high tensions—ecclesiological, political, religious, poetic and domestic—
tensions in greater and lesser degree informed by the tension of the dual heritage. In
some cases, as for example with the very humanist (in other words classically inspired)
endeavor of the Authorized Version of the Bible (1611), the outcome denotes the quality
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of the engagement as one of productive tension. 262 To the point, in four years of
collaborative endeavor, the Hebrew and Greek of the Old and the New Testaments
respectively resolved into the majesty of King James’ English, a coherent language of
astonishing poetic, rhetorical, political and of course theological force. In other cases,
however—that is, in virtually all of the political and ecclesiological disputes of 16251642—the outcome denotes the quality of engagement as ultimately one of conflict. To
this point, in seventeen years of what might also be termed, albeit less comfortably,
collaborative endeavor, the factions of church and state dissolved into war.
From a further perspective, however, what appears as debilitating conflict may
recur as productive tension, depending on one’s point of view with regard to given
outcomes. That is to say that only the most immediate, localized perspective affords the
designation of either tension or conflict. And even here, this designation depends on the
interpreter; and the interpreter’s perspective—based upon proximity to the outcome in
question, and to intellectual and perhaps spiritual inclination—in part determines his
interpretation. The potential for obscurity in such a hermeneutical situation is troublingly
manifest. 263
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For a detailed and formidable history of the making of the Authorized Version, see David Norton, A
Textual History of the King James Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For a more
accessible account, see Alistair McGrath, In the Beginning: The Story Of The King James Bible And How It
Changed A Nation, A Language, And A Culture (New York: Doubleday, 2001); and Adam Nicolson, God’s
Secretaries: The Making of the King James Bible (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). Most recently, and to
coincide with the 400th anniversary of the publication of the AV, Gordon Campbell has produced Bible:
The Story of the King James Version 1611-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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In both Biblical and philosophical work, hermeneutic refers both to the interpretation itself and to
theories of interpretation. By the intentionally vague “hermeneutical situation” I mean to invoke generally
the tradition of hermeneutics, from the rabbinic commentators and Plato to Gadamer (1900-2002). For a
good overview of this tradition, see Bjorn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal, “Hermeneutics,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
<plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hermeneutics/>. In particular, I refer to the idea of the
“hermeneutic circle.” The idea is first developed, although not named as such, by Spinoza in chapter 7 of
the Tractatus-theologico-politicus (1670). See Spinoza, Theological-political Treastise, trans. by Samuel
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This hermeneutical situation—of interpretation as ongoing crisis of understanding
played out between tension and conflict, potentially to resolute, potentially to dissolute
ends—is precisely the situation of Samson Agonistes. It is the fullest statement of
Milton’s own interpretive practices of scripture, of classical tragedy, drama and poetry, of
theology generally, and of his own poems and prose. 264 And it not only poses but is
Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackettt, 2001), Chapter 7, “Of the Interpretation of Scripture.” The title denotes that
Spinoza’s frame for his discussion of interpretation is hermeneutics as biblical exegesis, that of Talmud,
and of Christian commentary (e.g. Calvinist commentaries). Responding to the abject state of biblical
interpretation in his time, in terms of motive, approach, method and outcome, Spinoza sets out to “discuss
the true method of scriptural interpretation and examine it at depth” (87). He responds to the problem with
his now-famous analogy of scripture and nature: “For the method of interpreting scripture is no different
from the method of interpreting nature” (87). Spinoza develops the analogy over the course of the chapter
with an eye always to coming to a clear methodological understanding of hermeneutics. What he comes to
is the importance of context to any hermeneutical endeavor. By context he includes the historical, textual,
linguistic, philosophical, political and personal, and any other framework of thought which brings
organizing influence to any interpretation. Out of his sustained analogy of scripture and nature, Spinoza
makes his most important observation, in terms of hermeneutics and context: “Scripture does not provide
us with definitions of the things of which it speaks, any more than Nature does. Therefore, just as
definitions of the things of nature must be inferred from the various operations of Nature, in the same way
definitions must be elicited from the various Biblical narratives as they touch on a particular subject” (88).
In other words, understanding of scripture, as with nature, depends upon an understanding of parts (Biblical
narratives, particular subjects) and whole (scripture), and the relation of parts to whole. The hermeneutic
circle denotes the interpretive movement back and forth between parts and whole, in which both are always
kept in mind. So that a movement to a part is not a movement away from the whole, or vice versa, but a
movement in the whole, and with the whole toward one of its constituent parts; and the movement from
part to whole is the same. In Being and Time, and then again in “The Origin of the Work of Art,”
Heidegger expands (or perhaps abstracts) Spinoza’s hermeneutics to the realm of ontology. Heidegger’s
point of departure in Being in Time is precisely that hermeneutics is ontology, but can only function as such
once it is understood that “only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.” Martin Heidegger, Being and
Time, translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 35. In
other words, interpretation concerns being by and in its attending to specific phenomena, asked-for
(Heidegger’s formulation for a hermeneutical approach to specific phenomena, what he names entities). In
his formulation Heidegger turns from (and expands the field of inquiry of) Spinoza, and makes decisively
what is known as the “ontological turn” in hermeneutics. The effect produced on the hermeneutic circle is a
shift in emphasis from the parts and whole of a text, and the relationship between text and reader, to an
emphasis on the existential, that is, on the relationship between self and world, between one’s
understanding of oneself, one’s understanding of the world, and one’s understanding of their interplay (37,
182). In this context, Heidegger articulates three modes of being, cohered by an essential Heideggerian
position: Understanding is a mode of being. The activity of this understanding is interpretation. As
discussed in chapter two, Milton understood the circumstance of human being as being-as-interpretation as
the result of the fall.
264

Stanley Fish, “Spectacle and Evidence in Samson Agonistes,” Critical Inquiry 15 (1989), 556-86,
thereafter developed into “The Temptation of Intelligibility,” Chapter 13, How Milton Works. Strikingly,
Michael Lieb has described the critical dilemma produced by Samson Agonistes as a kind of “interpretive
anarchy,” which is the direct result of the total occlusion of the poem’s final meaning(s). See Lieb, “Terror
and Annihilation in Milton,” in Milton in the Age of Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text, and Terrorism
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 232. For a comprehensive study of Milton’s interpretive
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intentionally an interpretive dilemma. The intensity and disputatiousness of critical
debate about the right interpretation of the tragedy brings the point home. 265 As Susanne
Woods puts it, “Samson is preeminently about choice.” 266 The nature of that choice, for
all involved, is preeminently interpretive.

practices, see Dayton Haskin, Milton’s Burden of Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1994). Haskin’s book is the best of its kind. One of Haskins’ main arguments is the degree to which
Milton’s interpretive practices resulted not so much in the kind of providential certainty that Puritan
reading practices intended, but in a problematic (or perhaps, merely complex) hermeneutic of devotion and
ambiguity, the solution to which could only be continued interpretive engagement. This point is especially
important when one considers Milton’s late masterpieces. As Haskins writes, “While ‘liberating’
applications [of scripture] must have seemed to Milton highly desirable, ‘clarity’ and ‘certitude’ cannot be
said to be prominent goals of the interpretive activity that informs his mature poems” (xii). For Haskins’
reading of the interpretive difficulties presented by Samson Agonistes, see 162-238.
265

For a concise review of the interpretative battles the poem has generated, see Alan Rudrum, “Milton
Scholarship and the ‘Agon’ over ‘Samson Agonistes,’ Huntington Library Quarterly 65.3/4 (2002), 46588. The most recent critical dispute was set off by Stanley Fish’s How Milton Works, and from John
Carey’s response to Fish’s reading in light of the events of September 11th, 2001. Because of September
11th, Carey argued in the TLS that Samson Agonistes could no longer be read in the same way. See Carey,
“A Work in Praise of Terrorism? September 11 and Samson Agonistes,” TLS 6 (September, 2002), 15-16. It
needs to be noted that Carey’s “anti-heroic” reading of Samson was not caused by 9/11, but amplified by
9/11: see John Carey and Alastair Fowler, eds., The Poems of John Milton (London: Longmans, 1968),
335-41. Feisel G. Mohamed addressed the dispute in his influential “Confronting Religious Violence:
Milton’s Samson Agonistes” PMLA 120.2 (March, 2005), 327-40. Mohamed effectively dismantles
Carey’s post 9/11 reading, and interestingly, challenges Fish for not pushing the implications of his
interpretation far enough. For a good and, more importantly, judicious survey of Samson criticism, see John
T. Shawcross, The Uncertain World of Samson Agonistes, esp. 48-144. Rudrum’s review, cited above, is
less judicious than Shawcross, but I agree with it, particularly with regard to the interpretations put forth by
Carey, Irene Samuel, and Joseph Wittreich. Wittreich surveys the state of SA criticism, first in Interpreting
Samson Agonistes (1986), and then again in Shifting Contexts: Reinterpreting Samson Agonistes (2002). In
both cases his survey is pointedly polemical, directed especially at F. Michael Krouse’s Milton’s Samson
and the Christian Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), and what Wittreich sees as the
prevailing interpretations following Krouse, those especially of Hanford, Lewalski, and Radzinowicz. In
Interpreting Samson Agonistes, Wittreich is writing against all typological interpretations of SA, a position
of critical rigidity equal to the critical rigidity he convicts typological interpretations of having. Instead of
typological interpretation (by which he includes the traditional reading of SA as a drama of regeneration),
Wittreich argues for a contextual interpretation. However, for Wittreich, the relevant contexts are selfevidently seventeenth-century literary and theological thinking about Samson in Judges, as opposed to the
work of say Augustine and Luther. This assumption belies a misunderstanding of the very term it seeks to
justify: relevant contexts. The relevant contexts with which to interpret SA are those contexts which were
relevant to Milton, the poet, writing SA, as Radzinowicz suggests in her method of author-contextual
criticism (Toward Samson Agonistes, xix).
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“Choice and Election in Samson Agonistes,” 175.
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Samson Agonistes is an interpretive dilemma not only for all the characters of the
tragedy, especially Samson, but for all the readers of the tragedy. 267 Throughout Samson
Agonistes, all the other characters—the chorus, Manoa, Dalila, Harapha, the officer, the
messenger—are trying to interpret Samson. And throughout the tragedy, Samson is
trying to interpret the will of God, for himself, or is perhaps trying to appear to be so
doing. In turn, as Milton intends it, the reader of Samson Agonistes is faced with a tripletask of interpretation, one that brings with it the dreadful possibility of interpretive
collapse, of distinct hermeneutics coalescing not into a bright and harnessed latticework
of interpretation but into a pile of dumbness. 268
First, the reader is confronted with the task of interpreting Samson’s interpreters
(the chorus and Manoa being the most troublingly inconsistent in their interpretations).
Second, the reader is confronted with the task of interpreting Samson’s interpretation, not
with the end in view (Samson’s destruction of the temple), but radically, in the moments
of interpreting, without or despite it. 269 Third, the reader is confronted with the task of
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Any reading of Milton’s late poems that stipulates their reader as an agent in them most likely derives in
one way or another from Fish’s Surprised by Sin: the Reader in Paradise Lost. What Fish proposes as the
“interpretative choice” required of any reader of Paradise Lost (207-39), is even more the case with
Samson Agonistes.
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Perhaps the paradigmatic instance of interpretive collapse is Plato’s Parmenides, in which Parmenides’
deconstruction of Plato’s “theory of forms,” and Young Socrates’ delineation of eight deductions intended
to restore the philosophical validity of the forms, leads to an enormously obscure discussion of the nature
of the “One,” and of what can and cannot be said of the “One.” The dialogue ends, enigmatically, with an
interpretive debilitation that stands for the whole. The moment is one of profound and subtle pathos. The
great thinker, Parmenides, realizes that—despite all his experience and acumen, and despite all his arduous
intellectual work during the discussion just concluded—his philosophical investigation has not and will not
with any elegance or clarity resolve the questions he has posed. He must admit as much to his young
interlocutor. “It seems,” he says, “that, whether there is or is not a one, both that one and the others alike
are and are not, and appear and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways, with respect
to themselves and to one another.” To which, with devastating irony and the loss that drives it, Young
Socrates replies, “Most true” (166b).
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As Stanley Fish writes, “I think we are intended to understand that we cannot make the choice—cannot
say what kind of act the rebellion is—by simply pointing to what seem to be its empirical consequences …
That is to say, in a world where outcomes (but not intentions) are contingent, we should not, says Milton,
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interpreting what is in the drama not legible, or present in any discursive way: the will of
the divine with specific regard to Samson and Samson’s act. The second and third tasks
of interpretation, taken together, create an ethically fraught situation for the reader,
because of the death and destruction that Samson’s final act causes. Milton means to
put—pin would be more to the point—the reader where he does. For the fraught situation
is the hermeneutic situation seriously amplified, engaged in the very groundwork of
justice—life and death—and by this engagement made inescapably, gravely ethical. 270
And the task of interpreting the will of God—the non-legible presence, the “rousing
motion,” the absence?—in reference to Samson, and of not first interpreting the will of
God in terms of Samson’s final act, is the interpretive task that Milton sets before us.
In the traditional interpretation Samson Agonistes is a drama of regeneration. 271
Samson begins in despair, moves through penitence to a kind of self-surrender, hears not

justify our actions retroactively by waiting to see how they turned out and then reasoning backward to their
virtue or vice, as Samson does when he decides that, given what has happened to him, the marriage to
Dalila was a bad idea (‘I thought it lawful from my former act.’). Rather, it is a necessary and sufficient
justification if the act issues from a desire to do God’s will and to follow the path of obedience rather than
the path of carnal impulse. (On this view of the matter, the road to hell could not be paved with good
intentions)”: “Milton, Liberalism, and Terrorism,” in Milton in the Age of Fish: Essays on Authorship, Text,
and Terrorism, 250-51.
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Cf. Joan S. Bennett, “A Reading of Samson Agonistes,” 225: “In submitting ourselves to this tragedy,
we will enter an experience graver, more moral, and to our greater spiritual good than even that of Paradise
Lost or Paradise Regained; for the tragedy will work directly on our individual innermost selves,
addressing the roots of sin and suffering in us.”
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The representative critics of this tradition include Krouse, Hanford, Frye, Radzinowicz, Lewalksi and to
a degree, Shawcross. See for example, Krouse, Milton’s Samson and the Christian Tradition, passim;
Hanford, John Milton: Poet and Humanist (Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University, 1966),
264-86; Frye, Spiritus Mundi: Essays on Literature, Myth, and Society (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), 205-21; especially Radzinowicz, Toward Samson Agonistes: The Growth of Milton’s Mind
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), xx, 113, 227-65; Lewalski, “Samson Agonistes and the
‘Tragedy’ of the Apocalypse,” PMLA 85.5 (October, 1970), 1050-62; and Shawcross, The Uncertain World
of Samson Agonistes, ix, 48-64, 108, 112-44. See also Joan S. Bennett, Reviving Liberty: Radical Christian
Humanism in Milton’s Great Poems (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Georgia
Christopher, Milton and the Science of the Saints (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Wendy
Furman, “Samson Agonistes as Christian Tragedy,” Philological Quarterly 60 (1981), 169-81; Anthony
Low, The Blaze of Noon: A Reading of Samson Agonistes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974);
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himself but the will of the divine, and is regenerated as a hero. 272 For Mary Ann
Radzinowicz, Samson’s regeneration illustrates the drama’s theology of gradual
revelation. 273 At the beginning of the drama, Samson is a figure of crushing doubt,
“eyeless in Gaza at the mill with slaves” (SA l.41). Why? He wants to know,
Why was my breeding ordered and prescribed
As of a person separate to God,
Designed for great exploits if I must die
Betrayed, captive, and both my eyes put out,
Made of my enemies the scorn and gaze,
To grind in brazen fetters under task
With this Heav’n gifted strength?
(SA ll.30-36)
Samson asks this question in the pit of his own despair, rock-bottom as it were. From
here he has only his own guilt to call on. He does so in the form of pointed rhetorical
interrogation: “Whom have I to complain of but myself? / Who this high gift of strength
committed to me / In what part lodged, how easily bereft me, / Under the seal of silence
could not keep / But weakly to a woman must reveal it” (SA ll.46-50). And: “How could
I once look up, or heave the head, / Who like a foolish pilot have shipwrecked / My
vessel trusted to me from above, / Gloriously rigged; and for a word, a tear, / Fool, have
divulged the secret gift of God / to a deceitful woman” (SA ll.197-202, emphasis added).
The admission of guilt is the beginning of his penitence. His penitence signals the
beginning of his recovery of agency. Central to this recovery is Samson’s recollection of
and John M. Steadman, “Milton’s ‘Summa Epitasis’: The End of the Middle of ‘Samson Agonistes,’” The
Modern Language Review 69.4 (October, 1974), 730-44, esp. 731.
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his intimate accord with the will of God. This recollection—a kind of secondary source
of his regeneration, the primary source of which must be the will of the divine—is in part
brought on by challenging interactions, with the Chorus, Manoa, and especially with
Delilah, and then with Harapha. To the traditional reading, I would add that Samson’s
penitence is a waiting to hear. By dint of his interaction with bona fide opposition—
Delilah, Harapha (they are in their opposition part of his regeneration)—his waiting to
hear becomes a waiting to hear the will of the divine. Harapha ridicules what he takes to
be the fraudulent source and story of Samson’s strength:
Thou would not disparage glorious arms
Which greatest Heroes have in battle worn,
Their ornament and safety, had not spells
And black enchantments, some Magician’s art
Armed thee or charmed thee strong, which thou from Heaven
Feigned at thy birth was given thee in thy hair,
Where strength can least abide, though all thy hairs
Were bristles ranged like those that ridge the back
Of chased wild boars, or ruffled porcupines.
(SA ll.1130-38)
Strongly, clearly, unhesitantly, Samson replies: “I know no spells; use no forbidden arts: /
My trust is in the living God who gave me / At my Nativity this strength” (SA ll.113941). What becomes clear in Samson’s exchanges with Harapha is that the giant’s loudmouthed taunts especially serve as the unexpected and necessary prelude and instigation
to Samson’s regeneration, to the “rousing motions” (SA l.1382) Samson feels, and the
disposition those rousing motions produce in Samson (SA l.1382).
The particular quality of Samson’s heroic status depends on which source
tradition is emphasized as determinant, Christian or Classical. In the case of the latter,
the classical emphasis, Samson is simply a Greek hero regenerated, a version of Hercules,
and the question of scriptural precedent is more or less elided, or—and this is a more
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sophisticated interpretive maneuver—relegated to the background. 274 In the case of the
former—in the typological reading—Samson is a prefiguration of Christ. This
typological interpretation depends in large part for its persuasive power on the mention of
Samson in Hebrews 11.32-33 as a hero of faith, which seems to clarify the meaning, in
terms of Samson’s action and divine will, in Judges 16.28-30. 275 The problem with this
interpretative strategy is that Hebrews 11.32-33 is itself a typological interpretation of the
Samson story, and of others. To the point: Hebrews 11.32-33 interprets Judges 16.28-30
to establish Jesus Christ as the Messiah by identifying his precursors in the Old
Testament. This redactive interpretive effort is exactly the work and intention of
Christian typology: once the connection between Samson and Christ is established,
Samson can be read retroactively from a Christian perspective. So that Hebrews 11.3233 clarifies the will of the divine with regard to Samson precisely by reading him
typologically, as a Christ figure. And if Samson is a Christ figure, he is for Christians a
figure of divine will on earth. Therefore, his actions manifest that will, as Christ’s action
manifest that will. They adhere in terms of divine conscription. In terms of Samson
Agonistes, this interpretive logic proves circular, whether or not the typological reading
effectively legitimizes Jesus as the Messiah prophesized in the Hebrew Scriptures/Old
274
See William Riley Parker, “The Greek Spirit in Milton’s Samson Agonistes,” Essays and Studies by
Members of the English Association 20 (1934), 21-44; and Milton’s Debt to Greek Tragedy in Samson
Agonistes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), 237. Parker writes, “The theme of Samson
Agonistes, then, is the hero’s recovery and its result.” See also Kessner, “Milton’s Hebraic Herculean
Hero.”
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Hebrews 11.32-33: “And what more shall I say? For the time would fail me to tell of Gedeon, and of
Barak, and of Samson, and of Jephthae; of David also, and Samuel, and of the prophets: Who through faith
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Testament. 276 In other words, because Hebrews 11.32 is a typological interpretation of
Judges 16.28-30, it is not necessarily reliable as a tool with which to interpret the will of
the divine in Judges 16.28-30, or in Samson Agonistes.
In the counter-traditional interpretation, Samson is not so self-evidently a Messiah
figure, if he is a Messiah figure at all. 277 In this reading Samson’s final act—the atrocity
offstage as it were—necessarily dictates the interpretation of the work, and dictates the
interpretation not as regenerationist but as tragedy. Implicit in this interpretation is a
grappling with the ethical responsibilities of the interpreter, confronted with a text of
apparently dubious motivations. As Irene Samuel—perhaps the most influential
(particularly on Joseph Wittreich’s long engagement with the work), and certainly one of
the first Miltonists to argue against the regenerationist reading—explains:
Even the best of those who argue for Samson’s regeneration rather
noticeably close their eyes to the nature of his last act. They focus
exclusively on Samson as though no one else were involved and dismiss
the victims of his wholesale murderousness as ‘God’s enemies’
presumably placed there by divine providence in order that the Chorus
may rejoice over ‘thy slaughter’d foes in number more / Than all thy life
had slain before.’ Some of us cannot without profound discomfort
identify Milton’s with the gross morality that exonerates every injury of
276
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others if only it be committed in the name of God’s will. Milton himself
had lived through a long civil war during which God’s will was all-tooseriously called upon as sanction.
No, either we accuse the poet of Samson Agonistes of a serious
moral blindness, of sheer bigotry, or we recognize that he called the work
a tragedy for good reason…All that he [Samson] says and does is
appropriate to the protagonist of a tragedy; and as a tragic agent Samson
does not violate the ethic that Milton held. 278
Samuel’s registration of the “profound discomfort” Samson Agonistes causes its
interpreters is critically important. The question then is, what are we to do—what does
Milton intend us to do—with this grave discomfort? As Samuel suggests, the project of
identifying Milton’s morality in and by Samson Agonistes is dubious, if not doomed from
the start since the only morality to be resolutely and specifically discerned in the drama is
not Samson’s nor any other characters, but the reader’s. Finally, we as interpreters have
no critical access (which means Milton gives us no access) to Samson’s “rousing
motions,” and therefore we cannot finally interpret their quality, whether divine,
delusional, or anything else. And we have no access to the nature of Samson’s
transformation from despair to act. We have only what he says, and what others say to
and about him, both before and after he pulls the temple down. And what each character
says is, as soon as he or she says it, identifiable as rhetoric (as language being used to
persuade), and perhaps even as description of concern or intention, but what each says is
not in the least identifiable as the truth of the matter, as reported fact, or as the express
disclosure of Milton’ morality. Milton’s morality is not in the play; if anything, it is the
play, every word, every line, every transition, every character, every interaction between
characters, and every setting, actual and implied. So that the only appropriate definition
of Milton’s morality in Samson Agonistes would be to point to the play, and say “that.”
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If Milton intended otherwise—to have his morality clear and readily identifiable in the
drama—he would have delivered otherwise, in the manner of his prose. For example,
“But God himself is truth!” (2Def, Yale 4:585) Or:
Good and evil we know in the field of this World grow up together almost
inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involv’d and interwoven
with the knowledge of evill, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly
to be discern’d, that those confused seeds which were impos’d on Psyche
as incessant labor to cull out and sort asunder, were not more intermixt. 279
(Areop, Yale 2: 514)
What Samuel is saying here—the interpretive dilemma she is pointing to—is that with
Samson Agonistes we must either ascribe to Milton a coarse form of ‘popular morality,’
jacked-up on a lust for retribution—which would be a frankly inaccurate ascription—or
we are compelled to find a different reading. The counter-traditional reading that Samuel
and others have generated is just such a different reading, in which Milton’s intentions
are not as immediately assumed, as they are in the regenerationist reading.
The counter-traditional reading seeks to read both the obscurity and the nuance of
the drama not despite its violent dénouement, but as a way of understanding the meaning
of the dénouement. For this line of argument, it is important to remember that Milton’s
concept of obedience posits the potential if not the occasional synchronicity of human
will with divine will, and demonstrates the perfect moment of such synchronization in
Paradise Regained. 280 For Milton, moments of such synchronization—of what we might
think of as moments of accurate obedience—are of course entirely different from
moments not of synchronization but alienation, moments of inaccurate obedience (most
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particularly, perhaps, those moments of inaccurate obedience which nonetheless justify
injury caused as fulfilling divine will.) It follows that any comprehensive designation of
(human) acts “committed in the name of God’s will,” must at the very least afford
designations of those acts as accurate and inaccurate commissions, and further still, of the
whole set of partially accurate and inaccurate commissions between the two extremes of
accurate and inaccurate commission, moments of obedience and disobedience.
For Milton, whose life was one sustained attempt to discern the will of God both
for himself and for England, and whose poetry is the artful outcome of that attempt, the
idea that in all cases of injury to others the same designation can be applied is
insufficient. Considered in the light of Milton’s paramount valuation of obedience, only
those cases of “injury to others” which followed from inaccurate commissions of human
will in terms of its obedience to divine will would need to be exonerated, or to put it more
bluntly, explained so terribly away. However, in those cases in which “injury to others”
followed from accurate commissions of human will in terms of its obedience to divine
will, those injuries would not need to be exonerated. This is so precisely because
Milton’s paramount valuation of obedience indicates Milton’s entire epistemology, the
ground of his knowledge both theoretical and applied, in terms of truth and in terms of
the framework in which meaning for that truth is generated and organized. Milton values
obedience above all, because for Milton only obedience to divine will affords the
possibility of coming to the truth, which is for Milton God’s will.
By emphasizing the very incertitude of Samson Agonistes, the counter-traditional
reading suggests what may be a useful adjustment with regard to the kind of
interpretation the drama demands. For it may be that what Milton asks of us in our
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attempt to interpret human acts “committed in the name of God” is the reorientation of
our imaginations in which our critical judgments develop and from which those critical
judgments are advanced. We might describe this reorientation of imagination from one
of personalized imagination, in which human experience is the point of orientation and
concern, and human sentiment the inevitable result, to one of what might be called
sacrificial imagination, in which divine experience is the intended point of orientation,
and the revelation of divine will in the world the intended result. When acts “committed
in the name of God’s will” are evaluated by the critical faculty of the sacrificial rather
than the personalized imagination, the resultant interpretations will always be
qualitatively different, even in those instances when the final judgments are the same.
And in those potential cases in which such acts are accurate commissions of divine will,
then the evaluation of those acts, and all their effects, e.g., “injury to others,” would
proceed not in terms of exoneration but in terms of glorification and remembrance. For a
Christian, the injuries sustained would be injuries of martyrdom, wounds attributable to
the workings of the divine will in the world.
It is important to note that nowhere in the attempt to interpret acts committed in
the name of God’s will does the potential for sheer atrocity make itself felt than in just
this kind of formulation (although it must also be noted that sheer atrocity does not
require a God-oriented imagination for its efficacy). However, the positing of a
providential God entails just such a disquieting possibility. Milton’s God is not only the
God of the “inner light” but the God of the flood and of Jericho as well. And this God’s
providence is only reducible to justice, in divine terms, and to nothing else. As Feisel
Mohamed has pointed out, “that Samson’s actions carry a horrific human cost does not
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preclude consideration of them as consistent with Providence.” 281 From this perspective,
the “gross morality” might more accurately be called sublime.
However the sublime possibility is only a possibility. When we consider the
genre of Samson Agonistes other interpretations become possible. For example,
Samson’s final act may be an atrocity and even so, he is a tragic hero of neo-Greek
tragedy (one thinks of what Achilles does to Hector’s corpse). This interpretive
possibility reiterates the importance of reading Samson Agonistes in terms of Milton’s
own generic designation of it as tragedy. As Samuel writes, “Milton called Samson
Agonistes a tragedy, not a martyr play; its subject cannot be Samson restored to divine
favor. The title signifies Samson in his agon, his contest, and thus prepares us for a grim
struggle proper to tragedy.” 282 It is possible that the grim struggle finds its conclusion in
the tragically self-referential nether-reaches of Samson’s will, roused or otherwise. 283 As
for Samson’s will, it may be a site of perceptive distortion wreaked by a disastrous
alliance of virtues and harm. So when he looks out on his circumstance, or into his
circumstance, he perceives virtue harmed, or himself having harmed virtue, chiefly his
own, God-given. As Samuel writes, “along with virtues [Samson] has a hamartia so
deep in his ethos that he snares himself in folds of necessity.” 284
Hamartia corresponds negatively to kairos, and was used in Ancient Greece to
denote its opposite—not hitting the mark, but missing the mark. The senses of the word
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also included wrongdoing, error, and in the Judeo-Christian framework, sin. In simple
terms, Samson is so screwed up—because of the sin he committed, the mark he missed—
that he can’t see clearly. As Jane Melbourne puts it, Samson “suffers psychologically as
well as physically because he believes he was born to deliver Israel, and he has
accomplished nothing toward that end. From either a Deuteronomic or tragic
perspective, all that has happened to him is his own fault.” 285 So when the drama opens,
we meet a Samson blinded twice—by the Philistines, and then again by his crushing
sense of failure.
In terms of genre and its intent, the movement from Samson’s hamartia to the
conclusion of the drama follows from the proposal made in the preface to Samson
Agonistes. As Milton writes:
Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest,
moralist, and most profitable of all other poems: therefore said by
Aristotle to be of power by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the
mind of those and such-like passions, that is to temper and reduce them to
just measure with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those
passions well imitated.
The debt to Aristotle’s Poetics is explicit, most especially in its concern with the effect of
a literary work on its audience. The debt to Horace and the positing of neoclassical
literary theory are implied. The effect is first off “to be of power by raising pity and fear,
or terror, to purge the mind.” Here, Milton recalls Aristotle’s theory of catharsis or
purgation, set forth in chapters 9, 13-14, and 24-25 of the Poetics. 286 The purpose of the
purgation is taken up after chapter 9. Aristotle replaces catharsis with rhaumaston,
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usually translated as wonder, and in Ingram Bywater’s translation as “the marvelous.”
This move from catharsis to wonder is not a revision on Aristotle’s part but a shift in
emphasis. If purgation is one effect of tragedy, then there is the intended effect of that
purgation, the feeling that catharsis gives. For Aristotle, this feeling should be pleasure,
and the pleasure that follows from the cathartic, should be instructive.
In Ars Poetica (18 BCE), Horace unifies the Aristotelian notions of pleasure and
instruction as that necessary quality for drama but he does so without reference to
catharsis:
Poets aim either to benefit or to amuse, or to utter words at once both
pleasing and helpful to life. Whenever you instruct, be brief, so that what
is quickly said the mind may readily grasp and faithfully hold: every word
in excess flows away from the full mind. Fictions meant to please should
be close to the real, so that your play must not ask for belief in anything it
chooses, nor from the Ogress’s belly, after dinner, draw forth a living
child. The centuries of the elders chase from the stage what is profitless;
the proud Ramnes disdain poems devoid of charms. He has won every
vote who has blended profit and pleasure, at once delighting and
instructing the reader. 287
Reference to catharsis returns in neoclassicism, and English neoclassicism provisionally
dated from the Restoration in 1660. 288 Neoclassical literary theorists were indebted both
to Horace and to Aristotle. 289 As such pleasure (what Milton in the Preface calls
“delight”), instruction, and catharsis all appear as central tenets of poetry. The catharsis
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of the neoclassicists, however, is not that of Aristotle (to recall: Aristotelian catharsis
becomes wonder). The English neoclassicists especially—influenced perhaps by the
moral aesthetics of Puritanism, and having to justify poetry in a climate of Puritan moral
aesthetics—understood catharsis as purgation. And as René Wellek has noted, “purging
was interpreted to mean hardening, becoming inured to the passions of pity and fear, just
as a physician becomes indifferent to the sight of terrible wounds and a veteran soldier to
the most dangerous fighting.” 290 As Wellek continues, “In this [neoclassical] theory of
catharsis the emotional effect of art was central, even though it was interpreted to mean a
release from emotion as the final attainment of contemplation.” 291 Again then, in terms
of genre, the last line of Samson Agonistes—“calm of mind, all passion spent”—verifies
it as tragedy. 292
However, there is a necessary caveat to reading Samson Agonistes only as
tragedy: as much as the title signifies Samson in his agon as Samuel points out, and thus
emphasizes its Greek heritage, the title signifies that agon as Samson’s, a biblical
figure—in the Old Testament a figure “blessed” by the Lord (Judges 13.24), in whom the
spirit of the Lord moved (13.25), and for whom God provides miraculously (15.18-19),
and in the New Testament a “hero of faith” (Hebrews 11.32)—thus emphasizing its
Hebraic heritage. 293 So prioritizing either the agon of the title or the Samson of the title,
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Judges 13.24: “And the woman bare a son, and called his name Samson: and the child grew, and the
Lord blessed him”; Judges 13.25: “And the Spirit of the Lord began to move him at times in the camp of
Dan between Zorah and Eshtaol”; Judges 15.18-19: “And he was sore athirst, and called on the Lord, and
said, Thou hast given this great deliverance into the hand of thy servant: and now shall I die for thirst, and
fall into the hand of the uncircumcised? But God clave an hollow place that was in the jaw, and there came

185

tells us something of the critical disposition and intention of the interpreter, but not
necessarily anything about the prioritization of the Hellenic or Hebraic in the drama. In
other words, if the regenerationist interpretation prioritizes the Judeo-Christian
framework of Samson Agonistes, and the counter interpretation prioritizes the Greek
framework of the Samson Agonistes, in both cases, the interpretations follow from the
interpretive framework each prioritizes. And the characterizations of Samson the
interpretations propose are legitimated by propositions of cause and effect that are
themselves illegitimate, not least because each names Samson’s final act an effect, and
then reasons backward for a cause to justify that effect in keeping with the interpretation.
If Samson is a prefiguration of Christ, Samson’s final act must be sanctioned by divine
will. Therefore that act must be an effect, the cause of which is Samson’s regeneration
under the auspices of divine will. If Samson is merely a broken hero, a delusional
murderer, or both, then Samson’s final act must be a tragedy. And therefore, that act
must be an effect, the cause of which is Samson’s fatal flaw, as it were, the hamartia
deep in his ethos.
However, a point the counter-traditional view makes is that this kind of
“prioritizing” can be read as ignoring the poem’s status as a work of literature. That is,
some regenerationist readings seem to assume that the poem is, in effect, a versified and
unproblematic retelling of the Bible story, as opposed to a literary retelling not
necessarily tied to its original in all facets. As a work of literature—of imaginative art—
Samson Agonistes creates its own interpretive framework, even as it draws on both the

water thereout; and when he had drunk, his spirit came again, and he revived: wherefore he called the name
thereof Enhakkore, which is in Lehi unto this day; Hebrews 11.32: “And what shall I more say? For the
time would fail me to tell of Gedeon, and of Barak, and of Samson, and of Jephthae; of David also, and
Samuel, and of the prophets.”
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Hebraic and Hellenic frameworks at its disposal. The main point in the countertraditional reading is not necessarily that Samson Agonistes must be read as a Greek
tragedy, but that it should be read as an autonomous work of art. By prioritizing the
poem’s own framework, it may then be valid to interpret Samson as a prefiguration of
Christ, as long as one makes such an interpretation in the light of the interpretation of
Samson as tragic hero, and vice-versa, and always in direct reference to what the poem
itself says. The interpretive effort proposed here is not one of reading dialectically but of
reading the dialectic itself, or trying to, within the literary framework the poem itself
produces. 294 To do so, one affirms one interpretation, prioritizes the Hebraic or Hellenic
heritage; and this affirmation functions as a very temporary negation of the other
interpretation, and its repression of that other heritage. Once the affirmation has been
made, the negation rises to be affirmed, and subsequently what was affirmed is negated.
Samson Agonistes requires just such an interpretive practice. The practice correlates to
the Christian theology of kataphasis/apophasis, and is part of the necessary condition for
obedience. It is to the via negativa I now turn.

Apophasis
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The interpretive framework in which Milton’s concept of unknowing develops, and from
which it derives, is apophasis, or negative theology. In the simplest terms, apophasis
posits the unknowability of God and from this first position, sets out to describe God by
what God is not. 295 As Milton writes in Christian Doctrine, “God, as he is, is far beyond
man’s imagination, let alone his understanding.” 296 Two hundred years before Milton,
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) asked: “How do we seriously adore what we do not
know?”297 Cusa’s question is a restatement of the question Augustine posed at the
beginning of the Confessions: “Who then are you, My God, deeply hidden yet most
intimately present?”298 The question articulates the predicament apophasis or negative
theology continually poses, and posed, to Milton.
Negative theology may be defined as an intellectual method, as a spiritual
exercise, and as a critical practice. Understood as spiritual exercise, negative theology
depends upon its practicable aspect, which entails the negation of all affirmations one can
claim about God, followed by a negation of those negations. The specified reason for
these negations is that apophasis saves its practitioners from idolatry. It does so by
perpetual recourse to the fact of the individual’s perceptual limited-ness. This limitedness, and the uncertainty it denotes, at first provokes an existential anxiety. For negative
theologians this anxiety is tantamount to a kind of critical virtue.

295

The companion of apophasis is kataphasis, or affirmative theology, in which the knowability of God is
first posited, and then described along those lines of affirmation.
296

Christian Doctrine (Yale 6:133).

297

Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, translated by Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: A.J. Benning
Press, 1981), 50.

298

Confessions 1.4.

188

But it is so only if apophasis is practiced in relationship to kataphasis, or
affirmative theology. One of negative theology’s ongoing risks is its propensity for
becoming an epistemologically self-defeating catechism of negations. Further, the
relationship of apophasis to kataphasis is as a secondary to a primary. This is an obvious
point, but important enough to bear explication. Affirmative theology is the foundation
upon which negative theology depends, and without which it cannot function. As Hilary
Armstrong, the foremost authority on Plotinus, has argued, “One may have to negate
everything in the end: but one cannot negate it till one has understood it thoroughly. And
negation does not mean abandonment.” 299 In this regard the process or spiritual exercise
of kataphasis/apophasis is a dialectic practiced on behalf of preserving a right relation to
the divine; that is, of extending to knowledge and then returning to unknowing the
individual in his philosophical relationship to the divine. To put it another way, the
dialectic serves to promote continually more accurate apprehensions of the divine, while
at the same time successfully resisting idolatry.
Formulations of unknowing rely upon paradosis, for the use of paradox as the
predominant tool with which to express the experience of unknowing and to suggest its
meanings, and also for the situational paradox of a text engaged in articulations of the
unsayable, the unknown, the finally elusive. Parmenides of Elea (525 BCE) is
conventionally understood as the founder of this mode of thinking. After Parmenides, the
chief philosophical antecedent of negative theology is Plato. Socrates may be said to be
the exemplar of what Nicholas Cusa almost two thousand years later came to call
“learned ignorance.” Socrates knows that he does not know. In the Symposium, this
situation becomes the Platonic definition of the philosopher (see, for example,
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Symposium 175e). In Parmenides, the situation of unknowing is most fully investigated.
Every term deployed in the dialogue comes under relentless scrutiny. 300 Of all Plato’s
dialogues, Parmenides is most a process dialogue, in other words, an enactment and
recapitulation of the practice of doing philosophy. At the end of the dialogue no
conclusions can be viably drawn, other perhaps than that all philosophical argument
beyond the acknowledgement of being is doomed to degrees of inaccuracy and
reductiveness. 301
Fragments survive of Parmenides’ unfinished epic poem, dating to 515 BC, and
taken together establish the groundwork for practices of negation. The predominant
interpretation understands the fragments as an archetypical if severe monist doctrine,
making the argument that there is only and exactly one thing in the universe, unchanging
and completely unified, and this one thing may be understood as the truth, or as the
divine, and is in most cases radically different from what we perceive to be the case—in
other words, from the everyday world of sense and contingency. 302 In Parmenides’
poetic turn, “What is is/must be” and for all but the initiated the world is unknowable,
and most probably misapprehended at all times.
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With the birth of Christianity, apophatic philosophy begins to take real form as a
negative theology. Following Pierre Hadot, Christianity should here be understood as a
“revealed philosophy.” 303 Its doctrines are paradoxical. A Christian believes in an
unknowable God, and is committed to knowing that God; a Christian believes in the
resurrection of the dead; and after the council at Nicaea in 325 CE, a Christian subscribes
to the Trinity, the most mystical of Christian doctrines, which puts forth the God of three
persons, the triune unity, the One of three.
Influential to the concept of the persons of the Holy Trinity is Plotinus’ Enneads,
the first great work of Neoplatonism. In this work, Plotinus sets forth his three
metaphysical principles: the One, Intellect, Soul. 304 Most importantly with regard to the
development of negative theology, Plotinus establishes that the One can only in any way
be known by deducing what it is not. The name “One” is a conceit, and should not be
thought of as a principle of oneness, but as the evocation of what Plotinus considers
perfect simplicity. 305 This perfect simplicity or “Simplex” in Mackenna’s translation is
beyond the reach of the discursive, which cannot express the indivisible. (In this
formulation of the One, Plotinus may have been influenced not just by Plato but by
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Aristotle as well). 306 Plotinus’ admission of his conceits, both conceptual and linguistic,
serves as a defense against dogmatism.
With the Enneads the philosophical character of negative theology is in place.
With the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, an anonymous 5th-century Greek monk, the
mystical attributes of negative theology specifically, and of unknowing generally, are
formulated. Like John Scotus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa after him,
Pseudo-Dionysius was a speculative theologian, situated as they were, as all speculative
theologians more or less are, on the precarious edge of either religious heresy or
philosophical nonsense. Even so, for Pseudo-Dionysius the negative way is the most
advanced intellectual activity available to man. 307 He makes this point more than once in
The Divine Names, Celestial Hierarchies, and Mystical Theology, his exemplary treatise
of the practice of apophasis. However, he does not believe this is the case because it
concerns the divine, but because it concerns the ways in which we may speak about the
divine. This is a critical distinction and represents something of a genuine philosophical
innovation, foreseeing as it does many of the concerns of early modern and modern
philosophy, concerns as various as Kant’s Transcendental Analytic and the language
work of logical positivism. As Pseudo-Dionysius writes: “But my argument now rises
from what is below up the transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language
falters, and when it has passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent
completely.” 308 Another important aspect of Pseudo-Dionysius’s philosophy is his
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kataphatic “doctrine of analogy,” which posits that the divine is in all creation, and that
each individual entity can be known by the degree of divinity which it has, and which it
emanates. In other words, by the divine all creation is analogous to itself, and all figures
of creation are analogous to each other. 309 It is a doctrine positing creational harmony as
its thesis, in conjunction with an ethic of unknowing.
The Pseudo-Dionysian corpus influenced the entire discourse of medieval
philosophy and theology, and was considered orthodox teaching in the medieval Church.
John Scotus Eriguena wrote a commentary on Celestial Hierarchies in the ninth century,
translated Mystical Theology, and in his Periphyseon argues that divinity, which is
without limit, and beyond essence, can only be articulated by rigorously denying every
single affirmation we can posit about God. 310 To do so, is the absolute responsibility of
humankind. St. Thomas Aquinas, conventionally understood as the anti-mystic, was
more influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius than by any other Christian thinker—with the
noted exception of Augustine—perhaps because of the influence of his (Aquinas’)
teacher, Albertus Magnus, who himself wrote commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius.
Aquinas followed suit, writing the medieval commentary on The Divine Names. He also
utilized Pseudo-Dionysius’ doctrine of analogy in his Summa Theologica to develop his
concept of what constitutes the “intelligible world” and by what means that world is
perceivable by human beings. 311
Aquinas’ near-contemporary and fellow Dominican, Meister Eckhart, who was
known in his time as “the man from whom God hid nothing,” also relied on the Pseudo309
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Dionysian doctrine of analogy in his discussion of the relationship between absolute
being (the divine) and created being, a category which he names nulleitas or nothingness
for its total dependence on absolute being and for its total unintelligibility otherwise.
It is Eckhart who extends the mystical attributes of negative theology into a poetry of
abstraction noteworthy for its provocative formulations—e.g., “cherish in yourself the
birth of God” and “God becomes as phenomena express Him.” 312 Both statements follow
from Eckhart’s particular practice of negative theology, which delineates between God
and Godhead. God is that which is beyond all being, beyond discourse, in no language
can be approached. Godhead is the eternal potentiality and ongoing presence of God in
being, the creator, and is that to which we refer when we attempt to speak of the
divine. 313 Taken together, Eckhart’s sermons may be thought of as a prolonged and
guided excursion into the darkness of God.
Nicholas of Cusa’s On Learned Ignorance (1440) is generally considered both the
culmination to the negative theology of the medieval period, and the foundational text of
negative theology for the Renaissance. As Ernst Cassirer wrote more than forty years
ago, “Any study that seeks to view the philosophy of the Renaissance as a systematic unit
must take as its point of departure the doctrines of Nicholas Cusanus.” 314 First and
foremost, On Learned Ignorance is the work of a man who is both a speculative
theologian and a speculative mathematician (as Bruno and Pascal after him), a German
living in Italy, and a conforming Cardinal of the church who was throughout his career
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concerned with two inextricably related questions: 1) How can we seriously adore what
we do not know? Thus 2) How can we (finite, limited) think about the infinite and
transcendent God? In other words, Cusa is primarily concerned with addressing not
knowledge of God, but the possibility of knowledge of God. In response to this concern,
Cusa utilizes geometry, number, Neoplatonic philosophy, scripture, and moments of
exceptionally well-placed mysticism to develop his doctrine of “learned ignorance.” The
doctrine is most heavily indebted to Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart, and to Plotinus’
figuration of the One, which Cusanus refigures as the “Maximum.” 315 By “Maximum”
Cusa means not just the Plotinian “perfect simplicity” but also the antithesis to every
comparison, categorically to comparison itself, to every measure of grade and quantity,
an idea quite similar to that proposed in Plato’s Parmenides. This “Maximum” is set in
relatedness to the universe, which Cusa argues (thirty years before Copernicus and the
beginning of the scientific revolution) is indeterminate, with no fixed center. 316 The
absolute distance of the divine is a characteristic of its otherness; and the absolute
indeterminateness of the universe causes what Cusa terms “a crisis of
incommensurability,” to which only the practices of negative theology can effectively
respond. Cusa writes: “Sacred Ignorance has taught us that God is ineffable. And by
virtue of this fact, we speak of God more truly through removal and negation, as teaches
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Dionysius who did not believe that God is either Truth or understanding or Light or
anything which can be spoken of.” 317
Christ is in Cusa’s terms the “contracted maximal individual,” that is, he is God in
time, and the only instance of such (and is equal to the Father, who is the infinity of
oneness, by the unifying activity of the Holy Spirit). 318 The formulation is proposed
mathematically in On Learned Ignorance by way of geometric analogy. With this
formulation Cusa makes his (and arguably negative theology’s) culminating approach, in
unknowing, to a suggestion of God—a rigorous approximation. He explains: “the
intellect is to truth as the polygon is to the circle: just as the polygon, the more sides and
angles it has, approximates but never becomes a circle, even if one lets the sides and
angles multiply infinitely, so we know of the truth no more than that we cannot grasp it as
it is with any true precision.” 319

Threshold Poetry: Prayer and Act

In How Milton Works Stanley Fish writes, “In the end, the only value we can put on
Samson’s action is the value he gives it in context. Within that situation, it is an
expression, however provisional, of his reading of the divine will; and insofar as it
represents his desire to conform to that will, it is a virtuous action. No other standard for
evaluating it exists.” 320 It may be useful here to note that the title of the chapter in which
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this passage appears is “The Temptation of Understanding.” Fish’s critical purpose in the
chapter is obviously enough to demonstrate that the “temptation” that underlies Samson
Agonistes is the temptation to understand. (To extend Fish’s point I would suggest that
the very ground for human knowledge is divinely established as—and is paradoxically—
unknowing.) Fish concludes his argument thusly:
Along with the uncertainties, the difficulty of distinguishing between
inspiration and inclination, the softening of so many supposedly sharp
focuses, there coexists a strongly felt sense of cosmic order and regularity.
At every point, our inability to understand something is accompanied by a
conviction that if we only knew enough—that is, if we only were gods—it
could be understood. And while this may appear to be a contradiction, it is
in fact Milton’s triumph. For his purpose is not to deny the reality of a just
and benevolent God, but to suggest that we cannot infer his benevolence
or validate his justice from the known facts. 321
The underlying guarantor in all Milton’s work is exactly the reality and presence of a just
God, no matter how incomprehensible to humankind. As such, in Samson Agonistes the
point for Milton is not finally the death of the Philistines, but the accuracy of Samson’s
final act in terms of divine will.
If Samson is wrong in his evaluation of that will it does not follow that there
either is or is not a “reality of a just and benevolent God.” Further, even if Samson is
dead wrong, thus a murderer on all accounts, it does not follow that 1) he was not trying
to do the will of the divine, 2) that trying to do the will of the divine is itself categorically
wrong as a human activity, flowing from a human disposition, 3) that there either is or is
not any such thing as a just God. If the definition of Samson Agonistes as a tragedy
depends on one’s interpretation of the tragic genre, and then one’s interpretation of
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Samson’ final act, the designation of Samson Agonistes as a drama, depends upon what
one recognizes to be the source of its tragic power. In my view, the source lies not in the
final event, nor in Samson’s proposed hamartia, but in the related points that 1) a human
being, deluded or otherwise, attempted to do the will of the divine, 2) that such an
attempt is a legitimate activity regardless of outcome, 3) that there is (to Milton at least)
a just and benevolent God, 4) that the rightness of Samson’s act in terms of the will of the
divine can only ever be established (by the other characters in the drama, especially by
Manoa, and by the reader) by the persuasive rhetorical force of interpretation, and not by
any explicit and disclosed word from God, 5) that all such interpretations, beginning with
Samson’s interpretation of divine will, must be performed in a circumstance of terrible
and terrifying obscurity, and 6) that to do so—to interpret so to choose—is for Milton a
requirement of his faith.
What I am suggesting here is a reading that asserts the validity of elements within
both the traditional (“heroic”) and the counter-traditional (“anti-heroic”) interpretations
of Samson Agonistes, and negotiates the apparent impasse between them by reorienting
both interpretations in terms of unknowing. In effect this reading accords with the
counter-traditional argument that the poem is about unknowability of divine will, but also
returns to a kind of regenerationist reading by emphasizing that Samson’s heroic status, if
it is there, follows from the necessity of choosing nonetheless; that is, of still making the
decisive choice in a situation of terrible uncertainty. As John Shawcross put it: “The text
does not question the benevolence of ‘highest wisdom,’ it questions human understanding
of that wisdom and of the demands put upon humankind to uphold its covenant with its
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God.” 322 In brief, Samson is blind and bound, and bound again to be obedient to the will
of the divine, even if that will will not be disclosed.
Milton’s response to such a predicament is itself an act of interpretation, one that
utilizes negative theology to reorient the human condition (as dramatized by Samson)
from uncertainty (the predicament) to a necessary—thus in the Christian point of view
potentially obedient—condition of unknowing. Negative theology points continually to
the interpretive dilemma inherent in any and all attempts to describe or recall divine will,
and divine will in relation to human will. The term “unknowing” designates both
conceptual affinity with apophasis and practical differentiation from apophasis. Miltonic
unknowing does begin with the apophatic recognition of the ineffability of the divine,
and as Noam Reisner has demonstrated, Milton recurs to the idea of the ineffability of the
divine throughout his work. 323 However, Miltonic unknowing is more than a mere
recognition of the ineffability of the divine. Unknowing is Milton’s visionary refiguration of the existential condition of uncertainty into the necessary condition for
obedience.
To say that unknowing is for Milton the necessary condition for obedience is to
say that for Milton obedience must be understood in the frame of unknowing, and is only
efficacious in that frame. It is the necessary condition for obedience because outside of
this condition there can be no obedience, but only subjugation or delusion. So, outside
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the condition of obedience is akin to outside Eden. Both states of being produce exile. In
this way, obedience serves as the postlapsarian equivalent to Eden, as an internalized
abstraction recalling the lost space of Eden. In other words, what was literal as a place—
Eden—becomes, after the fall, figurative as a condition. Efficacy of obedience indicates
that the necessary condition is in place.
As the necessary condition for obedience, unknowing becomes dispositional,
recollecting Eve and Adam’s prelapsarian disposition of wonder. 324 So Miltonic
unknowing is not only the necessary condition for obedience, but the necessary condition
which instantiates a disposition, which in turn becomes a continual referent, the point of
orientation. So Miltonic unknowing is a condition, thus a disposition, thus an orientation.
As such unknowing directs every moment of choosing in terms of obedience, the human
will in its will to interpretation of divine will.
As Christopher Hill and others have noted, Samson’s condition recalls the close
of Paradise Lost. It does so because for Milton the condition of unknowing is the
condition for all humankind after the fall: 325
The world was all before them, where to choose
Their place of rest, and providence their guide:
They hand in hand with wand’ring steps and slow,
Through Eden took their solitary way.
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(12.646-48)
Paradise Lost closes with the first steps out of Eden, and into the world after the fall,
whatever it is and wherever it leads. In brief, Adam and Eve don’t know where they’re
going or why, and have only the promise of “providence their guide” to direct them, and
their mutual support. Samson Agonistes begins with Samson, eyeless in Gaza (l.41),
stepping tentatively, “a little further on” (l.2). The anxiety informing Adam and Eve’s
first steps out of Eden has become in Samson’s steps exhaustion, guilt, and on the
threshold of sure defeat. Furthermore, Adam and Eve’s solitary way out of Eden has, it
turns out, led to Samson Agonistes’ world of “popular noise” (l.16). Retiring from it,
Samson finds himself at the mercy of his
restless thoughts, that like a deadly swarm
Of hornets armed, no sooner found alone,
But rush upon me thronging, and present
Time past, what once I was, and what am now.
(ll.19-22)
For Samson, the promise of his birth has become the source of his guilt; and his one false
choice (Dalila), a mirror to Raphael’s “other surety none.” And his guilt over what he
takes to be his single act of disobedience has become a kind of despair in the
interrogative mode: the questions are coming out of him, hurled henceforth at himself,
and also to the heavens. And all his questions are reducible to a Job-like “why?” 326 Why
has my life become what it is? And why am I who I am? And why am I who I am, given
who “once I was” (l.22)? The first question Samson asks is a lament:
Why was my breeding ordered and prescribed
As of a person separate to God,
Designed for great exploits if I must die
Betrayed, captive, and both my eyes put out,
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Made of my enemies the scorn and gaze,
To grind in brazen fetters under task
With this heav’n gifted strength?
(ll.30-36)
So Samson’s interrogation begins as an interrogation of his circumstance, and it would
seem that given the freight of his guilt his interrogation will continue as such, that is, as a
series of questions designed not to be responded to, but for the sole purpose of laceration.
“Whom have I to complain of but myself” (l.46)? This is not Samson asking Samson or
God or anyone else a question. This is Samson leveling an accusation, which it at first
appears he will then build into an irrefutable conviction of guilt. All he needs for that
conviction is the demonstration of his shameful weakness and its result, disobedience.
Speaking of the “gift of strength committed” (l.47) to him, Samson says:
How easily bereft me,
Under the seal of silence could not keep,
But weakly to a woman must reveal it,
Overcome with impotence and tears.
O impotence of mind, body strong!
(ll.48.52)
It is here with “O impotence of mind, body strong” that the nature of Samson’s
interrogation begins to change, first in its interpretative framework, thus in its intention.
For Samson is asking into the paradox of his life: Why was I given (by God) such
strength and not the mind to go with it? He does not have the answer to this question,
and there is nothing he did that he can point to as causing it. As a result, the efficacy of
his interrogation of his circumstance has come up against its interpretive limits. In this
exact moment, Samson’s interpretive framework ceases to be the interrogation of his
circumstance, and begins to become something else entirely, an acknowledgment of his
condition:
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But peace, I must not quarrel with the will
Of highest dispensation, which herein
Haply had ends above my reach to know.
(ll.60-63)
The condition he acknowledges in these lines is the condition of unknowing. There are
many questions still to come, many questions Samson will still express, but from lines
60-63 on, these questions are not as previously the interrogation but are articulated in the
interpretive framework of unknowing, and are thereby directed by the ultimate intention
of that framework—obedience to the will of the divine. As such, Samson’s blindness,
initially self-conceived as an emblem of his imprisonment and ignorance—“Eyeless in
Gaza at the mill with slaves”—becomes the emblem of his obedience, by being purely
denotative of obedience’s necessary condition, unknowing.
By the time Harapha comes to taunt, Samson is so oriented by this unknowing,
that his expressions of obedience echo the words of the Son to Satan in Paradise
Regained. Like Satan before him, Harapha boasts and threatens (ll.1092-103). Samson
replies: “Boast not of what thou wouldst have done, but do / What then thou wouldst”
(ll.1104-05). His reply recalls the Son’s “Think not but that I know these things, or think
/ I know them not” (PR 4.286-87). The first lines of each are exactly the same metrically.
Further, the meanings of both, as replies to taunts, do the same work. In the case of the
former: do or don’t do what you’re boasting of, it makes no difference to me. In the case
of the latter: think or don’t think what you want of me, it makes no matter. So, in
unknowing, Samson—potentially—becomes aligned with the obedience of the Son of
God. And it is possible he knows it. He claims to Harapha, in an upsurge of agency:
“My trust is in the living God who gave me / At my Nativity this strength” (ll.1140-41).
Here, Samson announces his disposition as obedience. So he announces himself as
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obedient. And soon after, conveniently or by dint of kairos Samson feels what the Son
felt before him: “I begin to feel” he says, “Some rousing motion in me which dispose / To
something extraordinary my thoughts” (ll.1381-83, emphasis added). As the Son in
Paradise Regained said: “And now by some strong motion I am led / into this wilderness,
to what intent / I learn not yet, perhaps I need not know” (PR 1.290-92, emphasis added).
Samson now feels himself aligned, his will synchronized with the will of the divine. As
Milton renders it, Samson is at this moment on the threshold of his singular moment, and
is echoing the Son. And there is only one thing left for Samson to do, one choice left to
make: in obedience to perform his violent prayer. From Samson’s perspective he is in
terms of his obedience to divine will as right as he can be. Thus, in terms of divine will,
he is either right or wrong. If Samson is a hero it is because he chooses in a situation of
unknowability, thus without knowledge of the rightness of his choice. Further, he
chooses as a martyr chooses—not his life, but his God. Samson’s last lines in the drama
begin, “Happen what may....” He is already calm of mind. “Happen what may, of me
expect to hear / Nothing dishonorable, impure, unworthy / Our God, our law, my nation,
or myself, / The Last of me or no I cannot warrant” (SA ll.1423-26, emphasis added). If
Milton’s Samson is indeed a hero of faith it is because his long trial in unknowing has
made him first a hero of doubt.
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CONCLUSION
THE USES OF DARKNESS
On March 29, 1652, at 8:48 am, the sky above London went dark. 327 It went dark above
England generally. There was day, in terms of daylight, a day like any other. Then the
moon passed between the Earth and Sun and covered the Sun entirely. And then the Sun
could only be known as a distant glow emanating from behind what would have appeared
from any street in London as a black ball in a dark sky. It was a total solar eclipse, a
seamless darkness in the morning, in the Commonwealth of England. 328
Years later, Milton was perhaps thinking of or remembering the eclipse when he
composed Book 1 of Paradise Lost, first in his description of hell, “a darkness visible”
(PL 1.64), and then in his description of Satan. “He above the rest” Milton wrote
In shape and gesture proudly eminent
Stood like a tow’r; his form had not yet lost
All her original brightness, nor appeared
Less than Archangel ruined, and th’ excess
Of glory obscured: as when the sun new ris’n
Looks thorugh the horizontal misty air
Shorn of his beams, or from behind the moon
In dim eclipse disastrous twilight sheds
On half the nations, and with fear of change
Perplexes monarchs.
(PL 1.589-99, emphasis added)
Properly, the simile first extends at l.593 (“as when the sun new ris’n), and two lines later
offers the first of its two allusions, this one to Samson (“shorn of his beams”), a name
derived from the Hebrew shemesh, meaning sun. The second allusion follows the first
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(“in dim eclipse”). Further, in Paradise Regained poetic vestiges of the eclipse also
appear, this time neither in reference to possibly heroic humankind (Samson), nor to Hell,
but to the Son. In Book 2, Mary laments, “O what avails me now that high honor / To
have conceived of God” (PR 2.92-93). So she wonders, remembering how her (the) Son
disappeared from her when he was twelve:
I lost him, but so found, as well I saw
He could not lose himself; but went about
His Father’s business; what he meant I mused,
Since understand; much more his absence now
Thus long to some great purpose he obscures.
(PR 2.97-101)
From her, the Son is obscured, as the Sun in a solar eclipse is obscured. He is obscured
to all but the Father in Paradise Regained, and to Satan especially, whose fury to see the
Son (the punning equivalent of staring into the Sun) drives him to amplify his temptations
manically from a mere banquet to “The Kingdoms of the world” (PR 4.163). When
Satan tempts the Son with David’s throne, the Son responds in the vestigial language of
eclipse: “Know therefore when my season comes to sit / On David’s throne, it shall be
like a tree / Spreading and overshadowing all the Earth” (PR 4.146-48). He might have
said, as the eclipse that overshadowed all of London.
That eclipse, on Black Monday, March 29, lasted for nearly three hours. On the
streets of London, on the banks of the Thames, in the fields beyond London and the hills
beyond those fields, each Englishman and Englishwoman confronted a double task of
reading. Did the eclipse mean anything for human beings? This was the first task of
reading to be addressed, the first question to be responded to. If the eclipse did not mean
anything, then what did it mean that such a disquieting magnitude of dark did not mean
anything for human beings? If a portent, was it one of doom or of marvelous things to
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come? Or perhaps, to put it in terms less decisive if no less mysterious than portent, was
the eclipse a metaphor as yet unshaped by human minds? How people responded to the
eclipse—that is, interpreted the event—meant saying something about the present and
future state of the nation, and the present and future state of one’s soul. To bring the
point home: How would parents explain such seemingly aberrant morning darkness to
their children? All such explanations would be in their ways a referendum on the
meaning of being human, in England, in 1652.
There were prayers in the street. Sermons were preached. The day before the
eclipse, Fulk Bellers, “Master of Arts, and Preacher of the Gospel in the City of London,”
delivered a sermon at Paul’s Cross before the Lord Mayor and the city’s aldermen
entitled Jesus Christ the mysticall or Gospel sun, sometimes seemingly eclipsed, yet never
going down from his people: or Eclipses spiritualized (1652). 329 Nicholas Culpeper,
physician and astrologer, interpreted the eclipse along political lines in his Catastrophe
Magnatum: Or the Fall of Monarchie. A Caveat to Magistrates, deduced from the Eclipse
of the Sunne (1652). 330 And a doomful ballad appeared anonymously under the title,
England’s New Bell-Man: Ringing into all Peoples Ears Gods Dreadful Judgments to
this Land and Kingdom, Prognosticated by the great Eclipse of the Sun, March 29, 1652,
the strange effects to continue 1654, 1655, 1656, to the amazement of the whole world. 331
A little over a month before the eclipse, Milton in his capacity of Secretary of
Foreign Tongues, had written Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio (A Defense of the English
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People, customarily referred to as First Defense). Within weeks of its publication in
1651, complete blindness came down on him. On the morning of the eclipse then, Milton
would have been looking through a veil of double-darkness. The sun was eclipsed.
Milton’s eyesight had been eclipsed. And just as the solar eclipse could be seen as a
symbol for the troubles of the nation, the onset of Milton’s blindness could have been
seen as emblematic of the losses he sustained in the spring of 1652. (His enemies
interpreted his blindness as a divine judgment on his anti-monarchical polemic.) 332
Milton’s wife, Mary Powell, died in May three days after giving birth to Deborah. Six
weeks later, Milton’s infant son, John, died. And at the age of forty-three Milton found
himself a blind widower with three young daughters, and a governmental post the duties
of which were becoming—because of his blindness—increasingly difficult to execute.
Further, Milton, a proud man, now had to be led to Whitehall by the “guiding” hand of
his nephew. 333
What did all that was happening to him mean? More precisely, what meaning did
Milton make out of all that was happening to himself and to his nation? If Milton
despaired because of his blindness and the loss of his wife and his son, he re-interpreted
that feeling—with reason he chose his meaning—as the kind of humbling reserved for
prophets and seers, for God’s chosen instruments, and eventually turned that choice into
the making of his late poems. Just as the solar eclipse required interpretation, and in the
moment of interpretation became meaningful and that meaning extensive to the future, so
Milton’s situation required interpretation. In other words, there were critical
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interpretations for Milton to make in the personal, the political, and in the spiritual realm.
In all three realms, Milton made his interpretations, and of them, an over-arching
interpretation. That over-arching interpretation was Milton’s concept of obedience,
developed through all the years of his prose tracts, and rendered to full effect in the
theologically unified vision of Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained, and Samson Agonistes.
As I have sought to demonstrate over the course of this dissertation, Milton’s
obedience begins as a choice of interpretation, made to an ideal. The ideal is to be
obedient to the will of the divine. Once made, the choice requires the agency of
individual will. One must will what one chooses. If Milton had stopped here in his
consideration of obedience, his obedience would not be a concept, but merely a
prescription. But it is precisely the point that what Milton does not offer is a prescription
of obedience, but a visionary concept of it, so close to the Stoic insistence on selfsufficiency, so close to the Judaic insistence on Mosaic Law, so close to what we would
now call humanism, and yet not any of them. For Milton’s concept of obedience was the
product of a radical, seventeenth-century Christian Englishman, his Christianity radical
not only because of the force of his faith, but because of its idiosyncratic admixture of
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and its lifelong poetic and philosophical reliance on the
Classical tradition, any and all claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
The foundation of Milton’s obedience was scripture. From his reading,
interpretation, and use of scripture, Milton derived his definitional understanding of
obedience. That definition comprised the dictates of Mosaic Law and the prioritization of
Pauline conscience, itself a stoic inheritance. Milton then resolved the two in his
reformulation of purity, in most way reducible to Titus 1:15: “Unto the pure all things are
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pure.” Miltonic purity, as an expression of obedience, depends for its efficacy on
individual conscience. This is the case because for Milton, the Spirit of God makes itself
known in individual conscience, and individual conscience is the seat of reason. And it is
important here to recall that for Milton reason was indeed but choosing. By saying
“reason is but choosing” Milton implicitly rejected predestination in favor of a radical,
pressurizing estimation of free will. So that for Milton obedience to the will of God
requires free will, the activity of which is choosing. Without free will, and its activity of
choosing, obedience degrades to subjugation.
But how does one choose in a manner consistent with obedience? That is, how
does obedience actually work? Milton first fully confronted this question in 1634, in A
Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle. But the response he came up with then fell short, as
a misreading of chastity. As Milton formulated it in Masque, his obedience was a static
ideal, ill-suited if not downright irrelevant to living in the world, and all its clamor,
dispute, and beauty. By the time Milton addressed the question again, after years of
writing prose tracts in the service of a Revolution and then of a Commonwealth, he had
replaced his static figuration with a concept comprised of moving parts, and dependent
upon necessary conditions. In other words, he had come to articulate not only obedience
as a definitional ideal, but how it worked, and under what conditions. He had developed
not only an ideal understanding of it, but a mechanical and what we might call an ecotheological understanding of it, of the spiritual ecology necessary for obedience.
Milton derived his mechanism of obedience from the Greek concept kairos, and
from its poetic and philosophical legacy, to suggest right timing, the ability to recognize
moments of opening rightness and to act accordingly. He illustrated the perfect
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exemplum of right timing as the mechanism of obedience in the Son’s resistance to
Satan’s temptations, and then, in the Son’s stepping to, and standing on, the pinnacle.
For the necessary condition of obedience, Milton availed himself of the limited powers
and perceptual limitedness of human beings. It was a decisive interpretive choice for his
concept of obedience, and was made perhaps out of strict necessity. The course of the
world was uncertain, and one’s place in it was framed in and by that incertitude. In the
vernacular, there were no guarantees. For Milton, however, God was present. The
difficulty for Milton lay in the fact that God was both present and incomprehensible,
immediate in his sole command, and then again in the figure of the Son immediate in his
promise of redemption; but God did not and would not offer absolute verification of
choices made in the service of that sole command. Such verification redounded to
individual conscience, the agency of choosing, and the will to intend by one’s choosing to
be obedient to the will of the divine. God, being both before and beyond language, and
also the very generating logos itself, could not be known discursively. As such, the
grounds of all human choice—of the activity of free will—were in a strict way,
unknowable, and the condition for obedience, one of unknowing. Milton dramatized
unknowing to profound effect with Samson Agonistes.
With unknowing, Milton refigured the existential condition of uncertainty into the
necessary condition for obedience. With right timing, he illuminated an uncanny
mechanism by which to negotiate that condition, to make choices in that condition,
intended to be obedient to God. Importantly, this mechanism was, like the will of the
divine itself, not discursive. With right timing and unknowing Milton realized his
concept of obedience. Most strongly, it was for Milton a structure of being, a harmonic
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disposition intended to recollect, as much as can in this world be recollected, the
disposition of Adam and Even before the fall.
But to what end was Milton’s paramount valuation of obedience, and what was
the motive of that valuation? To what end in the everyday life of a nation and its people
did Milton intend his concept of obedience to serve? By the time he came to write his
late poems, was he just a blind, old, albeit formidably brilliant, sentimentalist—not only
for the Good Old Cause, but for Eden? Was he an exile twice, pushed by that exile to
imagine, if not a world in which he would feel finally at home, a disposition which
anticipated that world?
Here, we might imagine Milton as he was in the years immediately following the
eclipse—a blind man in the morning, an epic poet becoming, waiting for his nephew,
Edward Phillips, to lead him by the hand to Whitehall so he, Milton, could continue to
serve in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Tongues. Again and again blind Milton rose
to enter the noisome fray of the councils. If he did so because he believed—because he
had chosen—that to do so was to be obedient to the will of God, why did he think such
work, and his commitment to such work, synchronous with the will of God? If he
believed that obedience was the paramount value, and choosing the activity by which
individuals and nations collectively intended to be obedient to the will of the divine, why
did Milton choose what he chose?
Two years after the solar eclipse and the onset of total blindness, Milton
composed Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio Secunda (A Second Defence of the English
People, customarily referred to as Second Defence) in response to Regii sanguinis clamor
ad coelum…, published anonymously by Adrian Vlacq at The Hague, 1652. Having, in
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First Defense (1651), defended himself and his country against the attacks of Salmasius,
Milton now defended again, this time against the personal attacks and various libels of
Regii sanguinis. The tract begins with a declaration on the necessity of thanksgiving to
God. “In the whole life and estate of man,” Milton writes, “the first duty is to be grateful
to God and mindful of his blessings, and to offer particular and solemn thanks” (Yale
4:598). It is perhaps important to recall, immediately, that Second Defense was a polemic
written in the service of the state, and not a primer on Christian gratitude, or an extended
meditation on the ways and means of humankind’s relationship to God. But by
beginning the way he does, Milton implies that all work he undertakes in the civic sphere
follows from an orientation prior to that given by the civic sphere. He is indicating that
any service he renders to the state is a service rendered to God, and that this is
particularly the case in the present work (2Def), performed, if under duress, still with
“solemn thanks” to the divine. It is also important to note, that by beginning the way he
does, Milton rhetorically situates God with his cause. The gesture is both a polemical
strategy, and for Milton, always a prayer. In other words, Milton is implying, God is
with us, and also praying, God be with us. 334 With his opening declaration, Milton also
communicates that he considers the present task, a “blessing” of which he is indeed
“mindful.”
With such an opening strategy, one might find Milton dangerously close to
behaving like a proponent of theocracy. But Milton was, of course, anything but, as all
the prose tracts of the 1640’s and 50’s make clear, most especially his anti-prelatical
tracts. But how then, how can Milton adopt an opening strategy such as the one he
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utilizes for Second Defense, and at the same time not be a proponent of, but an opponent
of, any and all theocratic rule? The answer lies in the subject proper of Second Defense,
of the ideal Milton is writing in service of, both for himself and for England.
In the second paragraph of the tract, Milton poses a series of three successively
related, rhetorical questions. “For who,” he asks, “does not consider the glorious
achievements of his country as his own? But what can tend more to the honor and glory
of any country than the restoration of liberty both to civil life and to divine worship?
What nation, what state has displayed superior fortune or stouter courage in securing for
itself such liberty in either sphere?” (Yale 4:550). The subject of Second Defense, then,
is liberty. More specifically, it is about 1) the binding force of liberty, the “glorious
achievement” for a nation and its persons, each of whom may rightly consider the liberty
of England his or her own; 2) the binding force of liberty in terms of two necessarily
separated, yet intrinsically related spheres, the civic and the religious; and 3) England
(thus, following #1, Milton, and any other Englishman or woman who chose to thus
identify themselves) as the proven and durable exemplar of liberty. This last point,
Milton expands upon. “Being better instructed,” he writes, “and doubtless inspired by
heaven, they [the English people]
overcame all…obstacles with such confidence in their cause and such
strength of mind and courage that although they were indeed a multitude
in numbers, yet the lofty exaltation of their minds kept them from being a
mob. Britain herself, which was once called a land teeming with tyrants,
shall hereafter deserve the everlasting praise of all the ages as a country
where liberators flourish. The English people were not driven to unbridled
license by scorn for the laws or desecration of them. They were not
inflamed with the empty name of liberty by a false notion of virtue and
glory, or senseless emulation of the ancients. It was their purity of life and
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their blameless character which showed them the one direct road of
liberty. 335
(Yale 4:552, emphasis added).
Milton announces his cause, in ideal terms. Having done so, he is now ready to respond
directly to the attacks made by the anonymous author of Regii sanguinis. Of these
attacks, the most personal were those leveled at Milton’s appearance. 336 And the most
personal of these, were those leveled at Milton’s blindness—a deprivation of sight
divinely willed, in the anonymous author’s formulation.
Just as on March 29, 1652, English women and men had to decide what to make
of the cosmic poetry of the solar eclipse, so too Milton had to decide what to make of his
blindness. Ultimately, what Milton made of his blindness was his concept of obedience,
and his late poems. But it was the publication of Regii sanguinis, and the attacks therein
(like Harapha’s taunts of Samson), that gave Milton his first occasion—a moment of
opening rightness—as a thinker and poet, to respond to his blindness, to interpret it.
“Would that it were equally possible,” Milton writes, “to refute this brutish adversary on
the subject of my blindness, but it is not possible. Let me bear it then” (Yale 4:584).
Here, if we could hear thought gathering itself in the space between sentences, in the
space between “let me bear it then” and the sentences that follow, we would hear all
Milton’s thought gathering itself into the single brightness of a choice: “Let me bear it
then. Not blindness but the inability to endure blindness is a source of misery. Why
should I not bear that which every man ought to prepare himself to bear with equanimity,
if it befall him—that which I know may humanly befall any mortal?” (Yale 4:584). His
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choice is a willed interpretation of his predicament—blindness. He then elaborates what
that choice means in Christian terms:
May I be entirely helpless, provided that in my weakness there may arise
all the more powerfully this immortal and more perfect strength; provided
that in my shadows the light of the divine countenance may shine forth all
the more clearly. For then I shall be at once the weakest and the strongest,
at the same time blind and most keen in vision. By this infirmity may I be
perfected, by this completed. So in this darkness, may I be clothed in
light.
(Yale 4:590)
The choice once made, resolution follows. That resolution is, as Milton writes, “to risk
the greatest dangers for the sake of liberty” (Yale 4:591).
To return then to the question: to what end did Milton intend his concept of
obedience to serve? The answer is liberty. He valued obedience for the sake of liberty,
for himself and for his country. For Milton, to be obedient to the will of God meant to be
always attendant to the prospect of liberty. In everything he wrote, Milton sang beneath
“the sole command” for the sake of liberty, as he understood it. And so, everything
written in this dissertation—this prolonged attempt to understand Milton’s concept of
obedience—might be reconsidered, re-approached, and rewritten, in liberty’s terms, if not
for liberty’s sake.
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